This article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker’s bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.
Screening and short-term contracts / Paolini, Dimitri. - 2008:19(2008), p. 16.
Screening and short-term contracts
Paolini, Dimitri
2008-01-01
Abstract
This article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker’s bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Paolini_D_Working_Paper_2008_Screening.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Versione editoriale (versione finale pubblicata)
Licenza:
Non specificato
Dimensione
312.35 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
312.35 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
