This paper deals with the proposal, which has been recently advanced by the Finnish moral philosopher Joona Räsänen, that we should allow to change their legal age those people whose emotional and biological age does not match their chronological age, because legal age change would easily prevent, stop, or reduce severe forms of dicrimination by age they would otherwise face. I first address Räsänen’s argument as presupposing that chronological age is just a proxy in comparison to emotional and biological age, which are thought as variables making available more relevant and accurate information. I show how it is that this presupposition is deeply flawed. I then consider Räsänen’s argument as purified from this presupposition. I argue that the purified version of the argument supports the position that we should concede whatever legal age change to anyone who asks for it. Such a position, however, is hardly tenable, if for no other reason than because it is a slippery slope leading to an unbearable version of the law of the strongest – that is, the law of the strongest at substituting real with unreal and lucrative facts. I conclude that Räsänen’s argument is defective anyhow, and his proposal must be rejected until proven otherwise.

La Questione del Cambio di Età Legale (The Legal Age Change Case) / Bacchini, Fabio. - In: NOTIZIE DI POLITEIA. - ISSN 1128-2401. - (2022).

La Questione del Cambio di Età Legale (The Legal Age Change Case)

bacchini, fabio
2022

Abstract

This paper deals with the proposal, which has been recently advanced by the Finnish moral philosopher Joona Räsänen, that we should allow to change their legal age those people whose emotional and biological age does not match their chronological age, because legal age change would easily prevent, stop, or reduce severe forms of dicrimination by age they would otherwise face. I first address Räsänen’s argument as presupposing that chronological age is just a proxy in comparison to emotional and biological age, which are thought as variables making available more relevant and accurate information. I show how it is that this presupposition is deeply flawed. I then consider Räsänen’s argument as purified from this presupposition. I argue that the purified version of the argument supports the position that we should concede whatever legal age change to anyone who asks for it. Such a position, however, is hardly tenable, if for no other reason than because it is a slippery slope leading to an unbearable version of the law of the strongest – that is, the law of the strongest at substituting real with unreal and lucrative facts. I conclude that Räsänen’s argument is defective anyhow, and his proposal must be rejected until proven otherwise.
La Questione del Cambio di Età Legale (The Legal Age Change Case) / Bacchini, Fabio. - In: NOTIZIE DI POLITEIA. - ISSN 1128-2401. - (2022).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11388/254008
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