How existential dependence can ground existential grounding

Schnieder (2020) argues, against Orilia (2009) and Koslicki (2013), that claims of existential grounding of the form “the fact that 𝑥 exists is grounded in the fact that 𝑦 is 𝐹” cannot be grounded in claims of existen- tial dependence of the form “𝑥 existentially depends on 𝑦” and defends the view that the latter claims are grounded in the former, via a definition of existential dependence. I will first argue that Schnieder’s main point against the claim that existential grounding is grounded in existential de- pendence is not conclusive. I will then put forward a proposal concerning how claims of existential grounding can be grounded in claims of existen- tial dependence. The proposal is a third way between those of Schnieder and Orilia/Koslicki, which, although accepting the former’s definition of existential dependence in terms of grounding, makes room for the latter’s idea that existential dependence does the real job of structuring reality.