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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME AND ADULT-CHILD POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS.

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INTRODUCTION

The concepts of “adulthood “ and “childhood” are anchored in fundamental temporal otherness of children perceived by adults. Adult's and child's temporalities are only partially overlapped and their relationship unfolds in the moment of overlap, when the concentration of powers of the past and for the future, which adult and child respectively “possess”, is particularly unequal.[1] The adult can be perceived as an owner of a longer time lived (past), accumulated in experience and knowledge legitimizing adult authority. The child, on the other hand, has more of “unrealised” time, more time left and a longer future in which to act. Consequently, “what one loses in might, one gains in authority. To be mighty is to have more time left, to be authoritative is to have more time past.”[2] There's an unpredictable time in the future adults cannot access directly, only influence it via the didactic messages, asking the child to carry the task into another temporality which is out of adult power.

Education is a field of social life where children are treated as sites of investment, as human becomings- 'passive', 'active' or 'without end'. Future-oriented concerns underlie developmental 'becoming prospective' on children lives', which is being replaced with a 'being prospective' in the new sociology of childhood paradigm, where children participation and agency are of major importance.[3] Recently the new consideration emerged within the new sociology of childhood, where 'being' and 'becoming' discourses must be conceptualized together in a complimentary

1 Beauvais, C. (2015) *The mighty child: Time and power in children’s literature.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins: 6.
2 Ibid.
3 Qvortup, J., Bardy, M., Sgritta, G. and Wintersberger, H. (1994)(Eds) *Childhood Matters,* Aldershot, Avebury.

way.[4] James and Prout[5] argue that the social construction of time may be fruitful for the study of childhood, considering the centrality of time to developmental psychological concepts, distribution of power, furthermore, to control children's time and to order children lives.

4 Warming, H. (2013) *Participation, Citizenship and Trust in children's lives* : Palgrave Macmillan; Uprichard, E. (2008) *Children as Being and Becomings: Children, childhood and temporality*, Children and Society, 22(4): 303-313.
5 James, A. & A. Prout (1997) *Constructing and Re-constructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*, London, Falmer Press.

CHAPTER 1. TIME AND POWER

1.1. Theoretical perspectives on time

> Most things that can be possessed—diamonds, gold, hundred-dollar bills —can be replenished. New diamond and gold deposits are discovered, and new bills are printed. Such is not the case with time. Nothing that any of us does in this life will allow us to accrue a moment's more time, and nothing will allow us to regain time misspent. Once time has passed, it is gone forever.
>
> *Philip Zimbardo, The time paradox*[6]

Time and temporality are frequently implicit components of social theories, even when there's little or no attempt to problematize time and examine temporal context. Time offers potentially fertile territory in theories of social change, social mobility, cultural lag, life course and life cycle, careers, planning, narrative, biography, collective memory and childhood studies.

Nineteenth century social science paid a lot of attention to the question of how societies evolve in an attempt to understand and predict the vector of development of European society. Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Spencer all elaborated teleological theories of the stages of societal development in which time is a taken-for-granted dimension. Social mobility theories appeal to time as either a measure of movement in social space. Cultural lag theories are based on a temporal dimensions of change. Studies of information and innovation dissemination, link social space and time. Time and temporality are implicit in investigations of collective memory, narratives, and network dynamics. Life

6 Zimbardo, P., and Boyd, J. (2009). *The time paradox: The new psychology of time that will change your life.* New York, NY: Free Press.

course, life cycle, and career theories study human lives unfolding in time. Time is an indispensable background component of childhood studies largely.

Time is in the first place an order relation between events, allowing us to specify whether an event A came either before or after an event B. In classical physics (mechanics), time and space are closely associated and therefore everything else, like speed, velocity, that is, the change of location of a subject is defined by them. Above all, Isaac Newton influenced the definition of time and space and the correlation of the two. In his *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* he depicts time as something absolute, which would flow invariable without any relation to any kind of external subject.[7] This view dominated mathematics and philosophy until Einstein's *Theory of Relativity* was published in 1905. Relativity theory has revolutionized Newtonian notion of a complete or linear order of physical time by noting that sometimes the order of events cannot be determined:

> When A occurs outside of the light cone passing through B (which means that it is impossible to send a signal from B that arrives in A or vice-versa), then the temporal order between A and B is indeterminate. For some observers, A will appear to be in the future of B, for others in the past, or in the present. In general, we may say that A and B cannot be ordered absolutely. Therefore, according to relativity theory the order of time is only partial.[8]

Social theorists' and psychologists' writings generally share the relativistic perspective on time and agree that inner perception of time is subject to alterations, while social time is loaded with meaning and value, it's neither linear, nor objective, it can be re-shaped by conventions into variety of

7 Smith, G.E: (2007) *Newton's Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica,* http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-principia/

8 Heylighen F. (2010) *The Self-organization of Time and Causality: steps towards understanding the ultimate origin*, Foundations of Science, 15(4), 345-356.

forms.

1.1.1. Psychological time

Time is relative for more personal reasons than those stated in Einstein's theory of relativity. It is not only subject to the objective laws of physics discovered by Einstein, but also to more subjective psychological processes. Our emotional states, personal and cultural time perspective, the pace of life of the community to which we belong, all influence the way in which we experience time.[9]

For example, the more cognitive processing we do within a given period, the more time we perceive to have passed. Researchers at *Rice University* found that people judge sounds that increase *or* decrease in pitch to be longer than sounds of the same duration and constant pitch. The direction of change appears not important, while the amount of change causes the effect. Temporal illusions are driven by simple changes in tone and volume which lead people to perceive that more time has passed than really has.[10]

Mental problems not only disrupt the continuity of normal life. They can also come along with a radical shift in subjective temporality, even to the point of a disintegration of the experience of the self in time. Psychologists distinguish *implicit* and *explicit* temporality:

> Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the

9 Zimbardo, P., and Boyd, J. (2009). *The time paradox: The new psychology of time that will change your life.* New York, NY: Free Press

10 For an online experiment on how pitch alters perception of duration, see: www.owlnet.rice.edu/~aniko/duration/.

> dimensions of present, past and future.[...] temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: While implicit temporality is characterised by tacit bodily functioning and by synchronisation with others, explicit temporality arises with states of desynchronisation, that is, of a retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes.[11]

The *implicit mode of temporality* requires two fundamental conditions[12]

- The first is *the basic continuity of consciousness* which Husserl analysed as the constitutive or transcendental synthesis of "inner time consciousness".[13] In Husserl's terminology, the synthesis of protention (uncertain expectation of what is yet to come), presentation (primal or instant impression) and retention (keeping what has just been experienced as it disappears). It is only when succession of conscious moments mutually relate to each other in a forward and backward oriented intention that the sequence of experiences is integrated into a coordinated process. The coherence and temporal unity of conscious life is synonymous with the continuity of a basic sense of self
- The second requirement for implicit temporality is the basic "energetic" momentum of psychic life which can be defined by concepts such as drive, striving, urge or affection, it can be also called affective–conative momentum, or *conation*. This is the base of spontaneity, directedness, attention and mindful pursuit of a goal. Moreover, it contributes to *pre-*

11 Fuchs, T. (2010). *Temporality and psychopathology.* Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104 (75)
12 Fuchs, T. (2010). *Temporality and psychopathology.* Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104.
13 Husserl, E. (1969) Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Husserliana X, Nijhoff, Den Haag.— Engl. transl. by J. Brough ("On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time"), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991.

reflective self-awareness, in the sense of aliveness, or to *ipseity*, in the way of spontaneity and agency. The significance of *the conative momentum* for the experience of temporality and the self can be illustrated by changes in basic motivational states—for example, through the acceleration that takes place in manic states or the retardation that occurs in depression.

Thus, there are two constitutive or transcendental prerequisites of inner time consciousness - *conation* and *synthesis* . They are required for an intentional directedness and for a basic sense of a coherent self that is fundamentally temporal or, as Merleau-Ponty says: "We must understand time as the subject, the subject as time."[14]

Some researchers have indicated the parallel between Husserl's tripartite concept of time consciousness and Fuster's analysis[15] of the cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex. As Fuster argues, "integration across time is a basic function of the prefrontal cortex and the basis of its cardinal role in the temporal organisation of behaviour".[16] This integration is assisted by working memory, selective attention and preparatory set. Working memory (the ability to maintain a limited quantity of information accessible for use) may be linked to *retention*; selective attention (the capacity to select target information from a broader stimulus field and inhibit irrelevant or interfering influences) can be seen in analogy to *presentation*, and preparatory set (the ability to select and recruit action schemas for intentional goals) to *protention*. The dorsolateral prefrontal and the anterior

14 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of perception.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 376

15 Fuster, J. M. (1997). *The prefrontal cortex. Anatomy, physiology, and neuropsychology of the frontal lobe* (3rd ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott-Raven.; Fuster, J. M. (2003) *Cortex and Mind—Unifying Cognition.* Oxford University Press; Theunissen, M. (1991). *Negative Theologie der Zeit.* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

16Ibid.

cingulated cortex appear to play crucial roles in the neural networks supporting these functions.[17]

The *explicit experience* of temporality envelops the implicit mode when the regular duration of primary "becoming" (Bergson) or unaware activity is interrupted by the sudden. In such instants, pure lived temporality disrupts: "now" and "no longer" are split and make up an elemental segmentation of time. What up to now had been a timeless continuum disconnects from the present and now and becomes a remembered (and no longer a simply "retained") past. These encounters with the "no longer" are often painful. Consciousness of the past becomes sharper from early childhood on particularly through losses and disappointments.

Hence, *experienced time is created primarily through a disturbance* or negation, such as shock, surprise, pain, shame or loss. The interruption is produced not only in the direction of the past, but in the direction of the future too, as unfulfilled, unsatisfied, still-to-come time.

The explicit experience of temporality is closely connected with "certain time-specific emotions: the *"now"* with surprise, astonishment or shock; the *"no longer"* with regret, grief or remorse; the *"not yet"* with desire, impatience, yearning or hope."[18] Therefore, the explicit experience of time often carries an element of displeasure or suffering.

> The personal self is thus, in Heidegger's terminology, a dialectic unity of "thrownness" (Geworfenheit) and "project" (Entwurf), or a "thrown project" (geworfener Entwurf). It fulfils itself in time—indeed, "the

17 Kaiser, S., & Weisbrod, M. (2007). *Intentionality as a link between the neuropsychology and the symptoms of schizophrenia.* Psychopathology, 40, 221–228.
18 Fuchs, T. (2010). *Temporality and psychopathology.* Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104 (79).

> living of time and the fulfilment of the self are two aspects of the same process", writes Theunissen.[19] By actively living time and leading our life, we realise or "temporalize" ourselves and at the same time prevent explicit time from dominating us, so that we are not exposed to it merely passively.[20]

The intersubjective dimension of temporality requires a synchronisation of the organism's own cycles with cosmic rhythms—days, months, years, while a person synchronizing with her social environment. This synchronization leads to the implicit feeling of being temporally related to others, of living with them in the same intersubjective time. Minkowski has called this "*lived synchronicity*"[21]; or a *basic contemporality.*

This *contemporality* even impacts the basic flow of life. Spitz[22] *and* Bowlby[23] observed that institutionalised infants who lack any attachment relationships fall into deep apathy and depression, even to the point of dying from insignificant infections. These children gave up their psycho-physiological *conation*, the vital force that directs them towards the future. The conative momentum is not only an individual force; it is always integrated into the social relationships to others. Infants move forward into a future because they feel contemporal with caring adults who constitute the world to be an inviting place.

Synchronisations also mark the changes and developments that happen in

19 Theunissen, M. (1991). Negative Theologie der Zeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
20 Fuchs, T. (2010). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104 (81).
21 Minkowski, E. (1970). *Lived time: phenomenological and psychopathological studies*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
22 Spitz, R. A. (1945). *Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood.* Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 1, 53–74.
23 Bowlby, J. (1969). *Attachment and loss*. Vol. 1. London: Hogarth.
Tellenbach, H. (1980). *Melancholy. History of the problem, endogeneity, typology, pathogenesis, clinical considerations.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

different phases of life. Essential biographical transitions (starting school, getting a first job, marriage, career promotions, retirement, etc.) are more or less standardised and constitute a cohort of individuals. Eventually, there is the fundamental "contemporaneity" of people representing the same culture with their particular history, values, styles, forms of behaviour, etc.[24]

The correlation or *synchronicity* of one's own and world time creates a *feeling of well-being*, of a fulfilled present where one lives without dominant awareness of time, wholly dedicated to one's own activity ("flow experiences") or to resonance with others. The intersubjective "now" is established through the presence of the other, through our synchronous experience of the world, mutual attention or joint activity.

> The irreversibility and "dominance" of time is experienced first and foremost in discrepancies, remanences or separations from others to whom our lived time primarily relates. Time can be especially experienced as loss of simultaneity: as the "too early" or "too late", and thus as time which "creeps" or "rushes", which "flies" or against which one is fighting. In this, it is similar to health which normally remains unnoticed until we become ill, or to balance which we only appreciate when we lose it—when we stagger or become dizzy.[25]

24 Fuchs, T. (2010). *Temporality and psychopathology.* Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104 (82).
25 Ibid: 83.



Image 1. Synchronisation and desynchronisation of one's own and world time[26]

The "too early", the acceleration or antecedence of one's own time with respect to external activities, makes waiting necessary. Waiting enforces on us a slower temporality to which we can react with patience or impatience. Waiting can lead to boredom or manic acceleration.

Usually, the "too late" or the retardation of one's own time hurts more. Unlike waiting, "time pressure" constantly grows, which is a consequence of having to compensate a delay. Feeling of being left behind can be present. Grief indicates a disruption which has been experienced in one's synchronicity with others—the mourner cannot escape from the shared past, whereas the social time moves forward. Guilt, the failure to meet expectations or responsibilities, also has a retarding component if its person clings to the omissions of the past. Furthermore, a desynchronisation from intersubjective time is typical for melancholic depression.[27]

The depressive cannot pull himself away from his past. The past is not really over, it can no longer be disregarded and turns into an actuality concentrated in the present. The power of the past is the other side of the slowing conative dynamics,

26 Ibid: 84
27 Idem.

a lack of effort, interests and desires which are orientated to the future. As the future has no more the character of openness, freshness, surprise, and can be perceived as inevitable fate or catastrophe, at least as a stiff extension of the past or a repetition of the same. The temporal coordination during day-to-day interactions, in particular those experienced from childhood on, underlay basic "contemporality" with others.

Tellenbach[28] named "remanence" (i.e. chasing or delaying) as the characteristic triggering setting of melancholia. This counts for failure to meet obligations and to fulfil expectations, stress produced by the rapidity of external alterations and the incapacity to realise the transitions expected at the various phases of life (transition in social role, a child moving form home, important losses, career stages, etc.).

The inability to grieve is central to this desynchronisation. It feels too dreadful or too agonizing to let go of familiar patterns and attachments so that the person stays frozen in the past. The requirement for not falling a victim to time and becoming overruled by it, is to continuously integrate one's past with the future, which also includes closure with the past.

The depressive disorder slowly switches from an intersubjective into a biological desynchronisation. Consequently, the disruption of intersubjective temporality could be seen as a "switching point" which provokes a reaction of the whole organism, namely a psycho-physiological slowdown or stasis.[29]

28 Tellenbach, H. (1980). *Melancholy. History of the problem, endogeneity, typology, pathogenesis, clinical considerations.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

29 Depression can also be understood as an evolutionary defensive mechanism in situations of social stress which expresses in a psycho-physiological block or paralysis, in passive-submissive and inferior behaviour towards other members of the tribe, and which channels the individual temporarily away from social requests and competitive settings. (Fuchs, T. (2010). *Temporality and psychopathology.* Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1): 75–104 (84)).

Therefore, the time which meets us from outside as an apparently independent power is experienced mainly in relation to social processes and with respect to others. Disruptions of the subjective syntheses of time, whether it be at the underlying pre-reflective or at the explicit individual level, directly impacts intersubjective temporality and vice versa. Moreover, living in society requires a certain amount of denial of spontaneity and satisfaction of one's instincts, then the kind of restraint which the different historical forms of collective life.

1.1.2.Temporal notion and social theory

The main obstacle for the sociology of time is made up of the lack of a solid, systematic relation to general sociological theory formation. Usually, existing social-scientific studies of time are constructed on pretheoretical and randomly selected models of time that often broadly based on philosophical, anthropological, or even mundane concepts. As a result, the sociological literature on time is composed of a variety of unconnected, individual studies that lack a sufficient linkage to general approaches in social theory.

> As Barbara Adam remarks:
>
> None of the writers has the same focus. Everyone asks different questions. No two theorists have the same view on what it means to make time central to social theory. . . . There are no signposts for orientation in this maze of conceptual chaos.[30]

A systematic connection of the sociology of time, to the development of empirical research programs is still an unfulfilled necessity. However, we can divide social theories into three categories considering the way social thinkers deal with time and temporal notions in their work. The first regards the work of thinkers who have made explicit efforts to do a "sociology of time." The second includes works

30 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

which deals with time explicitly while theorizing other social phenomena. In the third category is composed of social theories in which time plays an essential but only implicit role.

"Sociology of time" perspectives consider attempts to define "social time," classify forms of temporal regularity, describe multiple temporalities associated with various forms of social organization, understand cross-cultural or trans-historical variations in the experience and organization of time. Representative thinkers in this category are Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, Ptirim Sorokin & Robert K. Merton, Georges Gurvitch, Wilbert Moore, Julius A. Roth, and Eviatar Zerubavel.

The second group includes theories of social time presented as key components of theories of other phenomena. Included here is work by Karl Marx, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schutz, Norbert Elias, Niklas Luhmann, Michel Foucault, and Anthony Giddens.

The third category deals with theories of diverse social phenomena – social change, development, diffusion, planning, for example – in which, even though not explicitly problematized, time plays a crucial role.

Durkheim is often perceived as the founder of "the sociology of time." His *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* is apparently about the nature of religion, though its exceeding goal is to demonstrate the social origin of the categories of thought – time, space, class, causality. Durkheim admits the reality of the subjective experience of time ,yet, he suggests that as a category time is not for me, but for us. The fabric within which things are temporally placed is taken from

collective social life.

> A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity. … what the category of time expresses is a time common to the group, a social time, so to speak. In itself it is a veritable social institution.[31]

Hubert and Mauss[32] developed this idea pointing out how social perception allowed groups to assign mathematically equal times with socially non-equivalent meanings as when in certain cultural contexts the year between 20 and 21 brings new legal rights but that between 30 and 31 is relatively uneventful. This topic is continued and elaborated by Sorokin and Merton[33] who state that social time is not only different from astronomical time, but that it holds many variants – social time changes qualitatively across social space. Numerous calendars, systems of calculation of time, and definitions of temporality are to be encountered in different societies, positions within societies, and even within different activities.

The idea of a multiplicity of social times adopted by Gurvitch in *The Spectrum of Social Time.*[34] Gurvitch describes eight kinds of social time, each related to specific manifestations of sociability (communion, community, and mass) or "levels of we-ness," types of social groupings, and degrees of continuity/discontinuity and contingency/certainty.

- "*Enduring time*" is the time of kinship, families and local demography, the enduring nowadays of everyday life.

31 Durkheim, E. ([1915] 1965) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Free Press.
32 Hubert, H. and Mauss, M. (1909) *'Etude sommaire de la représentation du temps dans la réligion et la magie'*, in Mélange d'histoire des réligions. Paris: Alcan.
33 Sorokin, P. A. and Merton, R. K. (1937). *Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis.*
34 Gurvitch, G . 1964. *The Spectrum of Social Time*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

- "*Deceptive time*" is the time of the daily round with its routines and surprises.
- "*Erratic time"* is the time of irregular life and world events, the uncertainties of ongoing history.
- "*Cyclical time*" is the time of dependable recurrences in life.
- "*Retarded time*" is the time of social symbols and institutions which, by the time they attain "reality" they are anchored backward in the past. As tradition and convention they are used in life moving forward but are marked by permanence that is backward reaching.
- "*Alternating time*" is the time of rules, algorithms and recipes. It is also based on the past and settled but it is used in moving forward toward change. The time of economy and industry is alternating time – it depends on what has been learned but is not about mere repetition.
- "*Pushing forward tim*e" is the time of aspiration and innovation. In it we reach out to the future, pulling the present forward.
- "*Explosive time*" is the time of collective creation and revolution. It is the time which allows existing structures to be superseded and replaced.

Different approaches to the multiplicities of social time were taken by social ecologists and functionalist thinkers of the 1960s. They demonstrate explicit concern with developing taxonomies and typologies of temporal patterning associated with various forms of social organization.

Sorokin[35] described synchronicity and order, rhythm and phases, periodicity and tempo; Hawley outlined rhythm, tempo, timing. Moore deals with

35 Sorokin, P. A. and Merton, R. K. (1937) *Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis*.

synchronization, sequence, and rates as central socio-temporal processes with respect to a number of institutions, such as the family, career, organizations, voluntary associations, and the city. He analyses the phenomena of temporal concentration and segregation (as when fresh food wholesaling takes place in the wee hours so that product is in the stores during shopping hours), temporal complementarity and schedule staggering which ease loads on systems (as when flexible schedule reduces rush hour traffic), but can also result in temporal mismatches between individuals or institutions (as when shift-working partners never see one another or working mothers cannot join school trips). Roth interpreted "timetable norms" as collective agreements about proper timing of life events. For example, when one can expect promotion at work or how long a couple can date before they should "get serious".

Zerubavel, in several influential works, strengthens much previous work and explicitly states his aims to establish a "sociology of time"[36] by looking into phenomena such as schedules, calendars, public/private time, the week, holidays. In contrast to more ecological approaches mentioned previously, which concentrate on the temporal patterning of social life, Zerubavel attempts to explain the *social foundations* of temporal patterning.

Zerubavel focuses on the "sociotemporal order" which he distinguishes from the biotermporal and physiotemporal orders. His study is built around the recognition of four forms of sociotemporal regularity which are neither natural, nor individually voluntaristic, but are, rather, conventional:

- sequential structure (collective agreement about the proper temporal order

36 Zerubavel, E. 1981. *Hidden Rhythms : Schedules and Calendars in Social Life.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.; Zerubavel, E. 1985. *The Seven Day Circle : The History and Meaning of the Week*. New York: Free Press.

of activities);

- duration (how long things should last);
- temporal location (what should be done when – schedules);
- rates of recurrence (how often things occur).

Rigid sequential structures prevent events and activities from taking place simultaneously. Sequential rigidity temporally segregates them in terms of "before" and "after". The sequential order of events may be purely accidental, yet, it is usually irreversibly rigid. The normative notions of "fast" and "slow" derive from the prescribed norm of "proper sequence" of steps or events. A person who skips their order is considered to be "fas" or "too fast", while an individual who avoids to move to the next step can labelled as "slow". The act of deviating from the "proper sequence" often calls for normative suctions and evokes the overwhelming feeling of "bad taste".

Many scholars have developed ideas on time and temporality as aftermaths to the works on other social phenomenon. Time is important, for example, in Schutz's theory of social action[37], Mannheim's sociology of knowledge[38], Giddens' theory of structuration,[39] Mead[40] and Luhmann[41] are often cited as researches of time, but their analyses of temporality are in service of other issues. Yet another group of scholars who deal with temporality in their analyses of the rationalization of

37 Schutz, A. 1967 [1932]. *The Phenomenology of the Social World.* Evanston: Northwestern UniversityPress.
38 Mannheim. K. ([1925] I986) *Conservatism: A contribution to the sociology of knowledge,* London and New York Routledge & Kegan Paul.
39 Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Introduction of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
40 Mead, G. H. ([1932] 1 959)*The Philosophy of the Present,* MURPHY, A. (ed.) La Salle, Open Court; Mead, G. H. ([1934] 1962) *Mind, Self and Society.* From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist , C. W. Morris (ed.). University of Chicago.
41 *Luhmann, N. (1995) Social Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

society counts Marx, Weber, and Foucault among others.

Temporal thinking in Alfred Schutz's[42] work on the meaning of action, routinization, social relationships, and multiple realities are essential in the field of phenomenological sociology. Schutz applied Husserl's phenomenology to offer a social psychological basis for Weber's theory of meaningful social action. If meaning is retrospective and involves reflection, how can action directed into the future be meaningful? How can an individual be consciously rational, aware of the motive of action?

