Indifference towards the legal interest is a defining feature of alternative intent and aberratio ictus – the concepts at the heart of the judgment in question – and is also characteristic of general intent and indirect intent. This essay examines the actual substance of this concept, highlights its semantic and substantive weaknesses, observes its instrumental function in specific contexts, and thus affirms its inability to express the content of intent. The instrumental use of indifference, and of the forms of intent into which it creeps, is accompanied by the aim of simplifying the burden of proof, which affects not only the structure but also, and at the same time, the object of intent: by impoverishing the object, the representational aspect is in turn impoverished and, consequently, the basis of the volitional aspect. Not even the homogeneity of the protected legal interest is capable of lending substance to indifference, since one can at best concede that such insensitivity is a mere emotional phase in the run-up to the conscious choice that represents the true essence of intent.
L’indifferenza nei confronti del bene giuridico contraddistingue il dolo alternativo e l’aberratio ictus, figure oggetto della sentenza in commento, e caratterizza anche il dolo generale e il dolo indiretto. Il saggio indaga l’effettiva consistenza di tale concetto, ne pone in evidenza la debolezza semantica e contenutistica, ne osserva la funzione strumentale in ambiti specifici e afferma dunque la sua incapacità a esprimere il contenuto del dolo. L’utilizzo strumentale dell’indifferenza, e delle figure di dolo in cui si insinua, si accompagna alla finalità di semplificazione probatoria, che agisce non solo sulla struttura ma anche e insieme sull’oggetto del dolo: impoverendo l’oggetto si impoverisce a sua volta il momento rappresentativo e di conseguenza la base del momento volitivo. Nemmeno l’omogeneità del bene giuridico tutelato è in grado di assegnare spessore alla indifferenza, potendosi concedere al più che tale insensibilità sia un semplice passaggio emotivo in vista della scelta consapevole che rappresenta la vera essenza del dolo.
Dal dolo alternativo all'aberratio ictus: critica dell'indifferenza come contenuto del dolo / Demuro, G.. - In: DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO. - ISSN 2240-7618. - 1/2026:(2026), pp. 15-37.
Dal dolo alternativo all'aberratio ictus: critica dell'indifferenza come contenuto del dolo
gian paolo demuro
2026-01-01
Abstract
Indifference towards the legal interest is a defining feature of alternative intent and aberratio ictus – the concepts at the heart of the judgment in question – and is also characteristic of general intent and indirect intent. This essay examines the actual substance of this concept, highlights its semantic and substantive weaknesses, observes its instrumental function in specific contexts, and thus affirms its inability to express the content of intent. The instrumental use of indifference, and of the forms of intent into which it creeps, is accompanied by the aim of simplifying the burden of proof, which affects not only the structure but also, and at the same time, the object of intent: by impoverishing the object, the representational aspect is in turn impoverished and, consequently, the basis of the volitional aspect. Not even the homogeneity of the protected legal interest is capable of lending substance to indifference, since one can at best concede that such insensitivity is a mere emotional phase in the run-up to the conscious choice that represents the true essence of intent.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


