Conditional sentences: truth conditions and probability

This dissertation supports a partial semantics for conditional statements, which wants to be a middle way between the idea conditionals have not truth conditions and that they always are true or false.Adams showed an important intuitive result, called “Equation”, according to which the probability of a conditional is its conditional probability. In a first moment the Equation was satisfied by Stalnaker’s theory, but Lewis 1975 showed—by the Triviality Result—the incompatibility between the assumption that the probability of a proposition is the probability it is true and the Equation. Consequently, supporting Stalnaker’s semantic means to reject Adams’ logic—and vice versa.In front of Lewis’ result, Adams concluded conditionals do not have truth conditions, suggesting a non-propositional view. Contrary, Stalnaker proposed to consider conditional sentences as standard propositions, giving up the Equation such as a general satisfied principle.With the intent to hold the Equation—and Adams’ logic—without denying conditionals have any kind of truth conditions, the dissertation analyzes Alberto Mura’s proposal—the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents. It concerns a semantic built on de Finetti’s three-valued logic with the intent to avoid Lewis’ result, incorporating Adams’ logic and extending it to every trievent. Demonstrating that every trievent is simple, Mura tried to provide a theory able to deal with bothsimpleand compound conditionals.