In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Gautier, A; Paolini, Dimitri. - In: ECONOMICS BULLETIN. - ISSN 1545-2921. - 29:(2009), pp. 2693-2702.
Delegation, externalities and organizational design
PAOLINI, Dimitri
2009-01-01
Abstract
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.File in questo prodotto:
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