Schutz[43] applies Husserl's theory of inner time consciousness to demonstrate how a future act can be comprehended in the future perfect tense and therefore be a component of the actor's choice of action. Routinization is the procedure whereby such chosen, meaningful directions of action are classified and taken-for-granted as "I can do it again." The existence of others is temporally constructed. Schutz splits it first into those who are temporally inaccessible (predecessors and successors) and those who temporally accessible. People with whom we share time are further classified into those who are spatially not accessible (contemporaries) and those who are (consociates). The We-relation, consociation in its perfect form, when our inner times melt into one another and we "grow older together", are possible with consociates. In addition to everyday awaken reality, Schutz[44] has thought of "multiple realities" of fantasy, dreaming, and scientific theory. Each of these realities, as Schutz states, has its own characteristic "temporal style."

42 Schutz, A. (1967 [1932]) *The Phenomenology of the Social World.* Evanston: Northwestern UniversityPress.
43Idem.
44 Schutz, A. (1967 [1932]) *The Phenomenology of the Social World.* Evanston: Northwestern UniversityPress.

Marx's analysis of ideology[45] introduced the idea that knowledge and ideas are historically contingent. While Mannheim's sociology of knowledge connotes a temporal aspect in the meaning of all social and cultural phenomena. He also pioneered the idea of time as identity and social location, describing generations as collective identities in his essay *"The Problem of Generations"*.[46] Recent work on cohorts and historical generations, the significance of biographical stages and the life course, stems from this tradition.

Giddens' theory of structuration[47] attempts to surpass structure/agency dualism by keeping that structure and agency are continuously related: structures both constrain and authorize actors while actions build up and reproduce those structures. From Hägerstrand's time-geography Giddens adopts five basic spatial-temporal constraints:

- the indivisibility of the body;
- the finitude of lifespan;
- duration/sequence/one task at a time;
- movement in space is always movement in time;
- finite packing capacity of time/space.

Giddenst[48] theorizes that the primal task in social theory is to explain "time-space distanciation" – the stretching of social systems across space and time – dealing

45 Marx, K. (1976) *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* . Vol. 1 . Trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin.
46 Mannheim, K. ([1928] 1952) *The Problem of Generation,* in K. Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 276–320. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
47 Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Introduction of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
48 Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Introduction of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

with these fundamental constraints. Hence, time, is not only environment of action, but also a dimension against which action is directed. Social life – from the reflexive individual to persistent social institutions – is both influenced by social temporality and constitutive of it.

Three "times" are key here:

- the time of Heidegger's *Dasein*, the fundamental finite temporality of being which is always a part of human life;
- *durée*, the time of the everyday flow of intentional action;
- *longue durée*, the time of institutional duration.

These times as well as related to them structures and practices are not build hierarchically, but rather in the co-constructing way. Hence, everyday routines consist of all three of them.

If Durkheim and his followers had constructed a sociology of time around the dualism of natural and social time; others proceeded to the analysis of the origins of "social" time, with inclusion of natural time. Mead constructs his ideas about time based on his general theory about the development of consciousness and society. In *The Philosophy of the Present,*[49] Mead declares the primacy of sociality as essential to mind and self which in their turn capture time as the nascent difference of past and future with the present. For Mead, the social and the psychological are a case of "nature" and so this understanding of the psychology and sociology of time is an understanding of time itself.

Luhmann[50] creates a related perspective on time in his systems theory. In line with

49 Mead, G. H. ([1932] 1 959) *The Philosophy of the Present,* MURPHY, A. (ed.) La Salle, Open Court.
50 Luhmann, N. (l 982) *The Differentiation of Society*, transl. S . Holmes and C. Larmore. New

Mead[51], he perceives time a rising from the contrast between past and future relating to one another in the present and similarly to Mead he understands temporality not as exclusively human but as a part of the nature. Several scholars inspired changes in the meaning of time, attitudes toward time, and ways of experiencing time as both a factor and an effect of cultural evolution. Elias[52] argues that as societies evolve, they need more complex forms of coordination and so moving through generations humans improve capacity to symbolize time and to use it as a "means of orientation."

Weber[53] and others discuss the advancing rationalization of time as an element of the rationalization of society emerged from the Rule of St. Benedict. The central theme here is transformation from the "natural", pre-industrial time, to the "rationalized" time. The "natural" time is continuous and spontaneous while the "rationalized" time is discrete and controlled. Foucault[54] described this micro-division of time as a manifestation of power, developing the observations of critics of Taylorism. Marx and Simmel suggest the substitution of natural pace with artificial and standardized pace of life as city time forces out the time of villages. As Lewis Mumford puts it, "In the city, time becomes visible".[55]

In order to enrich the theoretical summary on time and social theory, we will look into details of Norbert Elias's theory of time, a non-dichotomous framework of

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York: Columbia University Press .

51 Mead, G. H. ([1932] 1 959) *The Philosophy of the Present*, MURPHY, A. (ed.) La Salle, Open Court.

52 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.

53 Weber, M. (2001). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* . Trans. Talcott Parsons. New York: Routledge.

54 Foucault, M. (1995) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* . New York: Vintage.
Foucault, M. (1983)"The Subject and Power." In Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* , 208–29. 2d ed.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

55 Mumford, L. (1938) *The Culture of Cities.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

the relationship established between natural, social and individual time.

1.1.3. Temporal concepts of Norbert Elias

Elias[56] attempts to define what social time is, to establish what are the essential, historically stable elements of what we call 'time', both from the point of view of the norm, and from that of experience and choice. Emile Durkheim[57] undertook such an attempt before him, of course, but only in highlighting one of the characteristics of time: the secondary aspect of the collective and 'sacred' construction of time. The person's experience and individual construction of time are questions which are neither raised nor investigated in his work. In Elias's idea, on the contrary, the problems posed by social time are thoroughly developed and exhaustive explanations are given.

Elias's argues that,

> Timing thus is based on people's capacity for connecting with each other two or more different sequences of continuous changes, one of which serves as a timing standard for the other (or others)'[58]

In other words,

> … the word "time" is a symbol of a relationship that a human group of beings biologically endowed with the capacity for memory and synthesis, establishes between two or more continua of changes, one of which is used by it as a frame of reference or standard of

56 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.
Elias, N. (1982) *The Civilising Process, Vol. 2. State Formation and Civilisation*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Elias, N. (1989) *The Symbol Theory*. London: Sage.
Elias, N. (1992) *Time: An Essay*. Oxford: Blackwell.
57 Durkheim, E. ([1915] 1965) . *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Free Press.
58 Elias, N. (1992) *Time: An Essay*. Oxford: Blackwell.: 72.

measurement for the other or others[59]

Thus, the social construction of time is based on a specific *human ability to elaborate the experience of change, to respond, to structure and apply meaning to the experience.* Norbert Elias's definition gets clearer and its descriptive strength is apparent if it is interpreted in terms of psychological researches into the perception of time and in in reference to the mythological and religious characters to which the idea of time was generative[60] In almost all the works on research into the roots of time awareness, interpreted as the produced through of the perception of change, two types of experience are pointed as central: that of *continuity/discontinuity* and that of *recurrence.*[61]

1.The primary form of experiencing time (change) involves *continuity/discontinuity.* We perceive discontinuity when we realize that a change has occurred in some aspect of our reality: in our body, in our thinking, in the physical or social existence around us. This kind of experience arises from an event, which is recognised as a reference point for before and after, something appearing in expressions like 'from then on' or 'from that day on'. In individual and social life *memory* is structured through events like this, which come to be especially important when one thinks over one's own identity.

2.The second experience of time (change) is the constant cyclical appearance of the same phenomena. The seasons of the year, accompanied or followed by social seasons, make room for *recurrences.* Before and after become comparative terms, so every before is inevitably an after and

59 Ibid.: 46
60 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27
61 Fraser, J.T. (1968) *The Study of Time*, in The Voices of Time, New York: Penguin:pp. 582–94.

vice versa.[62]

Mythology holds rich evidence that the experience of change is connected with an awareness which triggers anxiety and is challenging to accept: the awareness of boundaries, of death, of the passing nature of everything about human life. Awareness of time and awareness of death are certainly related. The first encounter with the idea of 'time' would appear to imply an experience of change which is structured, supplied with meaning, and throughout which choices can be made.[63]

Translating it into Elias's terms, we sum up that the word 'time' is the assignment of meaning to change, executed by human communities and individuals, and its arrangement in terms of goals and other admission of values. The construction of time might be a uniquely social way of articulating on the 'meaning of life'. It, at the same time, fulfils organizational goals – setting up time of work, play or prayer – and moral goals for the collectivity – determining what is most essential to accomplish in life, i.e. in a period of time which appears confined.[64]

Independently of the historical context on which the experience of time is based, independently of the predominant social norms, the matter of time always goes together with the matter of *limit* (deficiency of time of which people are more or less aware) and the matter of *choice.*

Human societies create adaptable ways of measuring time with the *constant* purpose of linking change to the meaning they attempt to apply to on societal works, history and personal life. Elias[65] openly doubts the idea of an a priori

62 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias,* Time & society, 10(1): 5-27: 7-8
63 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27
64 Ibid.: 9.
65 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.

given time and blends it with the development of civilization. In the matter of a civilizing process, time has to be developed out of various elements so that it reaches today's phase and conception.

'Time' is the symbol for a relationship established by a human society between various orders of change: this symbol experiences great adjustments when the society transits from being 'simple' to extremely differentiated. From the point of view of the civilization process this symbol has been transformed through the ups and downs of life, through periods of deadlock and others of speedy evolution, but always in a direction that we can distinguish and recreate although no individual has consciously followed it. Human societies have engaged in a long path that has brought them to favour to use symbols that involve option to synthesis which are ever broader and more generalized. Nowadays 'time' is a symbol that contains a very high level of synthesis.[66]

Elias[67] insisted on the necessity for the sociologist to withdraw from the use, so notable in western philosophical thinking, of dualities in the analysis of reality, which leave one in an deadlock of oppositions such as individual/society, or nature/culture. This is one of the most challenging problems in social theory and one to which all outstanding sociologists have found their own solution. Opting out from dichotomies requires acknowledging why it is individuals who make the decisions and change history, yet within a collective framework that is often repressive; or again, why it is always individuals who choose what they wish to do, but within the physical and biological constraints dictated by nature. The answer to this old question in sociological thinking, which is obvious in the traditional confrontation between systems theories and action theories focused on

66 Idem.
67Idem.

the intentions of the actor, in Elias's thinking, can be facilitated by the adoption of a temporal perspective.[68]

As Barbara Adam has pointed out:

> Dualisms are deeply anchored in our thought and they permeate social theory. As synchrony and diachrony, structure and change, individual and society, nature and nurture, quantity and quality, objectivity and subjectivity, order and chaos they haunt our theories and analyses. A focus on time brings these dualisms into high relief and shows them to be untenable.[69]

A non-dichotomous framework of the relationship established between natural, social and individual time, according to Elias, helps to see the process of individualization. That is the process through which individual choice is made perceptible while the constricting collective character of the norm, the limits forced by social, and natural constitution and by physical and biological organization, are evident too.[70]

When one explores the use and individual conception of time, it becomes clear how the application of meaning and a natural or normative constraint merge to determine an explanation for certain attitudes and actions: every person invents original, very individualized methods to mold the unprocessed material of natural, social and biological times according to their own needs, to construct their own personal time. Research into how individuals shape their own time discloses the diverse schemes and personal styles people use to create a unique 'production': being exposed to an identical temporal constraint, everyone responds with

68 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27
69 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory* . Cambridge: Polity, p. 16.
70 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.

different solutions. An appropriate metaphor for this work of arrangement of natural times (e.g. day, night, seasons), social times (e.g. institutional timetables, family organization), bio-psychological times (e.g. periods which are easy or difficult for health and general wellbeing), is the metaphor of the mosaic.[71]

Social and natural times represent the raw material with which persons construct their *work time*, through which their tastes, inclinations and the present limits manifest themselves. The material utilized may remain the same but the diversity of designs adopted is the evidence of the unpredictability of the outcome of the interaction that occurs between individual and collective aspects of the experience.

If *work time* is that time through which, as an outcome of the long process that Elias determines as civilization, the individual constrains him/herself to hold systematic control over spontaneous urges, then *free time* will have to be the domain of life in which spontaneity and freedom from self-control are permitted, even if never absolutely and in socially accepted ways. Consequently, when the character of self-restraint at work alternate, the character of letting go of the control in *free time* also tend to alternate.[72]

Elias[73] himself, and together with Dunning[74], describes *a spectrum of free time* because, within the constellation made by the different times of the day, the different activities are often overlapped , though they can be separated and ordered in accordance with the degree of self-self-discipline and routinization they

71 Cavalli, A. (1985) 'Introduzione', in A. Cavalli (ed.) *Il tempo dei giovanni*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
72 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.
73Idem.
74 Elias, N. and Dunning, E. (1986) *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

necessitate. Free time embraces quite a large number of routine activities and requires a good level of self-control. Activities created by domestic organization, bureaucratic/administrative demands and the fulfilment of daily needs all make up this category. Other activities constitute the sphere of personal satisfaction and regard voluntary activity, professional training, information from newspapers and television, hobbies, and call for a lesser degree of self-discipline. All these activities coincide in their function to fulfil the desires of those involved in them and allow a high level of liberation from self-control.

In the civilizing process, Elias investigates the evolution of an increasing control over spontaneous impulses on the part of the person who, in turning into 'civilized', becomes progressively ambivalent in the attitudes, evermore splitted between the pleasure of the benefits of 'civilization' and the inclination to be free of it and satisfy instinctual needs.[75]

The ambivalence shows in the inability to be either completely rational and self-self-disciplined or absolutely free and spontaneous. Everyone has to find the structures, the times, the opportunities for expression of this double-edged disposition without leaving the battleground of tension produced by the double opposition of *work time* and *free time.* Moreover, social norms provide the possibilities appropriate to this 'civilization' of rewarding at least partially private impulses and spontaneity, at the cost of demand for continual self-control which constitutes a 'civilized' person.[76]

The more an individual has to restrain him/herself in work time, the greater will be the need for escaping in free time in aggressive behavioural patterns, expressing the violence that was suffered and caused. For Elias this translates in

75 Elias, N. (2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell.
76 Idem.

approaching the traditional confrontation of work time and free time as one constellation, a field of tension maintained between two interdependent poles, which always blend. Violence and hostility have to find a way of expressing itself within the socially accepted patterns of 'civilized' society, particularly in *free time activities* such as sport, whose transformations Elias explores in the course of the civilizing process.[77]

Elias's research on time, as the conclusion of many years of work, is aimed to eliminate the conceptual dichotomies. As has been emphasized, Elias is capable of demonstrating that from a temporal point of view there is no opposition between what is individual, social or natural. Individual, social and natural time are not in confrontation on the foundation of Elias's account of time, but happen to be *three different levels of the same human experience*, that of *change* and *choice*. *Individual time* turns out to be established on a choice which employs the material made accessible by present social and natural times. It is by means of the choice which creates a person's individual time, we can understand how and why the representations of time transform in the course of history. Elias's analysis of time develops the Durkheimian approach to the issue. His approach unfolds along the same lines, but improves it with new insights. It is not enough for Elias to demonstrate the social nature of time: he also provides an explanation of why time has become what it is today. Time is no anymore merely the joint rhythm of different human activities, but a social construction which changes along the way of the process of civilization, nowadays turning into a highly abstract symbol, a cognitive tool adopted from the natural sciences and thus a restricting social *habitus*.[78]

77 Elias, N. and Dunning, E. (1986) *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
78 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27

Elias's work of historical reconstruction is not completed by acknowledgement only of the normative dimension of time. Elias also considers the active, creative participation of individuals and their various experiences of time in ascribing meaning to the historical change that this concept has undergone throughout the centuries and to its accompanying changing social practices and representations. These reflections on the theme of time let us understand how the social, the individual, and the natural aspects of human existence are connected. Elias's research offers us an insight into how normative restraints and subjective intentions, limits and choices add to the solution of what represents individual time. Individuals make a wide range of various time strategies, they each have their own special way of achieving desired objectives, remaining in contact with the collective temporal norm. People are constantly adjusting and readjusting the facts to fit in their own specific needs and skills, and perpetually re-evaluating the relationships established by different social times.[79]

Elias has made an important contribution to the primary characteristic of research on time, which has been enriched with new understandings in recent years. Durkheim and his followers, developed the same topics over a period, but they have limited themselves to demonstrating the suppressing power of temporal structures. Elias improves this work of theoretical construction by accommodating *action theory* and *structure theory*, both in his *'Essay on Time'* (1992) and in his other works. That the adoption of a temporal perspective can be promising in tackling the problems inherited from the best known theoretical approaches is showed by the latest developments in social theory in the research of the best known contemporary scholars.

1.1.4. Time as a unifying process in social theories

79 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27.

According to Philip Abrams[80], for example, it is time to consider at last that social life is made up of processes: the relationship between *choice* and *restraint* becomes understandable only if represented in terms of how it unfolds in time. The introduction of time into social theory, therefore, does not only cancel the differentiation between a static and a dynamic analysis of phenomena. It is even more revolutionary: it is a question of considering intention and personal experience together with social restrictions in one single inseparable phenomenon which is perpetually constructed in time. The key of social analysis has to become this continual process of construction.

There is even more aspiring direction of research which has it that temporality turns into the core element from which to start in apprehension of the social world, the core for the construction of theories of society which can tackle the old dilemmas. Two social researchers who are apparently far from each other, Anthony Giddens[81] and Niklas Luhmann[82] coincide in indicating time as the foundation of their social theories.

Giddens's structuration theory proposes a new and improved answer to the old question 'How is society possible?', based on the observation of temporal (and spatial) forms in collective life. He argues that for an adequate understanding of social life, it is important to go beyond the partiality of the 'micro' and 'macro' approaches, where on the one hand unique emphasis is given to the research for meanings leaving behind the evident constraints on individual action, while on the other hand the exuberant power of these constraints keeps us from understanding how individuals ever succeed to keep on being capable of making choices:

80 Abrams, P. 1982. *Historical Sociology.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell. University Press.
81 Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Introduction of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
82 *Luhmann, N. (1995) Social Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

> The opposition between "micro" and "macro" is best reconceptualized as concerning how interaction in contexts of copresence is structurally implicated in systems which span large sectors of time-space.[83]

The idea of the dichotomy of structures is central to his structuration theory, which is primarily focused on social practices, the shapes and the order they assume in space–time, and their repetition in the form of routines[84]

As Giddens continuously stresses,

> … social practices, biting into space and time, are considered to be at the root of the constitution of both subject and social object[85]

Niklas Luhmann, too, believes that time is the core around which to create a new theory of society. He is above all concerned with the meaning that time acquires, the transformation of temporal horizons, the dynamic relationships that have been established in history between past and present and future, and their deficiency in recent times. However, Luhmann also

> … conceptualizes time as constituted at every level of existence and provides a time theory that unifies the social theory perspectives of system and action[86]

The most important contribution to a new social theory where time plays a key role is introduced by Luhmann in *Soziale Systeme*[87] in which he attempts to link the theory of *autopoiesis* and systems theory. The theory of *autopoiesis*, initiated by the Chilean biologists, H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela,[88] has been disputed,

83 Giddens, A. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Introduction of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press: xxvi.
84 Ibid.p. Xxvi.
85 Ibid. p. xxii.
86 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory* . Cambridge: Polity: 15.
87 Luhmann*, N. (1995) Social Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
88Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1975) *Autopoietic Systems*, BCL Report 9. Urbana: University

elaborated and applied to other fields, among which the social sciences. For Luhmann *autopoiesis* is not restricted to its application to biology and knowledge theory in the social sciences , it also provides adequate instruments for a general theoretical assessment, the theory of self-referential autopoietic systems, as he call it. [89]

> The elements which constitute any social system are, in Luhmann's view, the communicative actions, actions which would be meaningless in themselves if they were not part of a recursive network that included information, communication and comprehension. The actions are constituted self-referentially. Time and self-reference presuppose each other in that it is not possible to imagine something which is simultaneously object and subject if not by reference to circular time which recursively reproposes alternatives of opposing situations. Only a temporal perspective, in any case, allows a self-reflecting check on action. Luhmann reformulates the basic concepts of sociology in terms of the central role that time plays in self-referential systems.[90]

The concept of structure is changed and interpreted into a temporal concept, turning into 'the relationship between elements beyond their temporal distance'.[91] Concepts of action and event get linked, as they both refer to 'the instant which passes immediately' and an event can be interpreted sociologically only if its temporal characteristics are regarded.[92] Social systems have to be capable of assuring the link and 'the link is possible only in the temporal sphere'.[93]

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of Illinois Biological Computers Laboratory;
Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1980) *Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the Living*. Dordrecht, Boston, MA and London: Reidel.
89 Luhmann, *N. (1995) Social Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
90 Tabboni, S. (2001) *The idea of social time in Norbert Elias*, Time & society, 10(1): 5-27.
91 Luhmann, N. *(1995) Social Systems*, Stanford: Stanford University Press: 383.
92 Ibid: 389.
93Ibid.,p.390

Finally, Barbara Adam[94] has dealt with the question of time and social theory, investigating around an idea of time that links natural and social sciences.

In conclusion, and in order to situate Elias's contribution to time studies correctly, we have to distinguish two radically different lines of inspiration and research in what is nowadays loosely called the 'sociology of time'. There are researches on time which have almost nothing to do with social theory. These studies do not work on time to create a theory of society and history. They use it as a topic for study of the great shifts that are transforming the world we live in. This domain regards fields of analysis that have lately made visible advances in that they study the processes of transformation of most of the aspects of our existence.

The context of life in modern society have been notably changed by a series of great shifts which contribute to the challenging nature of time: there have been alterations in the shapes of experience of time and the temporal horizons we associate with, consequently the link between past, present and future has been adjusted.[95]

Large cities accommodate and co-ordinate new and different currents of circulation. The cycles and the ages of modern life have very little in common with those of the previous generation; the computer technology has eliminated time for communication and deeply altered the relationship between time and space. [96]

As Manuel Castells said,

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94 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory* . Cambridge: Polity; Adam, B. (2002) "The Multiplicity of Times: Contributions from the Tutzing Time Ecology Project." *Time and* Society 11:87–146.

95 Jedlowski, P. (1986) *Il tempo dell'esperienza*. Milano: Angeli; Leccardi, C. (1991) *Orizzonti del tempo.* Milano: Angeli; Sennett, R. (1998) *The Corrosion of Character*. New York and London: W.W. Norton.

96 Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

> I propose the idea that timeless time, as I label the dominant temporality of our society, occurs when the characteristics of a given context, namely the informational paradigm and the network society, induce systemic perturbation in the sequential order of phenomena performed in that context.[97]
>
> Space shapes time in our society, thus reversing a historical trend: flows induce timeless time, places are time-bounded[98]

Time policies to adopt in urban settings to contribute to efficacy of administrative institutions, shops or schools, discourses on changes or planned changes in the duration of the working day or in the right to have free time – all these are issues of great sociological interest nowadays.[99]

1.2. Inter-relationships of time and power

1.2.1. Competing temporalities and temporal regulation

The sociological approach to the study of temporality is primarily occupied with a qualitative conception of time.[100] It emphasizes importance of the temporal context, where social acts and situations take place, for the construction of different meaning such acts and situations may be attributed with. People are not likely "to confuse the meanings of drinking alcohol at the age of forty and at the age of fourteen, or at arriving at an official ceremony on time and half and hour

97 Ibid., p. 464.
98 Ibid., p. 465
99 Balbo, L. (1991) *Tempi di vita*. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Zajczyk, F. (2000) *Tempi di vita e orari della città*. Milano: Angeli.
100 Lukacs, G. (1971) *History and Class Consciousness,* Cambridge: MIT Press.
Schwartz, B. (1975). *Queuing and waiting.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Zerubavel, E. (1979) *Patterns of Time in Hospital Life*, Chicago: Chicago UP.

late."[101] Social thinkers[102] pointed out that firm temporal boundaries provide us with predictable and reliable repertoire of what is expected and diminish sense of uncertainty. It enhances predictability and planning in general, hence enables better capacity to control human activity.

Time serves as a major principle of segregation in modern societies, not only by differentiating spheres of everyday life, such as private and public, but also by separating individuals and social groups from each other.[103] Investigating social construction of time and overlaps of marginal temporal orders with those of dominant groups should give us hints about relations of power- how certain groups are included or excluded from access to resources. Social institutions control access to goods and services through temporal exclusion, specifically through queueing systems, or the systematic organization of delay.[104] Waiting is the subjective experience of this delay by the disadvantaged party.

