Previdenza e Fiscalità delle Stock Option in Italia: una fonte di Rischio e di Incertezza

This paper investigates, in a theoretical framework, the consequences of the new tax and welfare regime of directors’ compensation introduced in Italy. More specifically it will address the equity-based compensation. Given the optimal compensation contract which should be able to attract the right executives at the lowest cost, retain them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time), and motivate them to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value, the innovations introduced in terms of directors’ pay welfare and fiscal treatment are very likely to negatively influence the firm’s capability to appoint and retain the right directors in an increasingly global job market. Moreover, since firms which have traditionally rewarded their directors with stock options now incur additional costs tied to the exercise policy, which are completely unpredictable, the forecast of firms’ performance results are very likely to lose reliability. In conclusion, what the accounting reform of equity-based remuneration, whose latest elements are represented by the inclusion of the IFRS2 among the IAS, was aimed at (i.e. suppressing the bias in firms accounting results due to the use of stock options), is likely to be nullified by the fiscal and welfare reform of directors’ remuneration.

Il presente contributo fornisce una visione organica della normativa fiscale e previdenziale vigente per i compensi percepiti dagli amministratori. Alla luce delle innovazioni introdotte in materia, sono inoltre evidenziate le difficoltà di tipo competitivo e di stima dei risultati reddituali prospettici che le imprese, che fanno ricorso agli strumenti retributivi a base azionaria, si troveranno con ogni probabilità a dovere affrontare.