I will start from the assumption that the so-called various human sciences are part of a single, albeit articulated, science of history. I will show the two crucial theoretical moves that gave rise to this science of history: The affirmation of the centrality of the category of reproduction and the theory of the (human) subject as effect. We find both moments in the work of Karl Marx, which made it possible to understand the object of the science of history (i.e. the human) as a whole articulated in dominance (Althusser), where the economic dimension is determining only in the last instance. I will show that by considering the human in this way, we can avoid the “short-circuit” (with its negative consequences) caused in the human sciences by the correspondence between subject and object of knowledge. To this end, it is important to understand the specific role of philosophy, of which I will propose a precise definition, distinguishing a critical from an ideological one. Critical philosophy actively participates in the science of history by remaining a philosophy. I will then conclude that the science of history needs critical philosophy as much as critical philosophy needs the science of history.
Storia, Scienza della storia, filosofia. Storia, Scienza della storia, filosofia. Riflessioni su una possibile articolazione / Ghisu, Sebastiano. - In: GIORNALE CRITICO DI STORIA DELLE IDEE. - ISSN 2035-732X. - 30:2/2023(2023), pp. 91-101. [10.53129/gcsi_02-2023-07]
Storia, Scienza della storia, filosofia. Storia, Scienza della storia, filosofia. Riflessioni su una possibile articolazione
ghisu
2023-01-01
Abstract
I will start from the assumption that the so-called various human sciences are part of a single, albeit articulated, science of history. I will show the two crucial theoretical moves that gave rise to this science of history: The affirmation of the centrality of the category of reproduction and the theory of the (human) subject as effect. We find both moments in the work of Karl Marx, which made it possible to understand the object of the science of history (i.e. the human) as a whole articulated in dominance (Althusser), where the economic dimension is determining only in the last instance. I will show that by considering the human in this way, we can avoid the “short-circuit” (with its negative consequences) caused in the human sciences by the correspondence between subject and object of knowledge. To this end, it is important to understand the specific role of philosophy, of which I will propose a precise definition, distinguishing a critical from an ideological one. Critical philosophy actively participates in the science of history by remaining a philosophy. I will then conclude that the science of history needs critical philosophy as much as critical philosophy needs the science of history.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.