Schwartz's social psychological analyses of waiting[105] is also relevant to the dangers of unstructured time that mental health providers often alarmed with. Employing the psychoanalytic approach, Schwartz supposes that time emptied of any goal-oriented activity turns the individual's psychic energy inwards, thus allowing, among other possibilities, the arousal of unrepressed (uncontrollable?) fantasies.

Georges Gurvitch was among the first social theorists to emphasize the multiplicity of times, not only between different cultures, but within the same

101 Zerubavel, E. (1981) *Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life*, Chicago: Chicago UP: 101.
102 Idem., Bettelheim, B. (1970) *The Informed Heart, London :* Paladin; Nelkin, D. (1970) "Unpredictability and Life Style in a Migrant Labor Camp," Social Problems 17: 472-87.
103 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP
104 Schwartz, B. (1975). Queuing and waiting. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
105 Schwartz, B. (1975). Queuing and waiting. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

social formation: "...each society, each social class, each particular group, each microsocial element - indeed every social activity...has a tendency to operate in a time proper to itself...no society, no social class, no structured group...can leave without trying to control these social times, which is quite a different thing from conceptualizing them and even more different from quantifying them."[106]

Competing times set fertile ground for conflicts where one group strives "to dominate the time of another in the interest of power."[107] Being an object of power relations, time, or a plurality of coexistent times, is shaped by relations of power and inequality which are culturally and historically conditioned. Such temporal notions reflect "competing "interests" in a multiplicity of times."[108] Thus, in order to make time more controllable through power relations, the ideas about time and its significance must be objectified via clocks, schedules, calendars, normative codes, communicative acts and a politics of time. [109]

Rotenberg discusses the relations of power and temporality comparatively, exploring "how the symbolic actions of social time map the institutional actions of socially powerful."[110] He argues that the position of powerful intrinsically linked to the symbolic and behavioural constraints to those subordinate. The role of timekeepers provides the power holders with better capacity to control a greater number of activities. The power to time manifests itself in scheduling social consciousness of subordinates. Simultaneously institutionalised forms of temporality legitimate the position and authority of the powerful, transforming the

106 Gurvitch, G . 1964. The Spectrum of Social Time. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.: 174.
107 Rutz, Henry J. ed. 1992. The Politics of Time. American Ethnological Society Monograph Series, Number 4. Washington D.C.: American Anthropological Association: 1.
108 Ibid: 4.
109 Idem.
110 Rotenberg, R. 1992. Time and Order in Metropolitan Vienna. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press: 18.

producer of time into its product and creating temporal context to power.

Rotenberg[111] employs Eric Wolf's[112] the three modes of production – *kin-ordered, tributary* and *capitalist* in order to introduce different temporal patterns of power holders in order to organize and mobilize the labour of others.

In the kin-ordered mode, obligations of marriage and descent serve as legitimating appeal. In such agricultural and pastoral communities, family represents the most powerful constraint on temporal individual choice. "In this form of temporality, productive activities are organized through commitments of network reciprocity, residence, marriage and descent."[113] These commitments proved to be very persistent even in advanced capitalist societies, where "these same features reside in the organisations of households after they have met their commitments to external, public institutions".[114]

In tributary mode, external authority dominate individual choice through a combination of violence and ideology in order to extract various forms of tribute, while the calendars become instruments of coercion. In an attempt to replace the kin-ordered notion of time, tributary calendar appropriates already existing seasonal cycle for productive activities by attributing to them symbolic and ritual importance. Political domination serves legitimization of the temporal patterns of power holders.

In capitalist societies, it is the market to legitimize temporal choices of the timekeepers, "it is not moments, occasions, or relations that are ordered by time

111 Rotenberg, R. (1992). Time and Order in Metropolitan Vienna. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press: 18.
112 Wolf, E. R. (1982). Europe and the people without history. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chicago.
113 Rotenberg, R. (1992). Time and Order in Metropolitan Vienna. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press: 24.
114 Idem.

but categories of economically valued activities. Non-valued activities, personal time, sleep, and housework are unmarked, unremarkable and conventionally invisible."[115] The transition from the tributary to the capitalist mode can be understand as transition from repetitive sequence of meaningful days to repetitive sequence of meaningful activities.[116] As time becomes a business commodity, industry requires standardization, timetabling and precision in all aspects. The cosmic day gives up its temporal centrality for the power holders to the cost per hour. Karl Marx suggested that "the clock is the first automatic machine applied to practical purposes; the whole theory of production of regular motion was developed through it".[117]

Standardized timekeeping had important commercial implications to the length of the workday and work time discipline, when acceptance of the work giver's power to time was rewarded with higher salary.[118] Such discipline doesn't tolerate gaps, its logic requires thorough timing of all the production process and leads to increasing pressures of time.

The creation of unified time-structure has contributed to the increasing acceleration of both production and every-day life, driven by the criteria of time efficiency and rationality. As Toffler states,

> "Much otherwise incomprehensible conflict—between generations, between parents and children, between husbands and wives—can be traced to differential responses to the acceleration of the pace of life.

115 Ibid., p. 27.
116 Ibid, p. 28.
117 Gleick, J, (1999) *Faster: the Acceleration of Just About Everything,* Little, Brown and Company, London, p. 45.
118 Thompson J.D. (1967) *Organizations in Action: Social Science. Bases of Administrative Theory.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

The same is true of clashes between cultures." [119]

Private and domestic obligations are forced to compete against a dominant public schedule. The schedule aims to undermine the existence of social relations that may compete with the commitment to work activities.

Conventionality is a fundamental characteristic of the sociotemporal order, the specific domain formed by relations of power, in contrast to the pshychotemporal and biotemporal orders. Inspired by Weber's[120] and Simmel's[121] ideas about the "rationalistic" character of modern culture, Zerubavel[122] highlights "highly rationalized temporal orders"[123] of social life. Hence a major concern of his analysis is sociotemporal patterns which add to "the temporal rigidification of social situations, activities and events".[124]

Zerubavel[125] makes a reference to the medieval Benedictine monasteries and their schedules as the context of origin of temporal regularity of Western civilization. Regular timekeeping and punctuality in ringing the bells were essential to monastic life, given the centrality of temporal regularity to the monastery order. The genesis of the particular temporal organization of the West subsequently was crucially influenced by the invention of the mechanical clock. Zerubavel argues that monastic origin of the Western schedule plays an important part in its temporal patterns which are characterized by loss of spontaneity, utilitarian philosophy of time and abstract conception of temporality, and, finally, "the

119 Toffler, A. (1984) Future Shock. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group Inc.: 30.
120 Weber, M [1958] 2001. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism . Trans. Talcott Parsons. New York: Routledge.
121 Simmel, G. [1978] 2004 The Philosophy of Money . Ed. and trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby. London: Routledge.
122 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP.
123 Ibid, xvi.
124 Ibid: 2.
125 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP.

intricate relations between schedules and social solidarity".[126]

Zerubavel distinguishes sociotemporal order from physiotemporal and biotemporal highlighting its essentially socially constructed nature " which rests upon rather arbitrary social conventions".[127] Sociotemporal structuring of life differs from the physical and biological approaches to temporality, which emphasize objective qualities of time, in its attempt to constrain social live and activities into fairly rigid temporal patterns, based on the meaning people attach to subjective qualities of time. Zerubavel[128] highlights four major forms of temporal regularity which lead to construction of normative prescriptions:

1) rigid sequential structures;

2)fixed durations;

3)standard temporal locations;

4)uniform rates of recurrence.

Sequential structures fundamental to normative prescriptions of order in which situations and events take place. Although these structures based on organisational rationalities, their rigidity, to the point of irreversibility, is not natural, but purely symbolic in nature. Sequential order operates in terms of "before" and "after", minimizing simultaneous occurrence of events and activities. Sequential rigidity is manifested in ceremonial events (e.g. military parades, religious services, weddings, funerals), various rites of passage, sequential structure of career path and academic curricula. However sequential rigidity is not restricted to formal organisational life domains, but to informal (e.g. serving meals, courtship

126 Ibid, xiii.
127 Ibid, xii.
128 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP

rituals) as well. Zerubavel points out significance of notions of "fast" and "slow" for sequential rigidity, where "these terms refer primarily to sequential ordering, rather than to duration"[129] Notion of "fast" is commonly referred to a child, who skips developmental steps or reverse their order, while notion of "slow" may applied to a child who insist on ignoring the necessity to move to the next developmental stage.

Fixed duration of events and activities is often technologically and biologically determined, however conventional basis of the durational rigidity is apparent in "rounded off" time periods applied, for example, to classes in school, vacations, appointments, jail sentences and presidential terms. Failure to meet durational norms is evaluated in terms of "too early"("too short") or "too long".

Standard temporal location constitutes a third facet of temporal regularity which rules social events and human activity by means of schedules and calendars. It establishes normative prescription of "the proper time", imposes a norm of "punctuality", "which involves assigning a deviant character to the acts of being early or late."[130] As Murray Wax illustrates the key difference between naturally determined and conventional temporal locations,

> societies that live according to casual time recognize adolescence by the appearance of the appropriate social and physiological manifestations … societies that perceive time as a schedule grant this status according to time-serving – so many years of school or training[131]

Uniform rates of recurrence manifest themselves in "rhythmicity imposed on

129 Ibid, p.5
130 Ibid, p.8
131 Wax, M. (1960) "Ancient Judaism and the Protestant Ethic," American Journal of Sociology 65 : 452.

social life by the temporal spacing of numerous recurrent activities and events at mathematically regular intervals"[132] Normative prescriptions within this temporal regularity operate via notions of "too often" or "hardly ever". Rigid rhythmicity of our social life is based on "mechanical time" and it is not only independent of biological rhythmicity, but often even opposed to it.

As Kevin Lynch noted

> As men free themselves from submission to the external cycles of nature, relying more often on self-created and variable social cycles, they increasingly risk internal disruption.[133]

Zerubavel states that "the principle of temporal segregation is among the fundamentals of social life"[134] and challenges the view, according to which cyclical temporality is a specific attribute of traditional societies, while linear temporality is exclusively modern phenomenon. He suggests that both modalities of temporality coexist within the same society and culture.[135] Zerubavel states that profane time is best represented by linear, historical manner and sacred time is best distinguished by its ahistorical, cyclical character.

As Edward Leach argues,

> "Social time is made to appear discontinuous by inserting intervals of liminal, sacred non-time into the continuous flow of normal secular life ." [136]

132 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP

133 Lynch, K. (1972) What Time Is This Place? Cambridge : MIT Press, p. 119.

134 Zerubavel, E. (1981) Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life, Chicago: Chicago UP: 103

135 Ibid., p.113

136 Leach, E.R. "Two Essays concerning the Symbolic Representation of Time, " Rethinking Anthropology (London : Athlone, 1961), pp . 133-34 (83)

It's via scheduling and temporal segregation the continuum of time may be regarded as uneven, divided in time segments handled discretely in order to comfort human cognitive skill. Discontinuity, the preliminary condition of classification and temporal regulation, is crucial for our ability to transform nature into culture.[137]

1.2.2. Bourdieu's vision of temporal organization and the power of the state

According to Bourdieu, in order to understand the power of the state, it is essential to overcome the confrontation between a physicalist vision of the social world that perceives social relations as relations of physical force and a "cybernetic" or semiological vision which interprets them as relations of symbolic force, as relations of meaning or relations of communication.[138] The crudest relations of force are always, at the same time, symbolic relations. Acts of compliance and obedience embrace cognitive structures, forms and categories of perception, fundamentals of vision and division. The social world is constructed by social agents through cognitive structures that may be brought into play with all things of the world and especially with social structures. In some theoretical traditions these principles of vision and division are called "symbolic forms"[139] and "forms of classification".[140]

In less differentiated societies, the common principles of vision and division-the model of which is the opposition of masculine/feminine-are established in minds

137 Zerubavel, E. (1979) Patterns of Time in Hospital Life, Chicago: Chicago UP.;
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966), The Savage Mind, Chicago, University of Chicago Press
138 Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18 (12)
139 Cassirer. E. (1957). The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge.
140 Durkheim, E. ([1915] 1965) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Free Press.

and in bodies by the spatial and temporal organization of social life. Particularly through rites of institution that set up precise differences between those who introduced to the rite and those who did not. In modern western societies, the state plays a crucial role in the production and reproduction of the means of construction of social reality. As organizational frame and governor of practices, the state exercises a formative action through the range of restrictions and through the corporeal and mental discipline, consistently imposing it upon all social agents. Moreover, it enforces and inculcates all the fundamental norms of classification, based to sex, age, "skill," etc. It is found at the basis of the symbolic efficacy of all rites of institution, such as those regulating the family, or those that conduct through the routine functioning of the school system where durable and often unalterable differences are established between the chosen and the excluded, in the style of the rite of passage ceremony. [141]

The state constitutes and indoctrinates typical forms and categories of perception and obligation, social frameworks of perceptions, of understanding or memory, in other words, the state forms of classification. It thereby sets up the conditions for immediate arrangement of habituses which is itself the base of an agreement over these shared evidences essential for (national) common sense. Hence, for example, the important rhythms of the social calendar like the schedule of school or state holidays that regulate the "seasonal migrations" of many modern societies, accommodate both common objective referents and appropriate subjective principles of division which determine internal experiences of time compatible enough to make social life manageable. [142]

That the compliance we attribute to the dictates of the state cannot be

141 Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18 (13)
142 Idem

comprehended either as mechanical submission to an outer force or as conscious abidance to an order, because cognitive structures are not necessarily conscious *dispositions of the body*. The social world is full of calls to order that work as such only for those who are predisposed to regarding them as they activate deeply hidden corporeal dispositions, beyond the routes of consciousness and calculation. [143]

Symbolic order relies on the imposition upon all agents that they are in agreement with the objective structures of the social world. It is this immediate and inexplicit agreement, opposed to a declared contract, that establishes the relation of *doxic submission* which ties us to the constituted order with all the affiliations of the unconscious. The acceptance of legitimacy is not, as Weber thought, a free act of clear conscience. It is "rooted in the immediate, pre-reflexive, agreement between objective structures and embodied structures, now turned unconscious (such as those that organize temporal rhythms: viz. the quite arbitrary divisions of school schedules into periods)."[144]

It is this pre-reflexive compliance that explains the easiness with which the dominant enforces their domination:

> Nothing is as astonishing for those who consider human affairs with a philosophic eye than to see the ease with which the many will be governed by the few and to observe the implicit submission with which men revoke their own sentiments and passions in favor of their leaders. When we inquire about the means through which such an astonishing thing is accomplished, we find that force being always on the side of the governed, only opinion can sustain the governors. It is thus solely on

143 Ibid. 14

144 Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18 (14)

> opinion that government is founded, and such maxim applies to the most despotic and military government as well as to the freest and most popular.[145]

Indeed, the constituted order is not problematic, the doubting of the legitimacy of the state, and of the order it institutes, does not appear except in crisis situations. The state does not always have to give commands or to exercise physical enforcement in order to generate an ordered social world, as long as it is able to generate embodied cognitive structures that conform to objective structures and thus to guarantee the belief of which Hume spoke- that is to say, *doxic submission* to the constituted order. [146]

What seems to us today unquestionable, beyond consciousness and choice, has quite often been the achievement of bitter fights and established only as the result of persistent conflicts between dominant and dominated groups. The major effect of historical evolution is to abolish history by relegating to the past, i.e., to the unconscious, the lateral possibles that it eliminated. *Doxa, w*hat is taken for granted in any particular society, is a specific perspective, the perspective of the dominant, when it introduces and inflicts itself as a universal frame of reference, while it's the perspective of those who rule by dominating the state and who have imposed their frame of reference as universal by establishing the state.

1.2.3. Weber and Institutional Time Regulation

Even if Weber didn't produce an explicit sociological theory of time, it is possible

145 Hume,D. "On the first Principles of Government," in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, 1758. , as cited in Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18.
146 Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18.

to reconstruct a theoretical framework from some Weberian statements on temporality. Weber was very coherent in subjecting the statements, which he produced as a social scientist, to the limits of his own epistemology. Not lived experience (*Erlebnisse*), our own or others', past or present, of ideal types constitute the basis of causal attribution in history and the other social sciences.[147]

The definition of ideal types calls for broad knowledge of credible motives, rather than for the empathetic reflection on other people's mental processes in particular contexts. As a social scientist, Weber studied the subjective experience of time, and how this experience is affected by the social and institutional definitions of time. In this connection, he described the opposition – on the one hand – the semiconscious experience of time, distinguishing individuals and collectivities whenever traditional customs, mentalities, and styles of life prevail, with – on the other hand – it's extremely conscious individual experience and its rigorous social and institutional rules in specific circumstances.[148]

Thus social conduct, influenced by the prevailing formal rationality, embodied in the conduct of the public administration and the modern business. Stabilisation of conduct, both at work and in everyday life, stems not from tradition, but from the prevalence of these modern institutions, which require stability for their functioning. Often usual patterns of behaviour are no more natural, and do not show any link with tradition as a value. [149]

Modern capitalism has abolished the customary, less organized ways of working and having rest, that were once distinctive of entrepreneurs and factory workers. Instead, a very contrasting attitude and life style have predominated. The unrestrained commitment to work, defined as a profession, has been appointed,

147 Segre, S. (2000) *A Weberian Theory of Time.* In Time & Society, issue 9, nos. 2–3,p.147–70.
148 Idem.
149 Idem.

implemented and, at times, spontaneously offered, while the rule that 'time is money' has dominated minds of many entrepreneurs.[150]

Workers have been forced to conform to the institutional regulation of time by business companies, but social norms and individual dispositions of the workers alter the intensity and pace of their work. Regulation is most productive when social norms assist it. Spontaneous, voluntary consent to such a scrupulous constrained regulation of time, and in general to official rules, cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the formality of these rules may not be in accordance with personal exigencies. However, the power of bureaucratic domination presumes educated human resources that are recruited from advantaged social strata, and who employ their high school and university degrees to maintain invidious status differentiations against the less educated population. The privilege of education, besides its legal-rational legitimacy, supplies educated people with a source of legitimacy to bureaucratic domination.[151]

Similarly to Weber, Marx had a deep interest in the embeddedness of social time in the institutional environment provided by profit-seeking companies that seriously restrict the lives of people who are subject to their regulations, while working for impersonal markets. Marx also debated that working time is organized according to the demand of the company to produce goods which have a use value and an exchange value.[152]

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150 Weber, M. (1922b) 'Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist des Kapitalismus', in Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie. Tuebingen: Mohr.
Weber, M. (1922a) 'Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus', in Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, Tuebingen: Mohr.
151 Weber, M. (1956) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tuebingen: Mohr.
Weber, M. (1971) Gesammelte Politische Schriften. Tuebingen: Mohr.
Weber, M. (1984) Zur Politik im Weltkrieg. Tuebingen: Mohr.
152 Segre, S. (2000) "A Weberian Theory of Time." In Time & Society, issue 9, nos. 2–3,p.147–70: 155-57.

Any collective production by means of the social division of labour attempts to increase an exchange value. This value, in difference from use value, is defined by the average labour time required to produce any merchandise and to restore the workers' labour power. Exchange value is not delimited by the amount of labour time invested in the production of any particular product.[153]

The proportion between the surplus labour time and the necessary labour time shows the degree of the workers' exploitation. The total amount of labour time belongs to the employer, and its division between necessary and surplus labour time, is consequently the aspect of the capitalistic relations of production. Capitalism perpetually attempts to squeeze ever greater surplus value by increasing working hours, accelerating the pace of work, or rising work productivity with technological inventions.[154]

Socialism, according to Marx, would allow to the workers control and regulate collectively their labour time. Any extra time, which the productiveness of labour will make accessible, would be dedicated to the development of human abilities and to the constitution of a 'kingdom of freedom'.[155]

Weber did not agree to Marx's idea, that traditional patterns and values have been made inapplicable by capitalistic relations of production. Instead, he drew a line between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized long-standing patterns of practices and norms, and specified that the rational conduct, which distinguishes the business company as an institution, may be congruous with, and even reinforced by, traditional norms and values. In such case, the matching of labour -time rules by the company with the workers' own norms and values makes such

153 Idem.
154 Marx, Karl (1992-93). Capital: A critique of political economy, 3 vols. Penguin Classics.
155 Marx, Karl (1992-93). Capital: A critique of political economy, 3 vols. Penguin Classics.

rules especially functional.[156]

According to Weber, the business company, or the industrial company, is one of the regulative forces, beside the public administration, particular relevant to the institutional regulation of time in modern times. The hierarchy of authoritative power explains the employees' inability to control their own labour time. Capitalistic control of the tools of authoritative power, is consequently a particular case of a general process that distinguishes modernity, and that socialism would in no way modify.[157]

Simmel formulated his sociological thought on time with consideration of the cultural and social context of modernity, of which money is both the aspect and the cause.[158] Money, and hence capitalism, have altered the prior perception of time, consequently it has turned into something valuable, useful and scarce.[159] Money has also importantly accelerated the pace of life, by making financial transactions frequent and fast. The money economy put the end to the previous concepts of time according to natural events – the cycles of seasons, or of days and nights – while enforcing a rhythm of its own on modern individuals.

Indeed, high level of refinement and cultivation may reinforce the social norms controlling the ways of satisfying natural instincts, and the correct timing for such activities.[160] Simmel's dualism between objective and subjective culture[161] is defined by the dualism between

156 Segre, S. (2000) *A Weberian Theory of Time.* In Time & Society, issue 9, nos. 2–3,p.147–70: 155-57.
157 Idem.
158 Simmel, G. (1922) Philosophie des Geldes. Munich: Duncker & Humblot: 585
159 Ibid.:577
160 Ibid.
161 Frisby, D. (1992) *Simmel and Since. Essays on Georg Simmel's Social Theory*. London: Routledge; Molseed, M.J. (1987) 'The Problem of Temporality in the Work of Georg Simmel', Sociological Quarterly 28(3): 357–66; Weinstein, D. and Weinstein, M.A. (1989) 'Simmel and the Dialectic of Double Boundary: The Case of the Metropolis and the Mental Life', Sociological Inquiry 59:48–59.

- the impersonal, objective restraints stemming from modern institutions, and from the money economy,
- the purposelessness and fragmentation of personal existence.

Capitalism, and the factory in particular, imposed a pace on the employees' daily activity, while keeping uncertain the stability of their occupation and the continuity of their work.

Not only in commercial enterprise and industrial production, but also in the scientific, political, and artistic fields of social relations, the human activity distinctive for modernity have been rationalized mostly through time consumption, and the conduct is valued according to the rhythm of an efficient performance. The pace of social life accelerates or slows down depending on the amount of circulating money, and to the degree of stability of prices. The present-day inclination toward a great acceleration of the pace of life is proved by the speed of transactions yearly carried out through in the major stock exchanges, in the contemporary business world, and in the modern cities, which are the space of the monetary economy. Money, as the mobile exchange instrument of mediation between different economic goods, is the stable aspect of modern social life.[162]

The adventure – an abrupt, extraordinary, and meaningful experience, considered to be against the normality and predictability of everyday life – is then of special importance for individuals whose being is placed in the objectified context of contemporary life.[163]

Weber and Simmel coincide in their fundamental concern about the social regulation of time in the context of modernity and, particularly, of capitalism.

162 Simmel, G. (1922) Philosophie des Geldes. Munich: Duncker & Humblot
163 http://condor.depaul.edu/dweinste/theory/adventure.html (accessed 5 October 2016)

Both of them believed that education strengthens a coercive regulation of time. Though the theories on time and power relationships of Weber and Simmel have different objects:

- while Weber payed more attention to the institutional regulation of working time; Simmel observed the effects of the money economy as the fundamental existential condition of modern individuals,
- while Simmel mostly focused on time regulation within the factory, Weber believed that administrative organizations are also an important field of time regulation. The relevance of the money economy to the public administration was not articulated by Weber,
- Weber was more interested in how particular categories of people, and, especially, of factory workers, interact with the institutionally implemented restrictions about the pace of their activities, and in the motives of their circumstantial reactions.

According to Durkheim, in the course of time the process of social change has unfolded from simple, uniform, segmentary to complex and structurally differentiated societies. This evolutionary process may be described as 'normally slow, gradual, and small scale in character'.[164]

When social change comes about suddenly, it leads to a great collective crisis and shock, such periods Durkheim characterized as 'moments of effervescence' or 'periods of creation or revitalization'.[165]

Weber and Durkheim shared an opinion about the credibility of causal thinking in

164 Hinkle, R.C. (1976) `Durkheim's Evolutionary Conception of Social Change',Sociological Quarterly,17, 336–46. (343).
165 Durkheim, É. (1978). Review of Antonio Labriola. In M. Traugott (Ed.), Emile Durkheim on institutional analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

sociology and history, and a curiosity about the social construction and regulation of time, but some of their views and focus differed.

