Diritto penale e neuroscienze: una riflessione su limiti e prospettive

The present doctoral dissertation aims at examining the coordinates of the debate centered on the penal repercussions deriving from empirical evidence of neuroscientific nature. Identifying the right perspectives and the inherent limits of interaction between these two different fields of research required the realization of an interdisciplinary paper. For this purpose, a preliminary indepth analysis of various related scientific, philosophic and legal matters was necessary. The consequent analysis of our national legal landscape highlighted that on the one hand judges were extremely cautious when using neuroscientific evidence during trials, while on the other hand it appeared that judgment of imputability is neuroscience’s primary privileged interlocutor in the field of substantive law. The cautious approach observed within the legal doctrine is fully endorsed by the undersigned, and even though a reformulation of criminal law on neuroscientific basis is impossible, the objective value of cognitive data deriving from neuroscience is perfectly clear. For this reason, it is hoped that a cautious and fruitful dialogue between these two fields of knowledge will continue.