Le funzioni amministrative della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Profili critici e prospettive.

The thesis examines the administrative functions of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PCM) in the Italian administrative system, tracing its historical evolution, organizational structure, operational expansion, and critical implications. It highlights a long-term trend where the PCM, constitutionally tasked with directing, promoting, and coordinating ministerial activities under Article 95 of the Italian Constitution, has progressively assumed direct management roles in complex public policies, shifting from a lightweight staff model to an operational "super-ministry." This "administrative drift" stems from historical weaknesses, unresolved tensions between monocratic leadership, collegiality, and ministerial autonomy, and incremental legislative adaptations like Law 400/1988 and Legislative Decree 303/1999. The first chapter reconstructs the PCM's development from the Statuto Albertino era through fascism, the minimalist post-1948 phase, to modern reforms, identifying a persistent "constitutional dilemma" between a "little cabinet" (staff-oriented) and a French-style ministerial model. Key milestones include failed early strengthening attempts (e.g., Ricasoli Decree 1867), fascist centralization, the 1988 law's rationalization, and the 1999 decree's "variable geometry" framework, which institutionalized flexibility but failed to curb functional hypertrophy. Chapter II analyses the PCM's unique structure: a General Secretariat for coordination, policy-oriented departments (e.g., European Policies), temporary mission units, and strained relations with ministries, particularly the Economy Ministry. Personnel issues—heterogeneous staffing, spoils system extensions, and inefficiencies—exacerbate its hybrid identity, blending political impulse with active administration. Chapter III details the shift to direct administration via inter-ministerial committees and case studies: COVID-19 emergency management, EU funds governance (PNRR), and migration policies, revealing substitution for sectoral ministries due to coordination failures. Metrics like duration, spending authority, and platform control distinguish physiological acceleration from pathological overreach. Chapter IV critiques consequences: erosion of collegiality and ministerial responsibility, opacity in accountability, tensions with territorial autonomies, and judicial acquiescence. It proposes organizational (e.g., sunset clauses for missions) and operational remedies (e.g., clearer directives, enhanced traceability) without prescriptive solutions, questioning if recent practices herald a "fifth phase" of meta-management.