Weber concentrated on institutionalized organizations, while Durkheim emphasized the importance of the division of labor on the one hand, and the growing number and density of individuals, in addition to the speed of communications and pace of interactions, on the other, as major sources of time control in the context of modernity;

In contrast with Durkheim's focus on the 'macrofoundations of temporality' – to use Katovich's[166] clever expression – Weber defined the social regulation of time as the result of the clash between institutional norms, those of specific powerful groups, and individual predispositions or habits. Thoughts on power and collective meaning are consequently applicable in determining how time is socially regulated and played out in particular circumstances, such as – for example – daily or weekly cycles of work and leisure. Thus, such approach allows to combine micro- and macro-sociological aspect of the social construction of time.

Weber was particularly focused on the interactions between the non-institutionalized context, and the institutionally constructed and enforced regulation of time. He distinguished between formal (institutionalized) and informal (noninstitutionalized) social time. In keeping with the Weberian theory of time, the object of research would then be how these two concepts of social time interact in particular contexts.

Niklas Luhmann, similarly, to Weber, stressed the coercive regulation of time.

166 Katovich M. (1987) *Durkeim's macrofoundations of time*: An assessment and critique. The Sociological Quarterly: 28(3):367–385.

Luhmann's renowned essay on the *scarcity of time and the urgency of deadlines* points to the 'high interdependence of structures and processes that has come into existence in the course of the development of civilization', in order to explain the speeding-up of the pace of activities, the definition of their appropriate times, and the institutionalized assumption of longer waiting times.[167]

As Luhmann points out, problems with coordination of experiences, communications and other actions result in scarcity of time. The single constitutive parts of the social system raise their own claims on time, interrupting time planning by other parts. Conducive to maintaining costs and performance under control, it is essential to spend more time on the duty of coordinating time schedules and to set up deadlines as a way to reach a satisfactory amount of coordination. Establishing deadlines, however, appoints a prioritized order that does not adjust to other tastes and values.

Temporal coordination is achieved by different means: appointing strict deadlines, even though real time commitments cannot be predicted; promoting collaborative activities, rather than solitary ones; announcing distant deadlines in order to appoint sufficient time for compromises, so that incompatible values may be achieved with institutionalized opportunism; cultivating time scarcity as an ideological rule, and hence velocity as the approved way of managing institutional activities.[168]

The stress of time scarcity may be mitigated, to keep it from becoming destructive for the social system, by means of some specific institutional dispositions, such as the constitution of status variations, whereby those who are privileged in their status are able to have more freedom in managing their own time and to enforce

167 Luhmann, N. (1971) *Politische Planung*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag: 145.
168 Ibid: : 152–6.

deadlines on others, in such a way that they can deal with growing time pressure resulting from their advantaged status. It is often possible to refuse deadlines by counterweighting other deadlines that are supplied with a legitimacy of their own.[169]

Anthony Giddens set his sociological theory apart from Weber's, and that of others sociological classics, by analysing the relationship between time and space. Time measurement based on calendars and mechanical tools has standardized time worldwide, making coordination across time manageable, which in turn has allowed the control of space. Co-presence is not necessary to interact in space.[170]

As Giddens has debated that space no longer coincides with place, in contrast with the late 19th century spatio-temporal context. Space is more and more 'disembedded' – that is, 'lifted out' or stripped of place. The process of disembedding is supported by 'fostering relations between "absent" others, spatially far for face-to- face interaction'. The regulation of activities and social relations across time and space, which is not impeded by the physical absence of the actors, is based on this process.[171]

Disembedding mechanisms, and especially money, rely on trust, which is invested "not in individuals, but in abstract capacities",[172] and is consequently institutionalized.

In contrast to Giddens, Weber did not argue however that proximate, face-to-face, economic contacts have exhausted their relevance, but rather that they facilitate

169 Luhmann, N. (1971) Politische Planung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
170 Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
171 Idem.
172 Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

distant contacts. Market relations – even more so, commercial relations – imply trust among the partners, since they are generally available to anybody. Trust is institutionalized, as Weber states in agreement with Giddens, but simultaneously is best built via not fully institutionalized, personal contacts between the business partners, who may trust their partners' honesty and trustworthiness. Consequently, personal contacts are eased by, and even dependent on, involvement with highly privileged status groups.[173]

Barbara Adam made some noteworthy contributions to the sociology of time, seeking to embrace a plurality of conceptualizations, both sociological and non-sociological. According to Adam 'conceptualization in terms of levels', such as the times of nature and society, is recommended in order to reach 'a full understanding of time'.[174] All time is 'irreducibly social' , whether it is natural or biological, as it is rooted in human culture and constitutes human existential experience.[175]

Adam argues that human time must be studied simultaneously with the time of nature. Moreover, meanings and properties of temporal concepts in different societies are worth analysing. In modern industrial and capitalistic societies time, even that intended for education or leisure, is 'highly structured' and 'conceptualized as a resource'.'Structural relations of power, normative structure, and the negotiated interactions of social life' must be understood in relation to temporal concepts.[176]

Human time, and especially industrialized time, is transcended, to the extent that the past is appropriately conserved and archived for the management of the

173 Weber, M. (1956) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tuebingen: Mohr.
174 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press.
175 Ibid.; Adam, B. (1995) *Timewatch*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
176 Adam, B. (1990) *Time and Social Theory.* Cambridge: Polity Press: 109, 120.

present and future activity. Transcendence and power relations are constructs within which the social character of time is evident.

Time is then 'a essentially transdisciplinary subject' that must be researched by taking into account 'the theories, studies, and implicit utilization of time in the social and natural sciences'. [177] This point of view is further developed in more recent works, in which some troublesome issues of modernity, such as 'environmental degradation and hazards production', are described as rooted in the dualism between nature and culture, that she claims is characteristic of western industrial societies.[178]

As for Weber, he would probably point out that the use of time as a collective resource is constrained by a plurality of norms, not necessarily institutionalized nor agreed upon by all the actors. Nor are such norms necessarily 'embedded in the taken-for-granted realm of non-discursive knowledge',[179] since they may be explicitly articulated by conscious actors, striving to be consistent with ultimate values of their own (religious, social, or otherwise).

177 Ibid: 147-9
178 Adam, B. (1995) *Timewatch.* Cambridge: Polity Press: 12.
Adam, B. (1998) *Timescapes of Modernity.* London: Routledge: 126.
179 Adam, B. (1995) *Timewatch*. Cambridge: Polity Press: 51

1.3. Embracing changes in temporal contexts and power-structures

1.3.1.Modern temporal changes

Uncertainties of many sorts have always troubled human life, and human societies have always been vigilant about these uncertainties through collective practices of anticipation and risk minimization, and precautionary, future-oriented efforts.

In the recent past, the future was a domain of the gods. Nowadays it is perceived a human resource to be managed and used. The contemporary future is a "challenge to human control",[180] it must be calculated, predicted and insured through industrial activities. Humanity's attempt to reach out to the future is an essential aspect of culture dating back to prehistoric times. It was done "through the storage and preservation of food, the externalisation of knowledge in art, and the performance of rituals".[181]

The conscious extension into the future was carried through arts and writing in order to shape individuals of subsequent generations. Sacrifices, rituals and building of temples sought to pacify and affect the gods and ancestors, inhabiting the outer world, which were perceived as guardians of the future. And yet, Barbara Adam argues that industrial societies approach the distant and unknown in a different way:

> Safety, certainty and mastery are considered legitimate socioeconomic and political goals which arose with both the increasing power of science to move back the frontiers of the unknown, innovative technology, and the development of insurance to provide financial

180 Adam, B. (1998) *Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards*, Routledge, London:57.
181Idem.

> compensation for spoilt futures. These particular ways of reaching into the immediate, near and distant future are based not on bargaining with ancestors and gods but on a techno-economic relationship to a resource that is to be used, predicted, allocated, managed, sold, colonised and controlled in the present.[182]

The smooth flow of natural time was substituted by the discrete, measured instants of the mechanical clock around a century and a half ago. In recent years, however, alterations in timekeeping have come from various directions. One new challenger to the time of nature, but also to the motion of the mechanical dial clock, is the digital timepiece.[183]

Joseph Meeker, in his writing for *Minding the Earth Quarterly,* shares his thoughts about his digital watch:

> However accurate watches and clocks may be, they fail to tell the truth about time. My conventional watch (called these days an "analog" model) is a symbolic arrangement of numbers representing twelve adjacent hours, with continuously moving hands to indicate time passing. When I look at it I see a twelve-hour span, and I learn which part of it I am moving through. The watch measures time by rearranging its objects in space, which is analogous to what the solar system does. The speed of the hour hand is based upon the speed of the earth's daily rotation, so when I glance at my wrist I am reminded that the earth is in motion. Digital clocks and watches convey no such context. Impaired instruments that they are, they are unable to comprehend more than one instant at a time, with nothing to hint that there is a process going on that includes what went before and what

182 Adam, B. (1998) Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards, Routledge, London: 57

183 Levine, R. (1997). A geography of time: The temporal misadventures of a social psychologist. New York, NY: Basic Books: 79

> comes after. A digital timepiece resembles a highly trained specialist who has learned to do only one thing, to do it very well, and to ignore all surroundings and relationships. Digital watches and narrow visions fit together very well, and both are signs of our time.[184]

Digitalization of time has contributed to the unprecedented discreteness of time, along with ever-speeding tempo and urgency. When the sense of time urgency comes to be extreme and habitual-when people feel obliged to rush even in the absence of real external time pressures-it may cause what cardiac psychologists Diane Ulmer and Leonard Schwartzburd[185] call "hurry sickness". Alvin Toffler, in his popular book *Future Shock (1970),* [186] addresses the subject of tempo when he describes the psychic disruption provoked by too much change in too short a time. The trauma is not caused by the shock of change per se, but by the pace of change.

> During past eras, when change in the outer society was slow, men could, and did, remain unaware of this variable. Throughout one's entire lifetime the pace might vary little. The accelerative thrust, however, alters this drastically. For it is precisely through a step-up in the pace of life that the increased speed of broad scientific, technological and social change makes itself felt in the life of the individual. A great deal of human behavior is motivated by attraction or antagonism toward the pace of life enforced on the individual by the society or group within which he is embedded. Failure to grasp this principle lies behind the dangerous incapacity of education and psychology to prepare people for fruitful roles in a super-industrial

184 Meeker,J. Reflections on a digital watch. Quoted in Utne Reader (1987, September/October), 57.
185 Ulmer, D. K, and Schwartzburd, L. (1996). Treatment of time pathologies. In Robert Allan and Stephen Scheidt (eds.), Heart and Mind: The Practice of Cardiac Psychology, 32g-62. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
186 Toffler, A. (1970) Future Shock. New York: Random House.

society.[187]

As Zygmunt Bauman argues,

> People who move and act faster, who come nearest to the momentariness of movement, are now the people who rule. And it is the people who cannot move as quickly, and more conspicuously yet the category of people who cannot at will leave their place at all, who are ruled. Domination consists in one's own capacity to escape, to disengage, to 'be elsewhere', and the right to decide the speed with which all that is done - while simultaneously stripping the people on the dominated side of their ability to arrest or constrain their moves or slow them down. The contemporary battle of domination is waged between forces armed, respectively, with the weapons of acceleration and procrastination.[188]

Not only intensity of the tempo of life has changed, but also the duration of active part of the day. By means of electricity daily existence has been extended into the immediate future - the night, which turned into an extension of the time of work and pleasure. As Murray Melbin in the book *Night as Frontier: Colonizing the World After Dark* (1987) puts it,

> Society has broken form the boundaries of daytime. Organizations no longer sleep and instead pay attention to the events which happen everywhere.[189]

Not too long ago, the natural rhythm of one's daily life came to an end with the sunset. Even combats stopped with the arrival of night. The development of

187 Toffler, A. (1970) Future Shock. New York: Random House: 31
188 Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity.Cambridge: Polity Press: 120
189 Melbin M. (1987),Night as a Frontier. Colonizing the world after dark, Free Press, New York: 3

technology has brushed off the edge of night and people have filled the void with new activity. Electricity allowed to extend active life time by almost one third, without having to add one year to human life. All it took was a light-bulb which prolonged one's day from 8 pm to midnight. This expansion has become habitual because our society now counts on night-time activity to secure the well-being of those who are awake during daylight hours.

The night-time, like any frontier, has turned into a land of opportunity - and restrictions. This is the opportunity of overtime pay, if you are lucky. The voluntary choice of night work, according to one study, makes it possible for workers to escape the control and supervision of day shift work.[190]

However, this frontier not only holds opportunities, but also inflicts very serious constraints on individuals. Feeling pushed by economic and technological factors, company executives choose to rely on night workers to extract profits and minimise costs.[191] Night workers would often seek daytime work, driven by the knowledge that night work brings industrial accidents, low morale, fatigue, and the breakup of social routines. Physical, social, and psychological dimensions of the individual are thus dangerously affected under such conditions of work. Social research support unfavorability of night work shifts with findings about the overarching, negative impact of night work on family life,[192] already afflicted by low-paying service jobs.

Other technologies, notably electronic communication, weakened the space-body connection as distance lost its link with bodies. Getting over this conditioning

190 Mercure, D, Regimbald,D. and Tanguay, A.(1987) "Voluntary Night Work: To Remain Autonomous," Sociologie du Travail 29.3: 359-363
191 Dahrendorf, R. (1986): *Labour Market Flexibility.* Report by high level group expertise to the Secretary General. Paris: OECD.
192 Carpentier, J. and Cazamian, P. (1977) Night Work: Its Effects on the Health and Welfare of the Worker, Geneva: International Labour Office.

helped to bring near future into the present. While technological power led to the compression of time, eliminated both immediate and near futures an at the same time created and enslaved the long-term, open future and divorced the past populated by ancestors.

Since a socio-scientific perspective based on "timeless laws, abstract particles in motion, reversibility and endless transformation from one state into another", the future is perceived as a domain of only temporary uncertainty, fundamentally open to exploitation and control.[193]

As Hörning suggested over a decade ago:

> New technologies provoke new processes and experiences of temporal differentiation. New technologies may contribute to the reconfiguration of time, but when the plasticity of time becomes an object of reflection and change, time practices may start to challenge and subvert taken-for-granted uses of technology and may lead to a transformation of the technologies themselves. [194]

The growing accessibility of real-time data sources increasingly proposes that 'to know' turns out to be not so much about how to predict the future, but how to predict 'now', or even better, 'to grasp now before now has occurred'. The request for such knowledge generated a new genre of ahistorical research, which is a predictive research focused on knowing more about the present. Bollier[195] calls

193 Adam, B. (1998) Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards, Routledge, London: 58

194 Horning, K.H., Ahrens, D. and Gerhard, A. (1999) 'Do technologies have time?: new practices of time and the transformation of communication technologies', Time & Society, 8(2): 293-308 (305)

195 Bollier, D. (2010). The promise and peril of big-data. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute: 20

this kind of inquiry 'now-casting', where real-time data is utilized 'to describe contemporaneous activities *before* official data sources are available.' The more live methods and technologies become appropriated within the public sphere,[196] the more the issue about what it requests to do and live in and with the routine of the present is problematized. Therefore, this bring us a whole new set of time practices, each one distinguishing alternative sets of 'presents', eg. present present, past present, future present etc.[197] This can be linked to Schutz and Luckmann's[198] idea of continually interacting multiple life-worlds in which the temporal frames of both the 'past' and 'future' exist in the 'present' as body rhythms, social periods, cycles, social routines and so on. As Abbott argues:

> the "size" of the present is something encoded at any given time into the social structure… Moreover, just as there are many social structures that overlap, drawing the same individuals into do zones of different intersecting structures, so too do the presents those structures imply overlap and intersect.[199]

Romanyshyn, in his distinguished book *Technology as Symptom and Dream*,[200] explores the linear-perspective vision as one of the pivotal landmarks in the development towards the modern techno-scientific way of conceptualizing the world.

> The invention of linear perspective space initiated a revolution in human life. In the space opened up between the distance point and the

196 Graham, T. (2010a). Talking politics online within spaces of popular culture: The case of the Big Brother forum. Javnost – The Public, 17(4), 25–42.
Graham, T. (2010b). The use of expressives in online political talk: Impeding or facilitating the normative goals of deliberation?. In E. Tambouris, A. Macintosh, & O. Glassey (Eds.), Electronic participation (pp. 26–41). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
197 Adam. B. (2004) Time, Polity Key Concepts Series, Cambridge, UK &Malden, MA: Polity
198 Schutz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973). The structures of the life-world. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
199 Abbott, A. (2001). Time matters: On On Theory and Method, University of Chicago Press:235
200 Romanyshyn, R. (1989). Technology as Symptom and Dream. New York: Routledge.

> vanishing point a new self, a new body, and a new world were born. We are the heirs of that revolution…the self as a spectator behind the window has become the world's measure by making the world a matter of vision, an infinite vision which, in its singular focus and fixed intensity, has clarified the mystery of the world's depth in its explanations.[201]

Romanyshin[202] suggests that this artistic innovation prepared the ground for later philosophical and scientific changes. He affirms that this innovation of the fifteenth century grew into a cultural habit of mind that abstracts observers from their subject matters, separates the objects of vision from their context and, eventually, fragments those objects behind a mathematical grid. By perceiving the world through such a grid, 'reality' is interpreted from a living temporal process into a set of rigid numerical relations.

As Hanna Arendt[203] puts it, "Instead of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature or the universe—in the words of Heisenberg—man encounters only himself."[204]

Slowly, through many generations and accumulated knowledge the true meaning of the scientific revolution came to light.

> Only we, and we only for hardly more than a few decades, have come to live in a world thoroughly determined by a science and a technology whose objective truth and practical know-how are derived from cosmic and universal, as distinguished from terrestrial and "natural,"

201 Ibid: 65
202 Ibid.
203 Arendt, H.1998 [1958], The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
204 Arendt, H.1998 [1958], The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 261

> laws, and in which a knowledge acquired by selecting a point of reference outside the earth is applied to earthly nature and the human artifice.[205]

Barbara Adam links this deep-rooted distinction with believe in proximity of control over the future with:

> the impacts of synthetic chemicals, nuclear power and genotechnology, all technologies that express a belief in the potential knowability and controllability of the future: science may not be there quite yet, but, so this particular belief system insists, there is basically no cause for concern. The holy grail, the unifying theory, the solutions to the million-and-one hazards on the technological rebound, all are just around the next corner. Enlightenment and control are merely a question of time.[206]

Yet, the technologies themselves confront now their creators threatening not only prediction and certitude of the future, but the future itself. The greedy relation of industrial societies to "future presents and present futures and to spatially and temporally distant others" manufactures risk and uncertainty and poses moral and political dilemmas.[207]

1.3.2. Risk and uncertainty of late modernity

The collectively shared understandings about the goals, hopes and desires, about the future of industrial societies are challenged. The future failed to keep its openness, its quality of being a 'storehouse of possibilities' (Luhmann, 1976) and turned into a storehouse of risks and uncertainties (Beck, 1992). In terms of

205 Ibid: 268
206 Adam, B. (1998) Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards, Routledge, London: 58
207 Adam, B. (1998) Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards, Routledge, London.

temporal notions, this found expression in a loss of future orientation, accentuating discontinuities and uncertainties and thus the disruption of the linearity of time. The framework of social evolution as a perpetually progressing prosperity lost the validity it had during the time period after the Second World War. It seemed to have ceased: the end of mass-production, the end of permanent employment, the end of modernity, etc. While the coming on the scene structures could only be perceived through their temporal bond with what had been 'before', as *post*-industrial and *post*-modern.[208]

Beck[209] argues that risks can be differentiated from more general sources of uncertainty by their deep overlapping with practices and techniques for their estimation and control. Beck's takes into consideration not only a realist report of the emergence of new risks; it is a categorisation of the social construction of risk that comes along with the multiplication and dissemination of standards for the calculation and assessment of risks, and the consequences of such technologies and knowledge on everyday decisions and judgements.

The theory of the risk society, then, is shaped by an embracing historical narrative: while in traditional societies, multiple jeopardies to human and social well-being were mainly in evidence, they did not extend themselves to estimation in any systematic way but were instead ascribed to such external factors as divine source or cosmic destiny.

With the transition into industrial modernity, the emergence of the modern state and the rise of an instrumentally rational relation to both nature and social system,

208 Brose, H. G. (1989) 'Coping with Instability – The Emergence of New Biographical Patterns', Life Stories(5) : 3–260.
209 Beck, U. (1994) 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', pp. 1–55 in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds) Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge: Polity Press.

risks became the object of scientific measurement and evaluation, subject to rules of scientific causality and formal calculative rationality. 'Risk' in Beck's sense of the term was born with the arrival of these technologies. Such techniques of risk evaluation continued to be, throughout the period of industrial modernity, the responsibility of institutional elites in industry, labour, government and civil society – planners assigned with the task of calculating and assuming responsibility for the risks that might break the lives of others.[210]

It was not until the beginning of late or reflexive modernity, however, that several factors compiled to undermine the jurisdiction of institutional risk planning and to turn the burden of risk to individuals themselves – the decisive quality of the risk society.

With a vast augmentation in the range of technologies for the detection and evaluation of ever more risks, the assignment of rationalist concepts of causality and effect were overthrown by the downright omnipresence and mobility of societal risk itself.[211]

This effect went along with the reduced influence, under the ever-expanding strains of the market, of those collective institutions (states, civic institutions, labor unions, communities) whose purpose it was to employ risk-minimizing policies. While under the conditions of an earlier industrial modernity it might have been achievable for a corporate body of experts to define and describe these risks spatially and temporally, with the beginning of reflexive or late modernity the responsibility for calculation and preparedness plagued the individual.

This is especially true regarding social inequalities under the conditions of

210 Beck, U. (1994) 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', pp. 1–55 in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds) Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge: Polity Press.
211 Beck (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage.

reflexive modernity, which have been 'redefined in terms of an individualization of social risks':

> The result is that social problems are increasingly perceived in terms of psychological dispositions: as personal inadequacies, guilt feelings, anxieties, conflicts and neuroses . . . Social crises appear as individual crises, which are no longer (or are only very indirectly) perceived in terms of their rootedness in the social realm.[212]

Moreover, Beck[213] states, the augmentation and individualization of risk is a direct consequence of the growing reflexivity of modern society itself. Where once modernizing projects looked for the domestication of nature and the generation of wealth through the exploitation of natural resources, the frontiers of modernizing projects today face the side-effects of this primary modernity, in the form of unforeseen health consequences, environmental contamination, the displacement of communities and individual estrangement.

A crisis in the credibility of modernization processes themselves, in their prospects of everlasting growth through the application of rational schemes, is aggravated by an extensive reflection on the unintended consequences of this project, which comprises a generalized sense of anxiety about the personal future. Reflexivity of modernity, then, is transposed from institutions to the rational attitudes of a vigilant person.

For this self-reflexive individual, the inadequately developed risk awareness applied to everyday life happens to be a continuous issue, shaped by expert discourses and numerous available specific knowledges, which allow personal innovation and attentive action. Thus, with the transition from tradition to

212 Ibid: 100
213 Ibid.

modernity, risk has migrated from a domain defined by predestination and direct experience with calamity, to one delimited by science, abstract knowledge and expertise, where risk is moved within a relationship of trust between individuals and powerful institutions.

And with the beginning of late or reflexive modernity, with the break of this trust and the failure of these institutions, and with the growth of risk discourses, risk lost these qualities of predictability and control, generalized, diffused, and embedded into the practices of daily life itself, where it reigns as an ongoing and constantly re-emerging problem to which the individual is endlessly requested to attend.[214]

One important instrument of individuation of risk regards the reflexive formation of biography as a narrative of personal identity. The manufacture of a reflexive biography surpasses the retrospective representation of events and memories for integration into a narratively consistent form. It implies the projection into the future of a possible trajectory of anticipated outcomes and events. In an effort to carry out this narrative and manage these events, the individual is left struggling for resources.

Stripped of the assistance once provided by institutions such as the state, family and civil society, reflexive life-stories are projected into a world of precariousness and risk against which individuals have mostly their own resources to rely on.

