ABSTRACT. This note makes a contribution to the issue raised by Popper nad Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive.
When Probabilistic Support is Inductive / Mura, A.M.. - In: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. - ISSN 0031-8248. - 57:(1990), pp. 278-289. [10.1086/289548]
When Probabilistic Support is Inductive
MURA, Alberto Mario
1990-01-01
Abstract
ABSTRACT. This note makes a contribution to the issue raised by Popper nad Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
