Here, we address the phenomenology of visual objects, using verbal reports, spontaneous descriptions, answers to questions and responses to sug- gestions, as well as free associations. We occasionally ask for simple sketches. Such methods allow probing of the deep structure of visual awareness. This is above all revealed by what is not spontaneously mentioned, or is only men- tioned by way of incidental properties. It is also disclosed by changes induced by minor variations or additions. We find remarkable agreement over a large number of participants. Thus verbal reports are a powerful probe of visual structure. Similarly to language, “simple visual objects” have deep roots in subsidiary awareness. These “invisible” foundations serve to define simple fi- gures, like a “square”, as unique, prototypical objects. The nature of “visual objects” thus involves an extensive “invisible” realm. Without taking this into account, a proper understanding of the nature of the visual object is not pos- sible. Finally, this should lead to a formal syntactical theory of basic visual shapes.
The phenomenology of the invisible: From visual syntax to “shape from shapes” / Pinna, Baingio; Koenderink, J; van Doorn, A.. - In: PHILOSOPHIA SCIENTIAE. - ISSN 1281-2463. - 19:3(2015), pp. 5-29.
The phenomenology of the invisible: From visual syntax to “shape from shapes”
PINNA, Baingio
;
2015-01-01
Abstract
Here, we address the phenomenology of visual objects, using verbal reports, spontaneous descriptions, answers to questions and responses to sug- gestions, as well as free associations. We occasionally ask for simple sketches. Such methods allow probing of the deep structure of visual awareness. This is above all revealed by what is not spontaneously mentioned, or is only men- tioned by way of incidental properties. It is also disclosed by changes induced by minor variations or additions. We find remarkable agreement over a large number of participants. Thus verbal reports are a powerful probe of visual structure. Similarly to language, “simple visual objects” have deep roots in subsidiary awareness. These “invisible” foundations serve to define simple fi- gures, like a “square”, as unique, prototypical objects. The nature of “visual objects” thus involves an extensive “invisible” realm. Without taking this into account, a proper understanding of the nature of the visual object is not pos- sible. Finally, this should lead to a formal syntactical theory of basic visual shapes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.