Beck writes:

> In the individualized society, the individual must therefore learn, on pain of permanent disadvantage, to conceive of himself or herself as the center of action, as the planning office with respect to his/her own

214 Beck (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage.

> biography, abilities, orientations, relationship and so on . . . As a consequence the floodgates are opened wide for the subjectivization and individualization of risks and contradictions produced by institutions and society. The institutional conditions that determine individuals are no longer just events and conditions that happen to them, but also consequences of the decisions they themselves have made, which they must view and treat as such.[215]

Such an individualization of risk requires the increase of demands upon individuals that they consider their own future orientations as problems, that they confront the project of risk evaluation themselves, through advice from any of the countless institutional risk experts whose consultation is available in the form of life planning services, oriented towards medical, financial, career, family, investment or other uncertainties[216].

A subjective evaluation of these new risks demands the improvement of the individual's capacity to analyse information from a range of frequently competing sources and synthesize calculations of the probability of the outcomes of actions. This leads to an inflated awareness of risk in everyday life and a permanent state of anxiety and uncertainty about an ultimately unpredictable future.[217]

The individualization of risk orients the individual's attitude toward the occurrence of such risks, widening temporal horizons and 'responsibilizing' individual behaviour through the intense anticipatory regard for the future, even at the expense of the anxieties and uncertainties that accompany the anticipation of

215 Beck (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi: Sage: 135-6
216 Wynne, B. (1996). May the sheep safely graze? A reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide. In S. Lash, B. Szerszynski & B. Wynne (Ed.), Risk, Environment & Modernity (pp. 44-83). London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage.
217 Beck, U. (1994) 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', pp. 1–55 in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds) Reflexive Modernization. Cambridge: Polity Press.

numerous accountabilities.

As Zygmunt Bauman puts it,

> in the fluid and light as much as in the solid and heavy stage of modernity – individualization is a fate, not a choice. In the land of the individual freedom of choice the option to escape individualization and to refuse participation in the individualizing game is emphatically not on the agenda. The individual's self-containment and self-sufficiency may be another illusion: that men and women have no one to blame for their frustrations and troubles does not need now to mean, any more than it did in the past, that they can protect themselves against frustration using their own domestic appliances or pull themselves out of trouble, Baron Munchausen style, by their bootstraps. And yet, if they fall ill, it is assumed that this has happened because they were not resolute and industrious enough in following their health regime; if they stay unemployed, it is because they failed to learn the skills of gaining an interview, or because they did not try hard enough to find a job or because they are, purely and simply, work-shy; if they are not sure about their career prospects and agonize about their future, it is because they are not good enough at winning friends and influencing people and failed to learn and master, as they should have done, the arts of self-expression and impressing others. [...] Risks and contradictions go on being socially produced; it is just the duty and the necessity to cope with them which are being individualized.[218]

According to Bauman, modern settings teach an individual that risks must be faced and fought alone and help comes only in the form of advice. He defines the main contradiction of "fluid modernity", which should be tackled collectively, as

218 Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity.Cambridge: Polity Press: 34.

the ever-widening gap between the freedom for self-assertion and the individual resources to control the social context, which render such self-assertion unrealistic.[219]

The government of risk has emerged as an essential objective of contemporary governmental strategies, in so far as the aim of government is to set up connections between different modes of self-understanding and the purposes of organizations, institutions or states.

The government of risk entails the individualization of a personal concern for the future, and the adoption of a unique mode of temporality instructed by agents of governmental rationality: health researchers, demographers, financial forecasters, statisticians and environmental experts, coupled with the practical advice of therapists, consultants, legal advisors, insurance agents, real estate brokers and investment bankers.

This is a process requires a set of strategies meant to mobilize individuals against certain risks in the interest of safeguarding their own futures by cultivating in them a reflexive awareness of their own agency within an extended time consciousness, and accommodating them within a set of calculative practices relative to the future and its risks.

Mitchell Dean, following Pat O'Malley, has termed this everyday conduct the 'new prudentialism', which entails:

> The multiple responsibilization of individuals, families, households and communities for their own risks – of physical and mental ill-health, of unemployment, of poverty in old age, of poor educational performance, of becoming victims of crime. Competition between

219 Ibid: 36.

> public (state) schools, private health insurance and superannuation schemes, community policing and 'neighbourhood watch' schemes, and so on, are all instances of contriving practices of liberty in which the responsibilities for risk minimization become a feature of the choices that are made by individuals, households and communities as consumers, clients and users of services. [220]

This vision corresponds to Beck's discourse on the individualization of risk, describing those institutions, procedures and expert opinions which assist individuals in management of the risky futures into which their lives are projected. However, to understand the management of *subjective time consciousness* under conditions of late modernity, the activity generated by insufficiently reflexive part of the self must be taken into consideration. Useful resources for a better understanding of this matter can be found in *discourse on reflexivity and the habitus introduced by Pierre Bourdieu.*

1.3.3. Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the embodied temporal orientations and late modernity

Agency and self-awareness, are enormously influenced by dispersed and ubiquitous regimes of practice variously distributed across institutions and social space.[221] Among the most prominent recent developments of late modernity has

220 Dean, M. (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: SAGE: 166; see also O'Malley, P. (1996) 'Risk and Responsibility', in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government, pp. 189–207. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

221 Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences. London: SAGE;
Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (1994) Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press;
Alexander, J. (1996) 'Critical Reflections on "Reflexive Modernization"', Theory, Culture and Society 13(4): 133–38.

been the *transformation of personal time consciousness*, and the introduction of a uniquely reflexive future orientation integrated in the practice of self-government.

What Ulrich Beck terms the 'individualization of risk' is a process which is accompanied by many aspects of reflexive modernization, as individuals are constantly encouraged to adapt to more risk, to increase their awareness of the temporality of their own actions into an extended future and to adopt self-distancing perspective on their own conduct notwithstanding uncertain outcomes.[222] Nevertheless, limitations to Beck's approach have also been pointed out. The weaknesses of Beck's approach is in overemphasising the cognitivist dimensions ascribed to the 'individualization of risk'. Unlike Beck, Pierre Bourdieu treats the temporal dimensions of practice in a very different manner, accentuating the pre-cognitive dimensions of the habitus.

Under the settled conditions of life we find in a traditional society, where social assimilation and low levels of social differentiation are the standard, risk levels stay low, the congruity between field and habitus is comparatively stable and coherent, societal reflexivity is rather undeveloped and rarely do ordinary actors tackle the ethical problematization of their own temporal attitudes. However, under the more velocious and highly differentiated settings related to with late modernity, an awareness of the lack of congruity between habitus and field becomes more pervading. The breaks of the embodied temporality of action generate higher levels of reflexivity, and anxieties focused on risk and the

222 Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: SAGE.
Beck, U. (1994a) Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (1994b) Ecological Enlightenment: Essays in the Politics of the Risk Society. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1995) The Normal Chaos of Love. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (1996) 'Individualization and "Precarious Freedoms":
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences. London: SAGE.

technologies spread for the calculation and anticipation of risk display a greater and more ubiquitous presence in everyday life.[223]

Where the domains of social life multiply and fragment more and more, where a differentiation of life worlds and a growing autonomy of social fields call for mobility across an exploding diversity of sectors by ordinary actors, the connection of subjective prospects and objective outcomes, mediated by implicit, embodied notions, gets more and more inclined to disruption. In fact, many have integrated such abiding conditions of disruption into their routine habits or, as Sweetman has debated, 'the flexible or *reflexive* habitus may be both increasingly common and increasingly significant due to various social and cultural shifts'.[224] In these circumstances, behaviour adopts a more reflexive, even rationalist traits, as a specific time consciousness evolves into the object of a reflexive method of government.

As Bourdieu puts it:

> There will be no return to those social universes in which the quasi-perfect coincidence between objective tendencies and subjective expectations made the experience of the world a continuous interlocking of confirmed expectations. The lack of a future, previously reserved for the 'wretched of the earth', is an increasingly widespread, even modal experience.[225]

Actually, it is the necessity to cure the sense of a 'lack of a future' emerging from the absence of congruency between *habitus* and *field* that encourages individuals to think over their own *embodied temporal orientations*, to feel obliged to spread

223 Binkley, S. (2009) Governmentality, temporality and practice: from the individualization of risk to the 'contradictory movements of the soul'. Time&Society, Time & Society 18(1):86-105

224 Sweetman, P. (2003) 'Twenty-first Century Dis-ease? Habitual Reflexivity or the Reflexive Habitus', Sociological Review 51(4): 528–49.(529)

225 Bourdieu, P. (2000) Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press.: 234

out their future orientation, and to engage in work on themselves to come through this transformation.

Uncertainty in the demeanour of everyday duties, brought on by a sense of the hesitant fit between implicit expectations and the probability of successful realization of expected goals, stimulates in the individual a reflective self-distance and an awareness of the necessity to act on and improve an everyday habit, to contest the stubborn nature of a deep-rooted habit of doing things. The dynamism of these two conditions of practice – of reflexive self-awareness and the pre-reflexive nature of conduct – and the way in which the former takes the latter as its object, makes up a multidimensional practice.[226]

It is quite obvious that social-structural processes of modernization cannot develop without some consistency with the construction of subjective senses of self, in other words that social-structural shift through modernization must necessarily go together with a transformation of identity. Actors are increasingly dependent on a reflexive and instrumental concern for the resources and risks enclosed within the structures themselves, and learn planning strategies allowing them to negotiate these risks in creative, self-responsible ways.[227]

To understand the unruliness of social structures in the unconscious categories of individual practice, we can employ Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the habitus. Bourdieu's theory of the habitus is famous and will be only discussed here in its relation to his less widely known theory of temporality.[228] The habitus represents a 'structuring and structured structure', a system of *bodily habits where social*

226 Binkley, S. (2009) Governmentality, temporality and practice: from the individualization of risk to the 'contradictory movements of the soul'. Time&Society, Time & Society 18(1): 86-105.
227 Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
228 Binkley, S. (2009) Governmentality, temporality and practice: from the individualization of risk to the 'contradictory movements of the soul'. Time&Society, Time & Society 18(1): 86-105.

positions are internalized, established and lived through everyday practice, yet incorporated as an interchangeable set of bodily logics, or a 'bodily hexis', assisting as a reproductive set of principles for the structuring of conventional actions and conducts.[229] Unlike the rational, reflexive attitudes of individualized subjects involved in the management of risk or the reflexive management of the self, the habitus is the place in which the influence of social structures endures in the pre-reflexive habits of the body and is transformed into perceived as natural and customary aspects of daily conduct, which consecutively recreate those structures.[230]

Yet, habitus cannot be comprehended separately from the fields of action in which such embodied logics are applied through practice, or from the anticipating structure of action in which the relation between habitus and field is actualized. In fact, habitus itself represents a particular temporality: it is experienced as a position within a specific field related to the opportunities and resources offered by this field.

The anticipation of results of actions embodied in the habitus find a natural and pre-reflexive fit with the obstacles, constraints and possibilities enforced by a particular field, with the easiness and likeliness of favorable (i.e. profitable) outcomes growing proportionally with the development of applied knowledge about the field. This knowledge is located within actions carried out within that field and is internalized, embodied and integrated in the pre-reflexive habitus; in the 'feel for the game' that determines the habitus.[231]

229 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 93

230 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bourdieu, P. and Eagleton, T. (1999) 'Doxa and Common Life: An Interview', in S. Zizek (ed.) Mapping Ideology, pp. 265–77. London: Verso.

231 Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 80

Bourdieu placed temporal notions, and the particular relation to the future installed in temporal practices, at the core of his discourse on the habitus. For Bourdieu, time is the outcome of the relation between felt anticipations and the restraints of given circumstances, or the adjustment of habitus to the fields of practice:

> Far from being a condition a priori and transcendent to historicity, time is what practical activity produces in the very act whereby it produces itself. Because practice is the product of a habitus that is itself the product of the embodiment of the immanent regularities and tendencies of the world, it contains within itself an anticipation of these tendencies and regularities, that is, a nonthetic reference to a future inscribed in the immediacy of the present. Time is engendered in the actualization of the act, or the thought, which is by definition presentification and depresentification, that is, the 'passing' of time according to common sense.[232]

Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the temporality of practice is important because it let us understand the future orientation of settled agency in a manner that embraces the particularly *pre-cognitivist dimensions of action.* As Lois McNay puts it:

> Habitus suggests a layer of embodied experience that is not immediately amenable to self-fashioning. On a pre-reflexive level, the actor is predisposed or oriented to behave in a certain way because of the 'active presence' of the whole past embedded in the durable structures of the habitus.[233]

Such an approach recognizes the durability of those solidified patterns of social

232 Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press: 138

233 McNay, L. (1999) 'Gender, Habitus and the Field', Theory, Culture and Society 16(1): 95–117 (102)

order which appears to decline under the conditions of reflexive modernity. However, such structures *run deep into the pre- reflexive field of the body and embodied agency,* and play significantly within the organization of *individual temporalities* in quotidian conduct.[234]

As Bourdieu states in *Pascalian Meditations,*[235] there is, in the anticipating structure of agency, a pressure or ambiguity rooted into the possibility of the connection between *subjective expectations* and *objective opportunities*, or *habitus* and *field*. This possibility can, under certain conditions, present the setting for nascent forms of reflexivity.

Where the anticipations embodied in the habitus are coordinated with the limits dictated by a field, and where the skills of management of those limits are established in embodied capacity for the execution of practices, time flies by – *smooth actions call for little reflection and life is experienced on 'automatic pilot'*. But when the quotidian practice is defined by a lack of correspondence between habitus and field, where the felt expectation or possibility of action appears as more and more ambivalent in regard to the objective conditions of action, agents perceive their own embodied anticipations and their somatic attitudes to the future results of actions as problematic; they are inclined to be reflexive about the risks and futures of their own actions.[236]

As Lisa Adkins states,

> When the adjustment between habitus and field is broken

234 Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1987) The End of Organised Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press; Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Economies of Signs and Space. London: SAGE.
Csordas, T. J. (1999) 'Embodiment and Cultural Phenomenology', in G. Weiss and H. Forn Habor (eds) Perspectives on Embodiment, pp. 143–64. London: Routledge.
235 Bourdieu, P. (2000) Pascalian Meditations. Cambridge: Polity Press.
236 Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1992) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

> increased possibilities may arise for critical reflection on previously habituated forms of action'.[237]

According to Matthew Adams,[238] under the conditions of fast social change, globalization and cultural pluralization, conditions of defined by as, reflexivity can become a perpetual requirement of economic and professional life, taking form of a 'hybridization of habitus and reflexivity'. The interaction of these two patterns – of reflexive self-awareness and the pre-reflexive dispositions of behaviour – and the way in which the former takes the latter as its object, symbolizes a multidimensional ethical practice under conditions of late modernity.

According to Jeremy Rifkin,[239] temporal concerns will increasingly dominate the politics of the future. The common split in the political field between left and right wings will be substituted by a "new temporal spectrum with empathetic rhythms on one pole and power rhythms on the other." Political forces locating themselves within the power time frame believe in the values of efficiency and speed that are inherent to the "time is money" dogma of the modern age. Advocates of the empathetic time frame argue against "the artificial time frames that we have created ... Their interest is in redirecting the human consciousness toward a more empathetic union with the rhythms of nature."[240] Rifkin promises that "Politics, long viewed as a spatial science, is now also about to be considered as a temporal art."[241]

237 Adkins, L. (2002) Revisions: Gender and Sexuality in Late Modernity. Buckingham: Open University Press: 27
238 Adams, M. (2006) 'Hybridizing Habitus and Reflexivity: Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Identity?', Sociology 40(3): 511–28.
239Rifkin, J. (1987). Time Wars. New York: Henry Holt
240 Ibid: 2
241 Ibid: 5

CHAPTER 2. CHILDHOOD AND TIME

2.1. Childhood through the ages

All human beings have experience of being a child, nevertheless conceptualisation of childhood is a matter of academic debate across a range of disciplines. Some writers have argued that our current idea of childhood must be regarded as the product of modern western societies which simply did not exist in pre-modern times. This opinion states that the idea of childhood was 'invented' in the seventeenth century and the concept of childhood as we know it now lacks resemblance with what our ancestors thought of as childhood. This chapter will present an overview of the history of childhood seeking out indicators of change and continuity in understanding of children and childhood over the course of time.

2.1.1.Childhood: the discovery

The focus on medieval times as crucial for the emergency of the idea of childhood as a distinctive life stage is strongly associated with the French author, Philippe Ariès, whose book *Centuries of Childhood*, first published in the 1960s, has been notably influential in present-day discussions of the subject. Its appearance is associated with the beginning of the systematic study of the history of childhood. It is, perhaps, hardly surprising that this sub-discipline should originate in France. After the Second World War, the Annales school of history, which was well-recognized in France, expressed the need for new approaches to the study of society by historians. Ariès belonged to this school and sought to open up a whole new field of enquiry by bringing into focus the history of childhood.

Approaching the history of childhood, it is important to keep in mind the difficulties of historical research. Some limitations arise from an inevitably partial nature of the material available. Guidance manuals, law and policy initiatives contain idealized views and normative assumptions, rather than objective reflections of historical realities. Likewise, cultural and temporal contexts have power to influence selective use of historical evidence. The conclusions drawn by Ariès and other historians of childhood has been construed from a specific standpoint, that of modern Western societies, with the associated connotations that past behaviour is being judged according to specific situated contemporary standards.[242]

In an widely cited passage, Ariès said:

> In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with affection for children; it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. In medieval society, this awareness was lacking. That is why, as soon as the child could live without the constant solicitude of his mother, his nanny or his cradle-rocker, he belonged to adult society. That adult society now strikes us as rather puerile: no doubt this is largely a matter of its mental age, but it is also due to its physical age, because it was partly made up of children and youths.[243]

Ariès' claim regarding the "discovery", which has been both enthusiastically adopted and actively dismissed by scholars from various disciplines, is more

242 Smith, R. (2010). A Universal Child?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 33
243 Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, Oxford, England: Vintage books: 128

multifaceted than it may seem. Although in this passage Ariès makes an attempt carefully distinguish between a mental concept and everyday experience, the book was often "interpreted as saying that nobody could have experienced being a child until the idea of childhood had been invented."[244] As Hugh Cunningham[245] points out the problem lies in the translation, the English translation of Ariès's book uses the term "idea" where Ariès himself had used the term "sentiment." The difference between these two terms is pivotal. "Sentiment" holds two meanings: "the sense of a feeling about childhood as well as a concept of it".[246] Ariès did not intend to accentuate that individual medieval families did not show affection for their children, but rather that childhood was not perceived and valued as a distinct phase of human life. Thus, he asserted, there was much less division between adults and children in medieval society.

Even the term 'child', according to Ariès, didn't hold the restricted meaning which we intend nowadays, "people said 'child' much as we say 'lad' in everyday speech". [247]

> The idea of childhood was bound up with the idea of dependence: the words 'sons', 'varlets' and 'boys' were also words in the vocabulary of feudal subordination. One could leave childhood only by leaving the state of dependence, or at least the lower degrees of dependence. That is why the words associated with childhood would endure to indicate in a familiar style, in the spoken language, men of humble rank whose submission to others remained absolute: lackeys, for instance,

244 Cox, R. (1996). Shaping childhood: Themes of uncertainty in the history of adult-child relationships. London ; New York: Routledge.: 2.
245 Cunningham, H. (1995) Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500,London and New York: Longman
246 Ibid: 30.
247 Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, Oxford, England: Vintage books: 128.

journeymen and soldiers. [248]

At the same time, noble families utilized a word 'child' in reference to the first age, as they enjoyed more freedom and power, only physical weakness of the people who belonged to a high social class could be a cause of dependence, and that was the case with little family members, who couldn't take care of their bodies.[249]

However, within the medieval society, the child could occupy a place that was hardly distinguished from the adult.[250] Children worked, played, celebrated religious festivals, and witnessed birth and death just as adults did. The "monovalency" and continuity of the medieval world—the stability and continuity of customs and values over time—secured that adult life was present and visible to the children and that they could integrate in it without any special training or effort.[251]

Much of the evidence for the Ariès conclusion that childhood was discovered in the seventeenth century was derived from the paintings, literary texts and manuals, references to the child as 'it', and the use of the names of dead children for younger siblings in the same family. The selective use use of limited and partial data is believed to influence his conclusions.

Drawing on evidence relating to paintings of children, to their adult-like clothes and non-appearance in visual art, he has suggested that this depicted "a marked indifference …to the special characteristics of childhood".[252] Despite his emphasis on the seventeenth century, he also describes 'discovery of childhood' more as a

248 Ibid: 27
249 Idem
250 Ibid
251 van den Berg, J. H. (1961). The changing nature of man. New York: W. W. Norton.
252 Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, Oxford, England: Vintage books: 50

process than a sudden transformation which “began in the thirteenth century, and its progress can be traced in the history of art in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries”.[253]

The problematic nature of Ariès’s use of evidence consists, as well, in great reliance he places on specific forms of representations which he interprets as general truths. Pollock notes, for instance, that the practice of dressing children over the age of 7 as adults, "should not be taken to mean that they, therefore, entered the adult world”.[254]

Ariès also states that there was little or no differentiation between children and adults in the forms of recreation in which they participated. Although a special category for infants did exist, as they were too fragile to engage in adult's activities, Ariès suggests that “the little one did not count because she could disappear.”[255]

Some researchers[256] argue that medieval parents were not particularly sentimental about childhood, as sentimentality requires distance, a feeling of having lost something that is therefore cherished. Medieval childhood was not precious because the adults had not yet lost it.

As Barbara Tuchman[257] points out, childishness was a characteristic of medieval behaviour independently of age, which meant that there was not much difference between adults and children. They experienced the same physical and symbolic

253 Ibid: 47
254 Pollock L. H. (1983) Forgotten Children: Parent–Child Relations from 1500 to 1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 49
255 Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, Oxford, England: Vintage books: 128
256 Hanawalt, B. A. 1993. Growing up in medieval London: The experience of childhood in history. New York: Oxford University Press; Shahar, S. 1990. Childhood in the middle ages. Trans. C. Galai. London and New York: Routledge.
257 Tuchman, B. W. 1978. A distant mirror. New York: Knopf

world.

Postman[258] argues that the fostering of shame is a turning point in the history of childhood. One of the ways adults maintain their separation form children is that they keep certain facts of life secret from their children, especially facts that have to do with sexuality. One of the main differences between an adult and a child is that the adult is familiar with certain facets of life— its contradictions, its violence, its tragedies—that are not believed to be not suitable, and even shameful, for children to know. In the modern world, as children progress towards adulthood, we reveal these secrets to them gradually in an age-appropriate way. However, this practice is possible only in a culture in which there is a clear distinction between the adult world and the child's world, and where there are institutions that preserve that difference. The medieval world made no such differentiation and had no such institutions.[259]

We can also say, "the child is only childlike in comparison to what is not childlike",[260] and when adults become unlike children the true nature of childhood manifests:

> Children become children when adults become more "adult." A change in our understanding of adulthood brings with it a change in childhood. As long as the adults existed in the same visible and understandable lived world as the children, the difference between them did not matter. The difference was more one of size and economic status than a psychological reality."[261]

Affectionate parenting practices would fail to fulfil goals of upbringing as they

258 Postman, N. 1994. The disappearance of childhood. New York: Vintage.
259 Postman, N. 1994. The disappearance of childhood. New York: Vintage: 15
260 van den Berg, J. H. (1961). The changing nature of man. New York: W. W. Norton: 32
261 Simms, E.M. (2008) The child in the world: Embodiment, time, and language in early childhood. Detroit: Wayne State University Press: 199.

were perceived at the times. In fact, given the high infant mortality rates in the Middle Ages, at least half of all children born would fail to reach the age of ten. [262]

Ariès perceived as a contributing factor to parents' emotional disengagement from children. The absence of a distinct focus on children can be explained by the risk of investing in close emotional attachments to children whose prospects of long-term survival were very uncertain: “People could not allow themselves to become too attached to something that was regarded as a probable loss”.[263]

In contrast to Ariès, Hugh Cunningham emphasizes emotional vulnerability of parents forced by the historical context of life to come to terms with deaths of their children all too often :

> When we look at the history of childhood we are constantly confronted with parents trying to cope with the deaths of their children, and children facing the possibility of their own deaths or those of their siblings . King Alfred asked, 'What sight is more intolerable than the death of a child before its father's eyes?'[1] a pain greater than any he could imagine. The omnipresence of death could not be ignored. People would have been particularly aware of it during and after the fourteenth century Black Death, in which one in three of the population died, the young being particularly vulnerable.[264]

Pollock likewise has suggested that parental affection was not diminished by high infant mortality rate, proved by parents' efforts to secure their children's survival even in calamitous circumstances :

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262 Cunningham, H. (1995) Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500,London and New York: Longman: 21

263 Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life, Oxford, England: Vintage books: 38

264 Cunningham, H. (1995) Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500,London and New York: Longman: 21

> Parents living in cultures where there is every possibility that young children will die, do not “ignore” their children but adapt their methods of child-rearing in such way as to maximise their offspring's chance of survival.[265]

The evidence suggested that `religious' morality was conditioned by the high infant morality rates of the time and was focused on preparing children for death,[266] while parent's duties concentrated on saving the child's soul for the life in the hereafter.

As Stone[267] argues the spiritualisation of the household brought an intense interest in children, a greatly increased concern for their welfare and to an involved mother-child relationship. However, since the aim of parenting was the rise of inner discipline in the child, mothering, in particular, was was perceived as a serious duty:

> Many late sixteenth and seventeenth century mothers were both caring and repressive at the same time for the simple reason that the two went together. Puritans in particular were profoundly concerned about their children, loved them and subjected them to endless moral pressure. At the same time they feared and even hated them as agents of sin within the household, and therefore beat them mercilessly.[268]

The Enlightenment brought the shift of attention away from the effects of original sin, to the effects of socialisation. The struggle to establish the innocence of the newborn child was begun in the late seventeenth century, but it was never an easy

265 Pollock L. H. (1983) Forgotten Children: Parent–Child Relations from 1500 to 1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 51.
266 Burman, E. (2008a) Deconstructing Developmental Psychology, 2nd edition. London: Brunner Routledge: 71.
267 Stone, L. (1979) The Family Sex and Marriage in England 1500- 1800. Abridged version. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
268 Stone, L. (1979) The Family Sex and Marriage in England 1500- 1800. Abridged version. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books: 125.

fight and success has never been guaranteed (even nowadays). A new, radical dimension to parental responsibility was implied by the Enlightenment thinkers, "by suggesting a tension between the necessity of teaching and training the young child, and a desire to preserve the autonomy of the emerging adult".[269]

2.1.2. The child of the Enlightenment: the example of Locke and Rousseau

One of the important hallmarks of the Enlightenment is a shift in emphasis from concepts of *being* to concepts of *becoming*; a shift of focus from the absolute to the relative, from the fixed state to the historical tendency.[270]

Amongst the many consequences of this gradual split from conventional certainties was "a growing fascination with that changeable, changing and disordered period of human existence, childhood."[271]

As Porter states, Enlightenment thinkers "were above all *critics,* aiming to put human intelligence to use as an engine for understanding human nature, for analysing man as a sociable being, and the natural environment in which he lived".[272]

John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are two thinkers whose contemplation of the concern of educating children still dominates attention at the end of the twentieth century. Locke has often been considered as a founding father of the

269 Cox, R. (1996). Shaping childhood: Themes of uncertainty in the history of adult-child relationships. London ; New York: Routledge: 49.
270 Baumer, F. L. (1977) Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600-1950, New York: Macmillan: 20.
271 Cox, R. (1996). Shaping childhood: Themes of uncertainty in the history of adult-child relationships. London ; New York: Routledge: 48.
272 Porter, R. (1990) The enlightenment. London: MacMillan: 3.

Enlightenment because ideas of his were so often adopted and elaborated upon by eighteenth-century thinkers. Rousseau, on the other hand, was a member of the narrower intellectual school of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, but within that school, he was perceived as a rebel and an "alienated voice".[273]

The idea about early years as formative of children's long-term prospects is one of the most ancient and can be traced back at least as far as Plato (428-348BC):

> And the first step… is always what matters most, particularly when we are dealing with the young and tender. This is the time when they are taking shape and when any impression we choose to make leaves a permanent mark.[274]

These thoughts found new shape in Locke's idea of human perfectibility[275] and the necessity for parental watchfulness and constant correction of the child's natural instincts, which suggested the opposite possibility—that children unmonitored and untutored would fall well short of this goal.

Eighteenth century French writer and philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's writings on child rearing promoted the superiority of acknowledgement of the child's natural inclinations as the best guide to parenting.

> While Rousseau was effectively an antidote to Locke, the belief in the child's destiny as an unfolding natural phenomenon shared the assumption that children's growth revealed a progression of changes,

273 Cox, R. (1996). Shaping childhood: Themes of uncertainty in the history of adult-child relationships. London ; New York: Routledge: 47
274 as cited in Clarke, A. and Clarke, A. (2000) Early Experience and the Life Path, London, Jessica Kingsley: 11
275 Locke, J. ([1693]1996) Some thoughts concerning education: and, Of the Conduct of the Understanding .Hackett Publishing

for ill or good.[276]

Lock and Rousseau contributed to the development of one of the most influential themes shaping childhood policy - conception of childhood *innocence.* First, emanating from Rousseau, children are awarded a purity, by virtue of their *special nature.* Rousseau[277] suggested even a special kind of activity for children- *play is the child's work*- and modern psychologists seemed to agree that early childhood is the "play age". Play, according to Rousseau, is truly the child's work, because in play the child changes the world and his- or herself. Emerging from the Enlightenment, they are the Ideal immanence, and the messengers of Reason. It is the experience of society which perverts them. Rousseau believed that childhood could be violated by improper treatment, and that the child could be accordingly robbed of childhood; such ideas were essential to the formulation of a modern concept of abuse.

A second engagement with childhood innocence stems from Locke's claims about 'tabula rasa': children are thought to be innocent, not innately, but, like halfwits, as a consequence of their lack of social experience. This idea entails that children could be shaped by all kinds of experiences during their life. Through time the unknowing, unworldly child may become corrupted by society. Locke suggested that the power that parents have over their children, comes from the duty, which is obligatory for them to take care of their descendant, during the "imperfect" state of childhood.[278]

After discovering the child, the new notion of family was introduced to protect the

276 Lassonde, S. (2004) "Age and Development" in Encyclopedia of children and childhood : in history and society, ed. Paula S. Fass, New York: Macmillan Reference, 138-45. (43)
277 Rousseau, J. J. ([1762]1979) Emile, or On Education. Trans. A. Bloom. New York: Basic Books.
278 Matthews, Gareth B. (2008) "Getting Beyond the Deficit Conception of Childhood: Thinking Philosophically with Children," Philosophy in Schools, M. Hand and C. Win Stanley (eds.), London: Continuum, 27–40.

"young plant" against the dangers of the adult world. Jean-Jacques Rousseau expresses this sentiment perfectly. In his book *Emile,* he advises mothers:

> It is to you that I address myself, tender and foresighted mother, who are capable of keeping the nascent shrub away from the highway and securing it from the impact of human opinions! Cultivate and water the young plant before it dies. Its fruits will one day be your delights. Form an enclosure around your child's soul at an early date. Someone else can draw its circumference,but you alone must build the fence.[279]

The adult world was no more perceived as safe for children, and adult life has become so complex that it required from children almost two decades to catch up with their elders.

> The thirteenth century laughed about the failed attempts of children to be adults; the Renaissance looked at the child developmentally for the first time and appreciated the child's difference and innocence; the seventeenth century developed pervasive schooling and the nuclear family; and the eighteenth century finally called for the complete separation between children and adults because the adult world was seen as too corrupting in its influence on the young. In the portraits of the eighteenth century the child becomes cute, innocent, and helpless.[280]

2.1.3. Piaget, Vygotsky and developmental psychology

The idea of development in children stem from a set of older ideas about natural and human history. By the midnineteenth century, ideas about evolution, development, and progress had been securely established as the foundation for the

279 Rousseau, J. J. ([1762]1979) *Emile, or On Education*. Trans. A. Bloom. New York: Basic Books: 37-8

280 Simms, E.M. (2008) The child in the world: Embodiment, time, and language in early childhood. Detroit: Wayne State University Press: 210.

idea of development. Evolutionary history (phylogeny), individual development (ontogeny), and social change (history) all sustained and revealed development. The idea of development presumes that human change in time has a direction, an end and that its later stages build on earlier stages and are more developed and "better". The Swiss psychologist Jean Peaget[281] suggested formal operations as the universal end of cognitive development. For Piaget, formal operations represented the most all-inclusive and logically convincing organization of thought.[282]

Piaget's empirical studies on the development of thought and intelligence depict the necessary and clearly defined stages of intellectual growth that start from *sensory-motor* intelligence right after birth, and continue through *preconceptual* thought, *intuitive* thought and *concrete* operations up to the level of *formal operations*, for the majority of people, in early adolescence. These stages are arranged sequentially and hierarchically in time from low status, infantile, 'figurative' thought to high in hierarchy, adult, 'operative' intelligence. This introduced a narrative of cognitive growth that is by now universal and overwhelming. The 'figurative' cognition that is an innate attribute of the state of childhood is represented by focussed activity, being caught in the here and now and a subsequent inability to transfer experience or training from one situation to another. The child, for Piaget, is haunted by the continual and highly concrete reproduction of object states; it is dominated by objective structures and occupies a material universe. Moreover, figurative thought ignores distance or contemplation; it is structured through affective responses in particular settings,

281 Piaget, J. (1997). The child's conception of the world: Jean Piaget: Selected works (A. Tomlinson & J. Tomlinson, Trans.). London: Routledge; Piaget, J. (1997) The child's construction of reality. Abingdon, Oxen: Routledge; Piaget, J. (1959) The Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

282 Cahan, E. (2994) "History of the Concept of Child Development" in Encyclopedia of children and childhood : in history and society, ed. Paula S. Fass, New York: Macmillan Reference, 152-56. (152)

this mode of thinking we would normally call 'childish'.[283]

Operative intelligence, on the other hand, the desirable conclusion of the development, belongs to the stage of adulthood. It is manifested in the informed cognitive manipulation and transformation of objects by a contemplating subject. Operative intelligence is a goal; it represents logical process and freedom from tyranny of immediate experience. Within Piaget's system each stage of intellectual development is characterized by a specific 'schema' or distinct pattern and sequence of physical and mental activities controlling the child's orientation to the world. Thus the growth has a *rhythm and a calendar too*. The development and shift from figurative to operative thought, through a temporally arranged stages, incorporates an achievement standard. The transition depends on the child's skilfulness and accomplishment of the mental schemes at each stage. [284]

Due to his only focus on the abstracted epistemic apprehender, Piaget ignored s skilfulness and accomplishment of the mental schemes at each stage. [285]

Due to his only focus on the abstracted epistemic apprehender, Piaget ignored the distinction between individual and socio-cultural context.

As Venn and Walkerdine[286] put it,

> For Piaget, the individual subject is an exemplar, the typical representative of the species. He subscribes to the Lamarckian idea of cumulative assimilation, whereby the characteristics of individuals over time are resorbed into a single intellectual organism. Thus the processes, including those of cognitive development are the same in

283 Jenks, C. (2005) Childhood. (2nd ed.) London: Routledge: 22
284 Idem
285 Idem
286 Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1978) `The acquisition and production of knowledge: Piaget's theory reconsidered', Ideology and Consciousness, 3: 67±94.

> all single individuals, so that one need only study any exemplar and generalise.[287]

The Piagetian model, hence, fails to theorise cultural and historical process in relation to the development of knowledge. Moreover, since the content of thought is overlooked in favour of its (universal) structure, the emphasis on action is given less importance than a proclaimed tendency towards growing abstraction and idealisation:

> For Piaget the development of thought becomes `indifferent to' the actual content of thought and the material base, although constructed out of it. He speaks of action on the concrete as being the basis out of which the operational structures are constructed, but his account is in the end unsatisfactory because he is more concerned with the results of abstraction as indicators of the way the mind works. . . . He is not dealing with scientifc knowledge as such.[288]

Lev Vygotsky appears in developmental textbooks in relation to his dispute with Piaget. As Piaget was concentrated on universal, rational understanding of intellectual development, the Piagetian approach ignored social, cultural, and emotional contexts for cognition. The interest towards Vygotsky was motivated by critical reflection on developmental study. A acknowledgement of the importance of social and historical context, as stated by Vygotsky, was threatening not just to Piaget but also to the broader hypothesises that Piaget indicated. A focus on the non-universal nature of development – on the influence of context – represented a major challenge to traditional developmental theory.

Two related Vygotskian notions became widely renowned. One of them is the

287 Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1978) `The acquisition and production of knowledge: Piaget's theory reconsidered', Ideology and Consciousness, 3: 67±94.(79)
288 Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1978) `The acquisition and production of knowledge: Piaget's theory reconsidered', Ideology and Consciousness, 3: 67±94.(87)

principle of 'internalization'. According to Vygotsky:

> Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, *between* people (*interpsychological*) and then *inside* the child (*intrapsychological*). . . . All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals.[289]

It must be emphasized that Vygotsky's claim concerned 'higher' functions (that is, cultural functions). He seems to have believed human infancy to be controlled by 'lower' (that is, 'natural') functions.

The second principle was *'the zone of proximal development'*. Vygotsky's description of the zone are intended to accentuate the importance of social contexts for intellectual development. Vygotsky states that the achievement of any task happens first with help or guidance, before the task is performed independently. The difference between collective and individual development is one definition of the zone. In other words, if translated into a quantitative model, the zone is the difference between some level of independent achievement and some level of guided achievement.[290]

Van der Veer and Valsiner[291] interpret the zone as a notion designed to indicate something of the immediate ('proximate') *future development* of a child, by outlining competencies that are currently 'in process'. Achievements manageable with help or support, or possible by imitation, might thus be interpreted as *near-future independent* achievements. It is uncertain how conclusive, and to what

289 Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 57.
290 Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
291 van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky. Oxford: Blackwell.

extent open-ended. As the zone of proximal development can be understood in a very open-ended way, with a vast amount of potential skills being acquired.

There might be little or no bias as to what skills are to be expected as emerging 'next'. At the other extreme, the zone might be understood in a closed, inflexible way, with a well-defined set of expected skills and even a chronological timetable for their appearance. This latter, more rigid interpretation would lead to a traditional developmental framework. Western followers of Vygotsky have usually located the zone of proximal development somewhere in-between the two extremes.[292]

Vygotsky's own emphasis was probably also between these extreme poles. He does appear to have implied some predictable changes in children's development, situating him nearer to the 'closed' pole. His interest in 'crisis periods' in child development – when important restructuring is taking place – would confirm this interpretation.[293]

Such crisis periods were described by Vygotsky as happening at birth and at the first, third, seventh, thirteenth and seventeenth years of life. There was thus a rather traditional developmental side to Vygotsky, including a normative analysis of childhood. Therefore, much of what Vygotsky debated[294] in terms of his two principles appears to be rather familiar.

The first principle – internalization – postulates that developments in infancy are somehow 'lower' than those of later childhood. The value of the achievements of infancy and of early childhood is that they make future accomplishments possible.

292 Newman, F. and Holzman, L. (1993) Lev Vygotsky: Revolutionary Scientist, London and New York: Routledge
293 van der Veer, R., & Valsiner, J. (1991). Understanding Vygotsky. Oxford: Blackwell.
294 Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

The second principle – the zone of proximal development – proposes a natural hierarchy or chronological sequence of achievements, so that an expert in child development may be equipped to predict what is 'next' (that is, proximal).

If such normative and prescriptive tendencies are withstood, however, important possibilities are introduced by the zone of proximal development and by the principle of internalization. Vygotsky laid out[295] a psychology in which many characteristics of development would be approached as the taking-in of a culture. Vygotsky therefore offered a sociohistorical account for the study of human development, in which the cultural values of a society would be applied to determine maturity in that society.[296]

For Vygotsky, human development requires the *'interiorization' of a culture* and thus it can be linked to the social construction of mind.[297] He didn't deny completely the importance of biology and evolution, confronting a more traditionally biological theory with optimism for human transformation under changed circumstances, Vygotsky stated that thinking and consciousness can be approached as a kind of problem-solving. Consequently, thinking would be a disguised kind of labour, because labour normally includes the individual interacting with the world in a goal-oriented way. Furthermore, the particular tasks (physical or mental) which a person is requested to achieve are conditioned by the cultural setting – in all its economic and historical respect.

2.1.4. In search of the universal characteristics of childhood

We have presented an overview of the changing ideas about children's nature over

295 Idem.
296 Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
297 Harré, R. (1986) `Steps towards social construction', in M. Richards and P. Light (eds) Children of Social Worlds, Oxford: Polity.

time, from the emergency of the idea of childhood to the more precise definition of childhood; a specific stage of life provided by John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who contributed to the modern idea of children as innocent becomings in need of protection from the world of adults. And, finally, we looked into to the notions of developmental stages within childhood theorized by Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, the two influential developmental psychologists, the former emphasized the innate universal nature of children's stages of development, while the latter placed great importance to the social context of development. According to this Vygotsky, cognitive development happens as people learn to use cultural instruments for thinking (such as literacy and mathematics) with the assistance of more experienced others and social institutions. This sociocultural approach also offers a more integrated framework to human development. It considers cognitive, social, perceptual, motivational, physical, emotional, and other processes as aspects of sociocultural activity rather than as isolated, independent capabilities or "faculties," as has been conventional in developmental psychology. An integrated framework offers a better opportunity to understand how thinking is affected by social relations and cultural experience, without an artificial division into separated parts.

Childhood through the ages has been transformed by a complex set of social forces. The notion of childhood inevitably participate in patterns of social change "because it is integral to society, history, economics – in fact to life in all its many-sided complexity".[298] Recently education and the social sciences have experienced the development of childhood studies as an academic field of enquiry. Childhood studies as a field of academic research offers the potential for interdisciplinary research that can transform an emergent framework wherein new

298 Prout, A. (2005) The Future Of Childhood, London: Routledge

ways of looking at children can be explored and theorized.

In her article 'Subverting Theoretical Dualisms' the North American psychologist Rachel Joffe Falmagne claims that the social sciences experience the persistent tendency towards theoretical dualisms 'whereby theoretical statements are polarised into extreme, radicalised positions':[299] either social interaction or psychological development; either agency or socialisation; either social or individual; either socio-cultural or biological. Fallmagne[300] reasons that theoretical tensions often signal that each framework excludes important features of the phenomenon researched.

There are few characteristics which can be considered distinctive aspects of childhood and be agreed upon across disciplinary and contextual boundaries:

- psychophysiological and neurological changes;
- vulnerability and lack of resources;
- gaining knowledge and learning from experience.[301]

These distinctive characteristics, however, are not restricted exclusively to the period in lifetime demarcated as childhood.

It's undeniable that certain types of growth, hormonal and psychophysiological changes happen to a human being exclusively up to 18 years of age and cannot be found in the same form at any other life stage. While adolescence, for example, is variable and sensitive to environmental and cultural influences, it can be located

299 Falmagne, R. Joffe (2009) Subverting theoretical dualisms: Mentalism and discourse. Theory and Psychology, 19(6), 795-815.(796)
300 Ibid.
301 Smith, R. (2010). A Universal Child?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

only in this particular time period.[302]

The consequences of these changes are determined and embodied, although they are subject to social influences and cultural expectations. Shilling suggests to think of a body as 'unfinished' at birth, an entity which transforms and unfolds throughout an individual's life. The body as an unfinished entity is certainly affected by social factors, but cannot be reduced to these factors.[303]

The ever-changing nature of our bodies "requires that we adjust to and attend to our body, or that of others in an appropriate and special way, as carers or as cared for, as male or female or as independent or dependent beings. These configurations of size, maturity, dependency, power and value may take very different forms in relation to gender and age".[304]

Children may well express self-conscious concerns about their size and body shape in the present, while reflecting on rapid physiological changes they are going through.[305] Growth, especially in comparison themselves to other children and adults, appears to be an important feature of children's 'self-consciousness'.[306] Formal settings such as school classify and segregate children by age, thus the body size and height are implicitly embedded in this segregation. James, in her research, could observe that it was always important for children 'to know...who is

302 Prendergast, S. (2000) '"To become dizzy in our turning": girls, body maps and gender as childhood ends', in Prout, A. (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 101–24. (105)
303 Shilling, C. (2003) The Body and Social Theory, 2nd edn. London : Sage
304 Prendergast, S. (2000) '"To become dizzy in our turning": girls, body maps and gender as childhood ends', in Prout, A. (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 101–24. (105)
305 James, A. (2000) 'Embodied being(s):understanding the self and the body in childhood',in Prout, A. (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 19-37 (28)
306 Idem.

the smallest – indeed the “tiniest” in the class'.[307] Children's awareness of physical growth and change can also be a source of concern about growing and developing into an adult body.[308]

Children's body size and comparatively little strength, their relative lack of the time lived (experience) and, thus, their relative powerlessness (see. Chapter 2.2.) result in a sense of vulnerability. The notion of children vulnerability is in the core of official discourses around risk, safety and child protection.[309]

However, this notion shouldn't be taken for granted. While the language of vulnerability is culturally and historically conditioned, it also may create a greater inequality in adult-child power relationships, depicting 'an active, protecting and responsible adult' and 'a passive and unprotected child'.[310] Moreover, Mason and Falloon[311] link children's vulnerability to inequality of power between children and adults:

> These inequalities mean that adults are able to respond to children with physical, behavioral and emotional actions, in ways that are denied to children.[312]

2.2. Temporal notions and childhood

The child is generally constructed as a human being in the making. Chronologically, childhood has been variously described as: the period from birth

307 Idem.
308 James, A. (2000) 'Embodied being(s):understanding the self and the body in childhood',in Prout, A. (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 19-37 (29)
309 Parton, N. (2006) Safeguarding Childhood, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
310 Christensen, P. (2000) 'Childhood and the cultural constitution of vulnerable bodies', in Prout, A. (ed.) The Body, Childhood and Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan: 38-59 (39)
311Mason, J. and Falloon, J. (2001) 'Some children define abuse: Implications foragency in childhood.' In L. Alanen and B. Mayall (eds) Conceptualizing Child–Adult Relations. London: RoutledgeFalmer.

312 Ibid: 106

to 6 or 7, when the child can articulate clearly; birth to when the child can reproduce; birth to when the child can work; and birth to when the child can live independently of the parents.[313] According to the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989), childhood ends at the age of 18.[314]

Yet the age of consent, the voting age, the age when a driver's licence can be held and the age when compulsory schooling can be terminated vary with location, culture, and decisive adult voice. Unvaryingly, the voices of children themselves are not considered when these life transition points are decided.[315]

Chronological age is an important characteristic for the social distribution of dignity and respect. Children can be restricted in it due to the visibility of their low chronological age. Their opinions and desires are often undervalued, because their age has been thought of as proof that they are not worth paying attention to. There's a strong link between children's external aspects and children's intrinsic world. Some researchers suggest that differences in chronological age are less important in shaping childhoods than the social constructs based on children's external appearances.[316]

The social construction of time in (and through) social relationships is a rather overlooked theoretical subject within contemporary sociology. In recent years, however, there has been a re-discovering of interest in the temporal dimension of

313 Branscombe, N.A., Castle, K., Dorsey, A.G., Surbeck, E., & Taylor, J.B. (2000). Early Childhood Education – A Constructivist Approach. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
314 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989) http://353ld710iigr2n4po7k4kgvv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf
315 Sorin, R. (2005). Changing Images of Childhood: Reconceptualising Early Childhood Practice. International Journal of Transitions in Childhood. (1), 12-21.
316 Lee, N. (2001) Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty. Buckingham: Open University Press: 2

social relationships[317] and some researchers[318] suggest that the social construction of time may be important to the study of childhood, it may contribute to a deeper and more critical thinking about childhood as a social institution and about the lives of children themselves.

Time imposes sets of constraints upon our biological nature, which are translated in different cultures as different 'times' of life.'Time passed by'—the past— is expressed in a person's life through the concept of age, but it is during childhood that 'age' has an exceptional significance. For example, adults on first encounter with children often ask their age; parents are asked how old their children are and children themselves often mention their ages with distinct accuracy: nine and a half, seven and three-quarters. Such an explicit interest in an individual's 'age' during adulthood would be interpreted as rude or intrusive. Concepts of age are central for western conceptions of childhood, and it is through reference to concepts of age that the daily life experiences of children and their social position are produced and controlled.

Western societies might be perceived as being constructed around the following sequence: childhood comes after infancy and is succeeded by adolescence, adulthood, middle age and old age. Each 'time of life' is attributed with specific qualities and expectations so that cultures can have their own periodizations and establish such boundaries differently. Concepts of childhood—and related to them practices, beliefs and expectations about children—appear to be neither timeless nor universal but, instead, grounded in the past and regulated in the present. Therefore, concepts of childhood and of children must consider the temporal and

317 Young, M., & Schuller, T., (eds), 1988, The Rhythms of Society (London & New York: Routledge).

318 James, A. & A. Prout (1997) Constructing and Re-constructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood, London, Falmer Press

cultural specificity of ideas and social constructions.

The dialectical interaction between temporal notions and social practices is crucial for critical analysis of the concepts of children's needs and rights. Rather than presenting children's needs as a universal, psychological necessity, some researchers[319] suggest that they reflect different perspectives on what a child, an adult and their relationship are expected to be. The concepts of 'children's needs' 'children's rights' are the product of a specific patterning of adult responses to children which can be temporally and culturally situated in twentieth century western cultures.

The implicit normative character of 'needs' and 'rights' is conditioned by ideas of age (calculated as years of time passing) in relation to childhood. It is here that the study of time in and of childhood is perhaps most important. Age establishes the boundaries to western conceptions of childhood and, even if these limits are often context specific and may differ, 'age' represents a powerful and constraining force on the daily lives of children. Solberg's paper is most interesting in this respect.

Solberg[320] shows in her ethnographic research how age (time passed) and its associated concept of 'maturity', regardless of its apparent fixity, can be conceptually reshaped and contracted through negotiations between parents and their children. Children negotiating an older conceptual age are allowed to have more time during the day which is under their own control.

The importance of age in childhood study is emphasized by Qvortrup[321] who

319 James, A. & A. Prout (1997) Constructing and Re-constructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood, London, Falmer Press

320 Solberg, Anne (1997): "Negotiating Childhood: Changing Constructions of Age for Norwegian Children". In James, Allison & Alan Prout (eds.): Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood. London and New York: Routledge/Falmer. Pp. 126-144.

321 Qvortrup, Jens (1997) "A Voice for Children in Statistical and Social Accounting: A Plea for Children's Right to be Heard",In James, Allison & Alan Prout (eds.): Constructing and

demonstrates in his analysis of statistical data how children are constantly omitted from such reports. This insufficiency of information accessible from statistical sources about the lives of children—for example, their levels of poverty, the consequences of parental unemployment for children—suggests a specific conception of children as always represented by another agency—the family, the welfare system or the educational system. They are not recognized in their own right, time in childhood—children's daily life experiences—is perceived as secondary to the time of childhood, when children are considered as dependent and protected by the adults. Issues of dependency and protection, then, are linked to ideas of age and prevail as themes of the time of childhood.

Time passing and time past, thus, holds a particular power during childhood. Through the established structure of the school system, age classes organize the times for and of infancy, childhood and adolescence through setting the ages of introduction to and exit from different levels of the school system: nursery, primary and secondary schools.

> The somewhat ambiguous and blurred boundaries to these periods of time in an individual's life thus become more distinct and acquire meaning through the interlocking of biological age with social status, a mechanism provided primarily through the institution of schooling. The 'time of childhood' therefore structures and is structured by 'time in childhood'.[322]

2.2.1. Temporal otherness and distribution of power

One of the crucial temporal notions underlying adult-child power relationships is children's temporal otherness. It has been suggested by some developmental

Reconstructing Childhood. London and New York: Routledge/Falmer.. Pp. 83-103
322 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer: 235

psychology scholars (Morss 1996) that adults exercise a domination over the present. Adults, she states, are people who are. Children will be in the future, but they are denied full participation in the present. Certainly, young children have classically been considered as morally and cognitively limited to the present, moreover their experience has been defined as limited only to appearances. Children's status as 'becomings' rather than beings contribute to the importance given to the long-term effects of children's experiences, often at the expense of a recognition of immediate effects. On the contrary, the elderly are those-who-have-been: their existence is only in the past tense. Adulthood thus occupies the territory of the present, it controls the present, and hence legitimizes the denial of rights to non-adults.[323]

As proposed in the book of Clémentine Beauvais *The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature*[324], child and adult are symbolically divided by their belonging to different temporalities – and that this temporal split regulates the distribution of "powers" between the two age groups. The adult-child exchange of powers implicitly influenced by an awareness of temporality.

An adult authority, in an attempt to come to terms with the constant running out of time, "places in the idealised concept of childhood the belief that transformation can occur in the future as a result of current literary 'investments'".[325]

Prominently, it does not actually want to know what will happen in the future, but rather desires to preserve the possibility of the unpredictable."[326] It is the time

323 Morss, J.R. (1996) Growing Critical: Alternatives to Developmental Psychology. London: Routledge: 158.
324 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
325 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins:5

326 Idem.

adults spend on children that contributes to children's importance and expected might in the eyes of the adult.

The concepts of "adulthood " and "childhood" are anchored in fundamental temporal otherness of children perceived by adults. Adult's and child's temporalities are only partially overlapped and their relationship unfolds in the moment of overlap, when the concentration of powers of the past and for the future, which adult and child respectively "possess", is particularly unequal.[327]

There's an unpredictable time in the future adults cannot access directly, only influence it via the implicit or explicit didactic messages, asking the child to carry the task into another temporality which is out of adult power. The adult can be perceived as an owner of a longer *time lived* (past), accumulated in experience and knowledge legitimizing adult *authority*. The child, on the other hand, has more of "*unrealised" time*, more *time lef*t, she possesses a longer future in which to act. "What one loses in *might,* one gains in *authority*. To be mighty is to have more time left, to be authoritative is to have more time past."[328]

Linearity, timeliness, and punctuality are qualities that the adult world demands from itself in an attempt to grasp time in a mathematical sense. However, the temporality of adulthood, far from being standard and controlled, is characterised by acceleration, fast-forwards, backward sights in the form of nostalgia, and irregularity.

Symbolically, the child represents the future. The child thus has a particular place in what Nicolas Grimaldi[329] calls the process of *existential wait*, and the strategies employed by consciousness to cope with this *wait.* The concept of *wait* is

327 Ibid: 6
328 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins: 19
329 Grimaldi, N. (1992) Le désir et le temps. Paris: Vrin.

connected to one of the main "problems" of existence for existentialists: the impossibility ever to coincide with oneself, and therefore the ever delayed promise of abundance. A person in the present is in a state of lack; hence she imagines the future as the time when she will be what she should be. Yet when the future comes, it simply solidifies into a new present and she is still not what she expected to be.[330]

As Sartre describes this experience:

> *"I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it"* (original emphasis)[331], or,
>
> "I am my Future in the constant perspective of the possibility of not being it. Hence that anguish … I am not sufficiently that Future which I have to be and which gives its meaning to my present"[332]

Nicolas Grimaldi, in his book *Le désir et le temps*[333] ("Desire and Time"), refers a fundamental attribute of the perception of this existence by the individual: *wait*. According to Grimaldi, the ability to imagine is central to human consciousness. In particular, the ability to imagine ourselves beyond our quickly-solidifying situation: the ability to ideate the *future* and remember the *past*. We do not know what it is that we will and want to become, though we feel that our existence is presently incomplete and must someday discover its answer; that it will at certain moment reveal itself to us in reality. Nevertheless, the more we live, the more this answer happens to be postponed; time is running out, and the "promise" never gets fulfilled. There is a gap between the human consciousness in the present and

330 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
331 Sartre, J.-P. (1958) Being and Nothingness, translated from French by Hazel E. Barnes. London: Routledge: 56
332 Ibid: 152
333 Grimaldi, N. (1992) Le désir et le temps. Paris: Vrin.

the anticipated "complete" consciousness. As a result, one is always waiting for the promised completeness to be realized.

We are, Grimaldi[334] says, "haunted" by the lack of what we should be. The present gives the "splinter" of this future which is not yet. And of course, the more we grow old, the more it becomes apparent to us that there is an ever-diminishing chance of reaching that "real" self which we should be.

Grimaldi[335] suggests several ways in which consciousness tries to cope with draining time, and to symbolize to itself, albeit illusorily, the point of reconciliation, so hoped-for and so anticipated, with one's "real" self. He mentions *religion*, which situates a future beyond death. *Political activity* which is driven by a desire for real change in society in the future. *Love* allows the individual to be, even if temporarily, happily "united" with that self with which they so waited to merge, but projected onto another person.

Grimaldi[336] also considers play, which everlastingly provides the feeling of a reachable endpoint, and forever allows for experience to be generated again. These moments, styles and strategies all elaborate the paradoxical relation to time in existence.

As for the adult-child relationships, the adult's educational "message" to the child also brings out the adult's existential wait, as it will find its enactment or realisation in the future. The educational message is therefore linked to a time-slip: the idea that the words spoken (or any non-verbal form of communication involved) are in the present for the future. It is also, of course, a discourse intensely infiltrated by the past. As the adult speaker in the educational message is

334 Idem
335 Idem
336 Grimaldi, N. (1992) Le désir et le temps. Paris: Vrin.

taking a position of authority – with a baggage of past experience – it is acknowledged that the message must find its roots in the past, a temporality inaccessible to the child, and that from this temporality derives a form of power which justifies the educational and pedagogical undertaking. However, this message moves towards the future just like the child moves toward adulthood; just like consciousness waits and moves towards an uncertain future.[337]

This *wait* is impregnated with hope, a quality which adults often refer to in common discourses about children. Hope is an fundamental attribute of childhood; as long as the child is perceived as temporal other, an other-for-the-future. There is a large degree of coincidence between the notions of "possibility", "hope", "future": all of these notions could be compressed into the notion of *time left*. There is hope because there is time left.[338]

Hope is also a controversial concept in the philosophy of education. Paulo Freire, the founder of critical pedagogy, states in his *Pedagogy of Hope*[339] that hope is a necessary requirement for education, and that it is the educator's responsibility to reveal it to the child.

One of the philosophical studies on the subject, by David Halpin,[340] suggests that hope is the fabric of education, which by its very nature is concerned with the latent, we can also say with *the time left of the students*, beyond that of the teacher's. Halpin argues that it is possible to cultivate *"ultimate*" or *"complex" hope* though education: a particular, realistic purpose, always political and always

337 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
338 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
339 Freire, Paulo. 1998. Pedagogy of Hope, translated from Portuguese (Brazilian) by Robert R. Barr. New York NY: Continuum (Pedagogía da esperança, 1992).
340 Halpin, David. 2003. Hope and Education: he Role of the Utopian Imagination. London: Routledge.

relational, which offers a careful optimism for the future connected to a thorough knowledge of the past. In other words, Halpin's theory regards the tension between past and future as key to education. Halpin believes that hope is not solely about anticipating: it is "a way of living prospectively in and engaging purposefully with the past and present".[341] According to him, hoping for the miraculous, contrarily, means developing unproductive "absolute hope", situated in an impossible future, which can potentially make one deeply unhappy.

As Halpin advises that ultimate hope can be developed by conducting "thought experiments" of the "what would it be like if…?" kind.[342] These processes should consist of an evaluation of future possibilities, while allowing free space for the student to improvise. However, the awareness about a length of time with its abundance of possibilities, but also with its limitations is essential for the notion of hope. A temporal dimension of hope is imperative and comes before its cultural, religious or socio-political dimensions. Hope is intrinsic to the educational message, counteracting the decreasing length of time of the adult's life by relocating its concerns into the new time-frame accessible thanks to the children. Above all else, education can be seen as a temporal investment.[343]

According to Reynolds and Yate,[344] the modern concept of childhood, and related

341 Ibid: 14
342 Halpin, David. (2003) Hope and Education: he Role of the Utopian Imagination. London: Routledge: 54
343 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
344 Reynolds, K. & Yate, P. (1998) Too soon: Representations of childhood death in literature for children. In Children in Culture: Approaches to Childhood, Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (ed.), 151–

to it idea of hope for the future, emerged with secularisation of identity. When "futurity was widely regarded as the responsibility of the Divinity,"[345] the value of personal agency present and oriented towards one's existence was insignificant. Identity, socially, religiously and politically, was to a great extent determined from birth. However, they argue[346], nowadays identity "is a product of achievement"; therefore, child death, on which the authors focus, is strongly perceived as a "waste", a "lack of fulfilment", even a trigger for "shame". These comparatively modern concerns signify a shift towards a profoundly future-bound and practical aspect of adult hope for children.

Accodring to Reynolds and Yate, this "new" hope, which "[foregrounds] futurity and potential", implies an interpretation of identity as "defined by longevity and life-style".[347] Nevertheless, it is important to mention that hope in this interpretation is also characterized by the idea that the child could do anything. The child's future is accentuated by this unlimited plasticity of identity, this prospect of an unforeseeable existence, which neglects child's present, and emphasizes the existential property of the issue. This type of hope is one of the fundamental characteristics of the temporal otherness of childhood in modern times. It contributes to the fundamental difference between adult and child temporal visions. While the adult sees itself as fixed and determined, it perceives the child as future-bound, unrestrained and limitless. This hope is the specific dimension of the *existential wait,* where the child offers a safe, concrete blueprint to this enigmatic desire, providing embodied signifier for the condition of hope

177. London: Macmillan.
345 Ibid: 157
346 Reynolds, K. & Yate, P. (1998) Too soon: Representations of childhood death in literature for children. In Children in Culture: Approaches to Childhood, Karín Lesnik-Oberstein (ed.), 151–177. London: Macmillan.
347 Ibid: 175

and wait.[348]

The child as a symbol is *mighty* because it possesses the only thing that the adult does not: *the future*, and the open-endedness associated to it. The mighty child is this imaginary ideal child generated by the existential torment of the "waiting" adult. Despite the hypothetical nature of children's might, adult "power" over them is concrete – expressing itself in the form of commands, classrooms, punishment, grades. However, the mighty child is all the mightier because it belongs to the realm of the imagination, to the symbolic sphere, and is inherent to contemporary constructions of childhood; it consequently occupies every representation of childhood and every interaction with a child. Children are closely associated with the future, and this future that they symbolize is thus also, through them, the "property" of a number of (often conflicting) adult groups – parents, teachers, politicians.[349]

As George Lakoff's states in his book *Don't Think of an Elephant*[350], there is a tendency for political debates to polarize into a strict father model and a nurturing parent world-view (for example, Republicans and Democrats in American politics). The strict father model is a conservative framework which postulates:

> the world is a dangerous place, and it always will be, because there is evil out there in the world … there is an absolute right and an absolute wrong. Children are born bad, in the sense that they just want to do what feels good, not what is right.[351]

348 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
349 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
350 Lakoff, G. and Nunez, R. (2001). Where Mathematics Come From: How The Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being . Basic Book
351 Ibid.: 7

When this metaphor is enacted in politics, society must punish strictly to teach the internal discipline essential to act morally. The nurturing parent model expects "that children are born good and can be made better. The world can be made a better place and it is our job to work on that" .[352] Nurturance means empathy and duty and that we must take care of our children. When this metaphor is employed in politics, society must provide protection and assist its citizens in becoming fulfilled in life.[353]

The adult-child relationships, besides the symbolic temporal otherness of the child for the adult, are also characterized by the imagined gap in knowledge between adult and child. The adult's educational messages address not just a child but also a temporality, not just a subject but also a project, not just a now but also an after that. It is a message aimed at people who will continue to exist once the deliverers are dead. It is penetrated with anxieties about existence which philosophers have long identified, and which at times have nothing to do with childhood itself – or at least, with duties or care for actual children. The adult-child relationship is a lens through which we can observe the adult, both as a person and as a social category, dealing with and expressing fundamental discomfort about its existential condition.[354]

In the framework of the educational relation between adult and child, the educational message of the adult will never directly control the project of the child. Through the child, the adult can have access to futurity; the educational project can be carried forward, yet it is important to accept the freedom of the

352 Lakoff, George and Nunez, Rafael (2001). Where Mathematics Come From: How The Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being . Basic Book:12

353 Wascul D., Vannini P. (2006) Introduction: Body in Symbolic Interaction // Body/ Embodyment. Symbolic Interaction and the Sociology of the Body. Ed. by Wascul D., Vannini P. Hampshire, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited

354 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

child in doing so; the adult must embrace the unpredictability of the process. The project will find its realisation across the "cultural time-gap".[355]

The adult-child relationships are influenced by the period of latency between the delivery of the message and its potential realisation. In this delay, in this wait, adopting Grimaldi's vocabulary, there is more than information transferring; there is also the possibility for the child to do something unexpected with that information. There is the idea that the "result" of the educational influence may well be manifested when the adult's life is over. The educational message is delivered from a position of the awareness of a past experience – from a position of authority – and it attempts its enactment in a non-immediate temporality. This temporality, perhaps, will be evident beyond the existence of the speaker. It is therefore a dialogue of temporal instability, and also a dialogue charged with uncertainty. It is hard to evaluate, at least not immediately, the consequences of the didactic message. It may or may not be recollected, it may or may not be followed, it may or may not be understood in the way the adult desires.[356]

The adult-child conversation is likely to presuppose an alteration, voluntary or not, of the adult's message, to accommodate the child's understanding, interpreted as different. A situation of adult-child interaction which is not didactic is hardly possible. As long as adult and child consider each other and themselves as belonging to symbolic adulthood and symbolic childhood, an alteration of their initial messages is intrinsic to their encounter – an encounter with a perceived temporal otherness – and this altered communication triggers the didactic.[357]

355 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
356 Idem.
357 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

Theorist of childhood Daniel T. Cook describes this unavoidable dimension of the adult-child relationship:

> Tensions of voice, of persona, and of the locus of decision-making are present in every personal interaction with a child, in every depiction of a child, in every iteration of childhood, and in every gesture made by, toward, and about children. Each word to a child seems like a directive; each decision made on its behalf or in response to a request favors some aspects of the world over others; every lifestyle choice is potentially didactic.[358]

Charles Bingham,[359] philosopher of education, calls it a "performative" vision of authority: the notion that adult authority over children is not characterised by the content of the communication, but rather by its very assertion. The "tensions" that Cook refers to are manifestations of the formal relation of authority between adult and children.

If we interpret the adult-child conversation as the transmission of knowledge to correct a perceived ignorance, it would seem that the child would consistently benefit from the exchange, while the adult has not earned anything from the didactic situation. It would appear that it is a absolutely selfless mode of communication on the adult speaker's part. However, the opposite could be debated, that the adult, as leader of the educational project, having contributed both knowledge and knowledge of previous ignorance, has strengthened his or her position and lessened the child's.[360]

358 Cook, Daniel T. (2002) Interrogating symbolic childhood. In Symbolic Childhood, Daniel T. Cook (ed.), 1–14. Frankfurt: Peter Lang: 7
359 Bingham, Charles. 2008. Authority Is Relational. Rethinking Educational Empowerment. Albany NY: State University of New York Press.
360 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins: 85.

The adult-child conversation is a form of power play: the adult's evaluation of the child's ignorance leads to the adult's choice of what knowledge to deliver, how to deliver it, and what knowledge to withhold. The adult's position of superiority, after the communication, would thus be reinforced. The child, in the meantime, even if richer in knowledge than before, has been objectified by the adult's educational project. In other words, these two extreme views match to two critical positions regarding the value of the adult-child communication. [361]

One is the traditional pedagogical view. In this view, the child is made simultaneously more knowledgeable and more aware of past lack of knowledge, and therefore inspired to grow up in the awareness that knowledge can always be expanded. Adults might be voluntarily granting some of their time to "prepare" the child, whatever this "preparation" means, for the future. Giving, selfless adults are here seen as generous providers of knowledge, and organisers of the didactic experience.[362]

The second view – more marked in child-centred pedagogy – is that the didactic motivation is one of the ways through which both the normativity and the "power" of adulthood are strengthened, partly because it demands from the child to regard the gap between adulthood and childhood even as knowledge is being passed on. In fact, knowledge is often equated with age and experience, consequently, age becomes equivalent with superiority, sustaining the notion that knowledge is age-dependent and that age is power. In both cases, the debate relies on whether pinpointing and filling a gap in someone's knowledge is an instrument of altruism or oppression.[363]

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361 Idem
362 Idem
363 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

In order to overcome this dichotomy, we can concentrate on the equilibrium of adult and child imagined temporalities in the educational project. From this position, the balance of power between adult and child in the didactic communication depends less on the gap between the two than on the relation of both parties' knowledge of the world in the present and for the future. It is neither a selfless project on the part of the adult nor an oppressive one. It unveils, instead, the adult's unease with their knowledge and "baggage" of experience: the idea that there should be something to be done with it that is beyond their power. The adult wants to convey something: this impulse may be seen as existential. The person, states Grimaldi,[364] is "mediation", defined by "tendencies", dynamics, thus, it wants to communicate, to inseminate others:

> As it has its being in what is always to come, as it feels itself only within a perpetual wait, how could it not have the feeling of being just a passage, a transition?[365]

The more the person feels itself incomplete, and is aware that time of its existence is closing up, the more it concerns with transmitting to others what it has accumulated. The adult has been socioculturally accustomed to perceive knowledge as synonymous with "experience", with "adulthood"; and yet it may be ill-insecure what could be achieved with this knowledge. This discontent may trigger the didactic; it pushes the adult to transmit this knowledge to the child.

By handing some knowledge to the child, the adult does not solely grant it: s/he is attempting to convert it, to transform it, to make sense of it. The educational effort is sustains the feeling that the child can be better furnished to make meaning out of it. In other words, adults are both providing children with something that they

364 Grimaldi, Ni. (2013) Les theorèmes du moi. Paris: Grasset.
365 Grimaldi, Ni. (2013) Les theorèmes du moi. Paris: Grasset: 13, as cited in Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

know, and requesting children to process it so as to reveal to them something they do not know.[366]

This transmission is profoundly risky as it is extended between a temporality which does not exist any more (the past, and the resource of the adult) and a temporality which does not exist yet (the future, and the resource of the child).

Pedagogy is both gratifying and hurtful because it is a space where the adult's commitment with the child as future-bound, unforeseeable freedom is counterbalanced by the child's strong interest to the adult as a carrier of authority, as a possessor and a distributor of accumulated knowledge. The child is *temporally mighty*[367] because she may do in the future what the adult was incapable of doing. The adult hopes that a lost indeterminacy of the potential solidified in the past, can be partly retrieved through the child. The desire for indeterminacy indicates the adult faith that the child is an autonomous individual who can do something not yet known.

As Hannah Arendt[368] argues,

> Basically we are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is the basic human situation, in which the world is created by mortal hands to serve mortals for a limited time as home. Because the world is made by mortals it wears out; and because it continuously changes its inhabitants it runs the risk of becoming as mortal as they. To preserve the world against the mortality of its creators and inhabitants it must be constantly set right anew. The problem is simply to educate in such a way that a setting-right remains

366 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
367 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
368 Arendt, H. (1961) Between Past and Future, New York: Viking Press.

> actually possible, even though it can, of course, never be assured. Our hope always hangs on the new which every generation brings; but precisely because we can base our hope only on this, we destroy everything if we so try to control the new that we, the old, can dictate how it will look.[369]

Adults are not sure, but they expect that their educational message might have some impact. This interesting indeterminacy of the threat symbolizes the "negative", "dark" side of the "positive", "hopeful" indeterminacy which adults also approve in the symbol of the child. The threat, on the one hand, and the hope, on the other, are that children may end up doing something with the adult's words that the adult cannot predict. This *indeterminacy*, whether negative or positive, whether suppressed or celebrated, is at the core of the adult-children power relationships. It assumes that the child holds the potential for independent action, a potential we can call *might*, and it also admits that this potential can be activated by the words and interaction with the authoritative adult.[370]

2.2.2.Sociological and psychological temporalities of childhood.

In the book *Constructing and Re-constructing childhood* [371] A.James and A.Prout, first published in 1990, notice that the "social construction of time", the "temporal dimension of social relationships", are central aspects of adults' rhetoric about children. In western societies, they argue, there is a clear linear temporal sequence from infancy to old age, going through childhood, adolescence, and middle age. Childhood has its time, and this time is characterised, Prout and James claim, by temporal tension: "its present is continuously banished"[372] in preference to an

369 Ibid: 193
370 Beauvais, C. (2015) The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
371 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer.
372 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd

image of childhood as past, as reference to a future, or as timeless.

James and Prout[373] discuss *3 concepts of time in relation to childhood:*

- the linear model of past leading into future
- the model of timelessness in childhood
- and the model of childhood as present

The book criticizes the universalism and adultism of developmental thinking in psychology, as well as previous sociological thinking about childhood. It considers that the sociological studies tend to place the importance of the child in either the past or the future, while the present of the child has been systematically disregarded. It was, for example, the case in the studies of socialization, which are very concerned with what the child would be 'becoming'.

