This essay first takes into consideration the Kantian distinction between “ostensiveµ and “apagogicµ proofs. Then it relies on a page of Kant’s Prolegomena and on the 9th Chapter of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione in order to conclude that the apagogic inferences – which are based on the Principle of the Excluded Middle – could be produced only if an impossible condition was fulfilled. Likewise, the essay also shows – by referring to Kant’s pre-critical work Nova Dilucidatio, written in 1755 – that the ostensive proofs inevitably get caught in a vicious circle. The following overall conclusion is finally drawn: the whole rationalist tradition, as it is based on the idea that the truth must be demonstrable in order to be such, should be put into question: as a result, rational procedures such as proving, demonstrating and arguing show themselves to belong to the terrain of the opinion rather than to the dimension of the truth.
Scheda prodotto non validato
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo
|Titolo:||L'impegno per la verità. Argomentazione, dimostrazione, prova.|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|