In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.

Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Paolini, Dimitri; Gautier, Axel. - 2007:10(2007), p. 5.

Delegation, externalities and organizational design

Paolini, Dimitri;
2007-01-01

Abstract

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.
2007
Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Paolini, Dimitri; Gautier, Axel. - 2007:10(2007), p. 5.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11388/264639
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