The evolution of large-scale cooperation among strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that the so-called strong reciprocity plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation without punishment is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisonerâs dilemma framework where punishment (âstickâ) and rewarding (âcarrotâ) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who donât punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means âpunishing defectorsâ and, even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers do not perish if cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an extended notion of strong reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation that overlook the âdark sideâ of altruistic behavior.
Punish and perish? / Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca. - In: RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY. - ISSN 1043-4631. - 27:2(2015), pp. 195-223. [10.1177/1043463115576138]
Punish and perish?
ANTOCI, Angelo;
2015-01-01
Abstract
The evolution of large-scale cooperation among strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that the so-called strong reciprocity plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation without punishment is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisonerâs dilemma framework where punishment (âstickâ) and rewarding (âcarrotâ) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who donât punish in the population makes altruistic punishment evolutionarily weak. We show that cooperation breaks down and strong reciprocity is maladaptive if costly punishment means âpunishing defectorsâ and, even more so, if it is coupled with costly rewarding of cooperators. In contrast, punishers do not perish if cooperators, far from being rewarded, are sanctioned. These results, based on an extended notion of strong reciprocity, challenge evolutionary explanations of cooperation that overlook the âdark sideâ of altruistic behavior.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.