In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Gautier, A; Paolini, Dimitri. - In: ECONOMICS BULLETIN. - ISSN 1545-2921. - 29:(2009), pp. 2693-2702.

Delegation, externalities and organizational design

PAOLINI, Dimitri
2009

Abstract

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter- agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11388/84125
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact