In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.
Delegation, externalities and organizational design / Paolini, Dimitri; Gautier, Axel. - 2007:10(2007), p. 5.
Delegation, externalities and organizational design
Paolini, Dimitri;
2007-01-01
Abstract
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.File in questo prodotto:
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