This article focuses on the use of administrative orders and Security Pacts in Italy between 2007 and 2009, both of them considered as top-down instruments used by the public authorities for governing crime at urban and local level. The instrument known as Security Pacts was introduced in Italy on March 20th, 2007, with the Law No 296/2006, art. 1 par. 439 (2007 Financial Act). Prefects were granted the power to undersign agreements with the elected local authorities, for the implementation of coordinated surveillance territorial plans and the strengthening of the logistic, instrumental and financial collaboration between the Government and the above local authorities. In the same years, the city mayors were also allowed by the Legislative Decree No 267/2000, art. 54 (as amended by Decree-Law No 92/2008 and converted into Law No 125/2008) to address a wide range of urban security issues using the so-called administrative orders, in order to prevent and fight serious hazards threatening public safety. This paper will then explore the spread, the geographical distribution, the content and the difference among the aforementioned practices. By definition, Pacts are in fact used for “negotiation” and “accommodation” between possibly divergent interests, in a “long term bargaining game”, while the municipal orders are instead a more “direct”, “urgent”, and “for use in emergency” instrument in the hands of the Mayor as governmental official. It is therefore questionable whether those two top-down instruments are entirely incompatible and/or mutually exclusive, or vice versa they were considered by public administrations as compatible and convergent, despite the conditions referred to above. In the conclusion, this paper will also try to analyze the level of uniformity and mimetic isomorphism achieved by the two different top-down instruments, and their impact on local public policies in Italy for the indicated period.

The Top-down Instruments for Governing Crime: the Italian Experience between Administrative Orders and Security Pacts (2007-2009) / Calaresu M. - (2014), pp. 82-84. ((Intervento presentato al convegno 14th European Society of Criminology (ESC) Annual Conference tenutosi a Prague, Czech Republic nel 10-13 September 2014.

The Top-down Instruments for Governing Crime: the Italian Experience between Administrative Orders and Security Pacts (2007-2009)

CALARESU, Marco
2014

Abstract

This article focuses on the use of administrative orders and Security Pacts in Italy between 2007 and 2009, both of them considered as top-down instruments used by the public authorities for governing crime at urban and local level. The instrument known as Security Pacts was introduced in Italy on March 20th, 2007, with the Law No 296/2006, art. 1 par. 439 (2007 Financial Act). Prefects were granted the power to undersign agreements with the elected local authorities, for the implementation of coordinated surveillance territorial plans and the strengthening of the logistic, instrumental and financial collaboration between the Government and the above local authorities. In the same years, the city mayors were also allowed by the Legislative Decree No 267/2000, art. 54 (as amended by Decree-Law No 92/2008 and converted into Law No 125/2008) to address a wide range of urban security issues using the so-called administrative orders, in order to prevent and fight serious hazards threatening public safety. This paper will then explore the spread, the geographical distribution, the content and the difference among the aforementioned practices. By definition, Pacts are in fact used for “negotiation” and “accommodation” between possibly divergent interests, in a “long term bargaining game”, while the municipal orders are instead a more “direct”, “urgent”, and “for use in emergency” instrument in the hands of the Mayor as governmental official. It is therefore questionable whether those two top-down instruments are entirely incompatible and/or mutually exclusive, or vice versa they were considered by public administrations as compatible and convergent, despite the conditions referred to above. In the conclusion, this paper will also try to analyze the level of uniformity and mimetic isomorphism achieved by the two different top-down instruments, and their impact on local public policies in Italy for the indicated period.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11388/135505
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