Indeed, we can find a clear 'becoming' notion of the child, for instance, in the Hannah Arendt's book Between Past and Future,[374]

> [human society] never remains as it is but continuously renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new human beings. These newcomers, moreover, are not finished but in a state of becoming. Thus the child, the subject of education, has for the educator a double aspect: he is new in a world that is strange to him and he is in process of becoming, he is a new human being and he is a becoming human being.[375]

There are two main problems with the construction of the 'becoming' child discourse. The first is that it is excessively future-orientated. This emphasizes

edition). London: Falmer : 234.
373 Ibid.
374 Arendt, H. (1961) Between Past and Future, New York: Viking Press.
375 Ibid.185.

value of that which the child will be rather than that which the child is. The child is perceived as 'a future adult' rather than as a 'young human being' with his or her own rights. This position is problematic because the temporal focus inevitably forces us to disregard or ignore the present everyday experiences of being a child.

However, while our predictions of the future may affect how we conceptualise something in the present, our predictions may be wrong Hence, to build our understanding of what a child is, mainly on what that child will be, is questionable, even if we value the future. The second problem, is that the 'becoming' child is perceived as incompetent in comparison to adult. From a 'becoming' perspective, as Young[376] argues,

> [the child] is seen as progressing from a state of vulnerability to sophistication, from an earlier lack of skills to a later possession of abilities.

This view not only suggests that 'competency' is something that is achieved the proximity of adulthood, but also that competency is necessarily (and only) an adult attribute, i.e. one that children cannot possess. Nevertheless, several authors[377] have challenged the idea of competency by underlining the importance of the social context in which a person is situated. According to this framework, children and adults can be competent and incompetent depending on the situation in which they are placed.

Some studies also put children in *the timeless zone*, "timelessness—contextualizes

376 Young, M., & Schuller, T., (eds), 1988, The Rhythms of Society (London & New York: Routledge).: 41.
377 Alanen L, Mayall B (eds). (2001) Conceptualising Child–Adult Relations. Routledge: London.; Christensen P, James A (eds). (2000) Research with Children: Perspectives and Practices. Falmer Press: London.; James, A., Jenks, C. and Prout, A. (1998) Theorizing Childhood. Oxford: Blackwell; Lee N. 2002. Childhood and Society: Growing Up in an Age of Uncertainty. Open University Press: Buckingham.

the themes of innocence and purity as being the essence of childhood."[378] Therefore, the sanctity childhood is assured by children's freedom from the uncompromising passage of time which distinguishes the adult world.

As Holt depicts the timeless culture of childhood:

> Most people who believe in the institution of childhood as we know it see it as a kind of walled garden in which children, being small and weak, are protected from the harshness of the world outside until they become strong and clever enough to cope with it.[379]

An attractive ideology of the 'separate haven of childhood' allows to cast children into a mythical past or a magical present.[380] Boas[381] argues that this ideology serves as a function of cultural primitivism inspired by a nostalgia for time passed: a child is seen as a primitive adult, who is in harmony with nature and free from the accelerated path of modern world, inhabits a timeless cultural space.

Examples of the timeless model of childhood can be found in studies of children's play culture. The Opies[382] depict the culture of childhood as a repository of things past, 'primitive' in its nature:

> The folklorist and anthropologist can, without travelling a mile from his door, examine a thriving unselfconscious culture (the word culture is used here deliberately) which is as unnoticed by the sophisticated

378 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer: 238.
379 Holt, J. (1975) Escape from Childhood, Harmondsworth: Penguin: 22.
380 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer: 238.
381 Boas, G. (1966) The Cult of Childhood, London, Warburg Institute.
382 Opie, I. and Opie, P. (1977) The Lore and Language of School children. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Opie, I. and Opie, P. (1984) Children's Games in Street and Playground, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

> world and quite as little affected by it, as is the culture of some dwindling aboriginal tribe living out its helpless existence in the hinterland of a native reserve.[383]

The *'time capsule'* model of childhood is coherent with the context of the late 70s, the time when the study of childhood was beginning to emerge. This model can be perceived as a reaction to the past obscurity of children, as well as, an important step towards incorporating children within the discourses of social sciences.[384]

When The New Sociology of Childhood[385] first introduced children as active participants and meaning-makers in their own lives, as *'human beings'* rather than *'human becomings*',[386] the temporal construct was attributed to the social and discursive structures, while the children were framed only into the space of the present.[387]

In contrast to *the past-future* and the *timeless* model, the present of childhood approach wanted to introduce children as *active participants* and meaning-makers of their own lives, as human beings rather than as human becomings. So, in contrast to the model of timelessness, it implies children's agency situated in a specific context framed by the way the childhood is socially constructed at different times in different places.

Even though James and Prout[388] did acknowledge the 'being' child also had a past

383 Opie, I. and Opie, P. (1977) The Lore and Language of School children. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 22.
384 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer: 240.
385 Ibid.
386 Qvortrup, J., Bardy, M., Sgritta, G. and Wintersberger, H. (1994) (Eds) Childhood Matters, Aldershot, Avebury: 4
387 Uprichard, E. (2008) 'Children as Being and Becomings: Children, childhood and temporality', Children and Society, 22(4): 303-313.
388 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer.

and a future, this is not the dimension that gained much focus, either in their own program of work or in the theoretical and empirical work that followed the way of what was called the new sociology of childhood. As Emma Uprichard wrote:

> 'In the process of focusing on the 'being' child, the temporality of the 'becoming' child has, for the most part, been lost.'[389]

The reason for this maybe that the new sociology of childhood was caught up in its own deliberate self-destruction as an alternative to developmental psychology, psychoanalysis and socialization theory. The findings of developmental psychology are silenced or not really considered in the new sociology of childhood. Both questions of how children's developing mental and emotional capacities contribute to the agency in a given context and how the actions trigger further changes in these capacities were excluded from analysis of the present.

As developmental psychologist Martin Woodhead sharply phrases it, the new sociology of childhood attempted to consign "traditional developmental psychology to the dustbin of history, along with psychoanalysis and common sense."[390]

Valerie Walkerdine[391] points out the tendency to dualism between psychology and sociology in the new sociology of childhood leaving 'no room for discussion of the 'psychological', nor for reworking of psychology, which could move beyond this dualism. Such dualism can seriously limit discussion of temporal dimensions in children's life. What is usually seen in the prospective of change are the

389 James, A. and Prout, A., (eds), (1997) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood (2nd edition). London: Falmer: 306.
390 Woodhead, Martin (2008). Childhood studies: past, present and future. In: Kehily, Mary Jane ed. An Introduction to Childhood Studies. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, pp. 17–34. (27).
391 Walkerdine, V. (2003) Reclassifying Upward Mobility: Femininity and the Neo-liberal Subject. Gender and Education, 15(3), 237–248.

historical constructions of childhood not the children situated within a given construction of childhood, they are just beings.

The view that 'being' and 'becoming' should not be constructed as a dichotomy, but rather understood in relations to each other, has gained support among child researches during the last decade. It's been acknowledged that children themselves directed in time and have a strong sense of becoming. Jens Qvortrup,[392] Emma Uprichard[393] and Hanne Warming,[394]for example, takes that view.

Emma Uprichard draws on Prigogine's work of physical systems 'being and becoming'[395] in order to construct 'being and becoming' model of the child. In his discussion Prigogine goes beyond the Newtonian conception of time and to the notion of 'time as an arrow', looking into time and change in dynamic systems. He argues that in order to understand how a thing changes over time, we need to consider time in two kinds of ways: as a 'marker' of time (the epistemology of change) and as an integral inner feature of the thing itself (the ontology of change). Therefore, for all things in the social and physical dimensions, time is reversible and irreversible, external and internal to the thing itself, and always and necessarily 'being and becoming'.Furthermore, 'being' perspective in itself is outdated in the context of the late modern society in which consumerism and the demands of flexibility build up the context in which neither adulthood , no childhood can be understood as stable states of being. The modern context

392 Qvortrup, J., Bardy, M., Sgritta, G. and Wintersberger, H. (1994) (Eds) Childhood Matters, Aldershot, Avebury.

393 Uprichard, E. (2008) 'Children as Being and Becomings: Children, childhood and temporality', Children and Society, 22(4): 303-313.

394 Warming, H. (2013) Participation, Citizenship and Trust in children's lives : Palgrave Macmillan.

395 Prigogine I. (1980) From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences. W.H. Freeman: San Francisco, CA; Prigogine I. (1996) The laws of chaos. Review: Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economics, Historical Systems and Civilizations 19: 1–10.

requires unlimited reconsideration or reintegration of development.

Lee[396] argues, that people— children and adults— are interdependent beings who are also always subject to the process of 'being' and 'becoming' , who are more or less competent at certain skills throughout our lives. This 'being and becoming' approach is much more than either the 'being' model or the 'becoming' model taken alone, not just because it is based on a conceptually more adequate representation of both children and adults, but also because it repairs the split that makes children 'different' to adults.[397]

396 Lee, N. (2001) Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty. Buckingham: Open University Press.
397 Strandell H. 2005. Re-evaluating difference in childhood research. Childhoods: Children and Youth in Emerging and Transforming Societies — International Conference. Oslo, June 29–July 3.

Chapter 3. School: shaping the future of citizens and society

3.1 The origin and development of children's rights and child participation

The social value that children represent within the structure of the adult-child power relationships in many societies has been closely connected to the fact that they are regarded as possessions of their parents, of their communities, or of a state. In many cases such agreements have ascribed children with important value as human beings to love, to nurture, and to care for. However, these social arrangements placed children in a somewhat vulnerable position insofar as their economic, legal, and political rights are constructed by "a culture that values them only at second hand". [398]

The human potential of children and their privileges have been largely dependent on their relationship with fully-developed social members –i.e. adults. The idea of 'children's rights' as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[399] attempts to provide children with a degree of self-possession. It promotes the recognition of the child's unique individual opinions and interests beyond adult agendas. The idea of children's rights often can be interpreted as a threat to tradition. The deep-rooted resistance to the idea of children's rights is fueled by the tension between self-possession and possession.

3.1.1.Four ways of valuing children

398 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press:3.
399 *United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child* (1989) http://353ld710iigr2n4po7k4kgvv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf

Nick Lee[400] states that there are four different concepts according to which children are valued:

- as innocents;
- as parental investments;
- as bearers of cultural and familial heritage;
- and as sites of state investment.

Children's innocence may appear in a form of presumed cognitive incompetence, or that of unawareness *about implicit expectations of* social interaction. Competence can be interpreted as opposed to innocence. The adult can be defined as an owner of a longer time lived (past), accumulated in experience and knowledge legitimizing adult authority. This *innocence* can be deeply reassuring for adults who acknowledge its value by reciprocating children with love and support.

Miller[401] suggests that adults' need for preservation of childhood innocence and their concern with the positive moral nature of the adult world, has been manifested in a doctrine for children: *Thou shalt not be aware:*

> Not only is much insight into sexuality, personal relationships and power withheld from children as a matter both of public policy and parental preference, but, further, those children who have been made 'aware' may find it very difficult to get help in understanding their experiences.[402]

400 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press.
401 Miller, A. (1998) *Thou Shalt Not Be Aware.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
402 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability*. Maidenhead: Open University Press: 8.

Postman[403] suggests that the cultivation of shame is one of the turning points away from the communal, medieval culture and is a shift towards the history of childhood. One of the main boundaries between adults and children is that adults distance children from certain facts of life, keep them secret. especially facts that have to do with sexuality. It is possible to say that one of the major distinctions between an adult and a child is that the adult is aware about certain aspects of life —its perplexities, its contradictions, its violence, its misfortunes—that are believed to be not appropriate for children to know and that are shameful to disclose to them. Nowadays, as children progress towards adulthood, we allow them gradually into this secret domain of life in what we believe to be a psychologically digestible way. Secrets and shame contribute to the sharp distinction between the adult world and the child's world, and to the institutionalization of the power imbalance related to it.[404]

Prout and Prendergast[405] demonstrated in their research that children can be valued as *an investment of parents in their own identity.* Evidently, this way of valuing children is generally implied and put to use where becoming a father or a mother means becoming 'somebody', having a role, being recognized, and taken seriously and is associated with personal stability, reliability and trustworthiness. Children are valued because of their contribution to their *parents' identities in the present* and to the their *future security*. The fact of ageing has long been a solid motive for having children.

As Angel and Angel[406] state before the nineteenth century in many European

403 Postman, N. 1994. *The disappearance of childhood.* New York: Vintage.
404 Ibid.: 15.
405 Prout, A. and Prendergast, S. (1980) *'What will I do . . .?' Teenage girls and the social construction of motherhood,* Sociological Review, 28, 3: 517–36.
406 Angel, R.J. and Angel, J.L. (1997) *Who Will Care for Us?: Ageing and Long-term Care in Multi-cultural America.* New York: New York University Press.

countries, retirement contracts of parents with their children were practised widely, children were obliged to look after parents in exchange for parents' estates. During the twentieth century welfare systems, with the social support of the aged group, developed caring responsibilities that traditionally were placed upon the children of the elderly. However, parents still require from their children emotional and practical support.

Adults can value in children their capacity to inherit certain qualities. Sometimes the quality is a trait of character common for members of the same family. Sometimes the quality is a distinguishable *cultural or family identity.* The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 30[407], postulates that children should not be forbidden to learn and participate in their *parents' and grandparents' cultural practices* or to speak their parents' language.

> There's an unpredictable time in the future adults cannot access directly, only influence it via the implicit or explicit didactic messages, asking the child to carry the task into another temporality which is out of adult power.[408]

Children are valued not only as the future of a culture or of a family, they are often also valued as *the future citizens of a state.* At least since the eighteenth century, influential adults have used their interest in the state's future as a motive to intervene in children's lives.[409] In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, powerful individuals and movements created strategies that would prevent certain groups of population from the conception of children,[410] choose

407 United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child (1989) http://353ld710iigr2n4po7k4kgvv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf

408 Beauvais, C. (2015) *The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

409 Donzelot, J. (1979) *The Policing of Families.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

410 Carlson, E.A. (2001) T*he Unfit: The History of a Bad Idea.* New York: Cold Spring

who was denied to have children through discriminating sterilization,[411] and lobby birth control for working-class women.[412] What these strategies had in common was a preoccupation about the quality of a nation's future population, an inclination to breed certain qualities and types of people from the population in order to guarantee the future 'success' of the nation. This interest and the strategies it generated are known as eugenics. Though eugenics is now widely disapproved and dismantled,[413] the active interventionist concern for the future of a state's populations remains present.

One of its main areas of application of this concern is the *education system*. As Jones[414] argues, education policy has often been including basic decisions about the legitimate purpose of educating children, has often been framed by policy-makers' ideas about the future economic demands of a state. The school curriculum is profoundly conformed to the delivery of success in formal tests actively promoted by policy-makers. This has been interpreted to be advantageous for children, because it presumably prepares them for the requests of the workplace, as valuable for the education system in general because it helps to identify badly-run schools, and as beneficial to the future economic system of a state. In other words, policy-makers reassert their power to shape children's lives due to common perception of children as a state investment.

This value ascribed to childhood can play an double-edged role in children's lives, both favouring and depriving them as individuals. The controversial nature of valuing children is evident in the cases of parental and state investment.

Harbor Laboratory Press.
411 Idem.
412 Peel, R.A. (1997) *Marie Stopes, Eugenics and the English Birth Control Movement.* London: The Galton Institute.
413 Carlson, E.A. (2001) *The Unfit: The History of a Bad Idea.* New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press.
414 Jones, K. (2003) *Education in Britain*: 1944 to Present. Cambridge: Polity.

The parents' motives to care for children may seem selfish, but, at the same time, parents' need to invest in their own identity can secure their interest in their child's well-being and contribute to meaningfulness of their relationship. Similarly, policy-makers' intervention in children's lives may seem manipulative, but lack of support from a state can be tragic for many children.[415]

There is something else important about these *four ways of valuing children,* they are all about connectedness, as each value ascribed to the child is involved in a broader network of relationship between the child and the other people. Connections with children reveal adults to themselves and to each other. A dirty child might undermine opinion about a parent because she 'belongs' to that parent. Children perceived as 'immoral' might dishonour a whole family because they are members of that family. Parental love, as well as state care, is partly the product of possession which contributes to the evident struggle between loving and caring for children and valuing them as equals.[416]

Nowadays there are many reasons for a wide range of adults in the world to be preoccupied about the continuity of bonds between generations. There may be concern that parents are hampered in raising their children by such factors as popular culture or the break-up of families. Some concerns are by-products of the modern life-style, such as the high divorce rate and can bring forth a desire[417] to reassert adults' possession of their children.

3.1.2. 'Separation anxieties' and participation right of children

Many modern social issues involving children are prone to provoke '*separation*

415 Kligman, G. (1998) *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania.* London: University of California Press.
416 Lee, N. (2005). Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability. Maidenhead: Open University Press:12
417 Smart, C. and Neale, B. (1999) Family Fragments? Cambridge: Polity.

anxieties' in adults. One way for adults to defend themselves from separation anxiety is to reassure the goodness and legitimacy of ways of valuing children that approach them as possessions, to bring 'family values' or 'tradition' back into existence. Another defence is manifested in being contemptuous or sarcastic about children's rights.[418] For instance, Purdy supposes that some of her readers might think of children's rights as 'ludicrous'.[419] It is evident that any slight alternative to the possessive way of valuing children is likely to cause upset. This conflict of values influences children's lives today.[420]

It is understandable that *rights to participation* often face a more ambivalent and less favourable response than those to *protection* and *provision.*[421] So let us explore them. Article 15 recognises children's rights to free association and peaceful assembly. These are the rights one would need to participate in a political, cultural or religious meeting or to join a political protest free from interference by state agents or by other citizens. Article 14 protects children's freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Section 1 of Article 12 declares:

> States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in

418 Alderson, P. (2000) Young Children's Rights: Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice. London: Jessica Kingsley.

419 Purdy, L.M. (1992) In their Best Interest? The Case against Equal Rights for Children. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press:2

420 Lee, N. (2005). Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability. Maidenhead: Open University Press:16.

421 Goonsekere, S. (1998) Children, Law and Justice: A South Asian Perspective. New Delhi: Sage; Alderson, P. (2000) Young Children's Rights: Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice. London: Jessica Kingsley.

accordance with the age and maturity of the child.[422]

This allows children to have a voice in decisions that affect them. It suggests that, "in some circumstances, children might have different views and opinions than all the other people who surround them and that, when those circumstances arise, that difference should be heard in any 'judicial' or 'administrative' proceedings affecting the child, as Section 2 of Article 12 has it."[423]

This does not mean that other people's views are always unimportant, the weight of children's opinions is moderated according their age and maturity. Like protection and provision rights, participation rights are concerned not just to protect from bad abusive forms of possession but also to strengthen beneficial forms of adults' possessive interest in children. Yet, participation rights have been met with more resistance.

'Protection' connotes an image of children defended by adults who keep away threats from which children alone would be powerless to protect themselves. *'Provision'* implies that children in attendance of adults and being nurtured with food, knowledge, and so on that they might be incapable of acquiring by themselves. In these representations, children's incompetence forms the background of protection, the provision of which encompasses possessiveness. Even though *'participation'* does not imply the absence of adults, it does propose a context "in which children are with adults rather than surrounded by them, accompanied rather than possesses".[424]

As Percy-Smith and Thomas put it:

422 http://www.unicef.org/cbsc/files/Articles12-13-17.pdf (assessed 12 September 2016).
423 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press:18.
424 Idem.

> On the one hand, adult concerns about protecting children may get in the way of their participation rights, for example by reducing opportunities for them to associate freely or by preventing them from influencing decisions. On the other hand, participation may be an important way for children to achieve provision and protection rights.[425]

Moreover, the child's well-being would clearly involve speaking for herself, in situations when an adult's disregard or harmful intention would keep children from delivering information that would influence a decision shaping a child's life. A temporary change in the relationship with the adults involved is necessary, in order for the child to speak for herself. Rather than being 'surrounded' by adults as they communicate, a framework that could always suppress or falsify their words, they are invited to be 'with' or even 'against' that adult.[426]

For most adults, establishing and sustaining relationships with their children is one of their most important and continual activities, whether they perceive their children mostly as their personal possession and responsibility, or as the possession and responsibility of their culture or family. In all human relations, each separation and each attachment, is 'partial'.[427]

'Partial separations' would be restricted to specific spaces and to specific times. They are never total, yet significant. Moreover, at times, separability can help strengthen attachment, just as Article 12 helps authorize the value in adults' possession of children. The Convention postulates the partial and temporary separability of children, not their complete separateness from others. Children's

425 Percy-Smith, B. and Thomas, N. (2010) *A handbook of children and young people's participation: perspectives from theory and practice*.London: Routledge: 358.
426 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability*. Maidenhead: Open University Press: 19.
427 Strathern, M. (1991) *Partial Connection*s. Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

separability can assist legitimacy of the possessive love of those who take care of them, while simultaneously, it regulates against possessive exploitation.

Concerning adult separation anxieties, it seems reasonable that ambivalent or even antagonistic reactions to children's rights or equality in general and, especially, children's participation rights are, to a certain extent, reactions against the separation of children from the adults who would usually possess them. According to Nick Lee it is important "to distinguish between separability and actual and complete separation"[428] in order to soften the usual hostile reaction to children's participation right.

3.1.3. The origins of modern human rights

As stated by the political theorist Charles Taylor,[429] the value attributed to different people fluctuates within and between societies and over historical time. He proposes that it is possible to define principles fundamental to the distribution of that value. These principles set up how people are to be classified and/or distinguished from one another. Taylor points out that modern Western societies attribute human value according to a principle of 'dignity', where once a principle of 'honour' regulated distribution of human value in European societies. In societies determined by honour, such as late medieval England or France:

> what we now call identity was largely fixed by one's social position. That is, the background that explained what people recognised as important to themselves was to a great extent determined by their

428 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press: 19.
429 Taylor, C. and Gutmann, A. (1992) *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

> place in society and whatever roles or activities attached to this position'.[430]

Honour was inherently connected to inequality. Whether or not a person was perceived "to be worth consulting and listening to in matters that would affect their lives was determined by their place in the honour system, with a noble counting far more than a commoner."[431]

The value of children was affected by the distribution of human value according to honour. Ariès[432] stated, there was no concept of childhood in the Middle Ages. He built his argument relying on portraits of children of the French nobility, in which they were dressed like adults and decorated with jewellery considered symbolic of honour. Apparently, in an honour system, an individual's age was mostly irrelevant to their value and status. At court any distinction between child and adult who belonged to the nobility was insignificant, whereas the common people, adults, as well as their children, hardly enjoyed the privilege of being considered worth for hearing.

The development of dignity and representative democracy of modern European societies is connected to the history of European colonialism.[433] One dimension of a system of honour, when it's isolated, is that it pledges the undisputed favourable position of the upper classes. The difficulty with downgrading the members of the nobility of the colonized societies, where similar honour-based distribution of human value prevailed, was solved with the introduction of a new principle for the

430 Taylor, C. and Gutmann, A. (1992) *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 31.
431 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press: 22.
432 Ariès, P. (1965). *Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life,* Oxford, England: Vintage books.
433 Larrain, J. (1990) *Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency*. Cambridge: Polity.

distribution of human value, which Nick Lee[434] calls 'level of development'.

Moreover, the search for distinction in distribution of human value among individuals had important consequences for the history of body management, placing great demands on the control over the body. Elias in his book *The Civilizing Process*[435] argues that a progressive socialization of the body required two main forms of separation.

First, there is the separation of the body from the dictates of nature, as bodily functions became increasingly socially managed and organized. Due to technical advances, such as the design and construction of the toilet, these functions were eliminated from social life and displaced 'behind the scenes'.[436]

Second, as the body became subject to ever spreading taboos, it is transformed into a site for expression of codes of behaviour. This 'separation' of the body from nature helped to define the level of development and to distribute human value according to the bodily worth. As the previously shared bodily functions became increasingly hidden from view, the manners and dispositions which distinguished individuals could progressively be interpreted as markers of their value and self-identity.

The principle of 'level of development' allowed the discrimination in human value in favour of those:

> who could be seen as highly 'developed' in terms of human evolutionary history, in terms of the culture that they belonged to, or,

434 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press.
435 Elias, N. ([1939] 2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell..
436 Ibid.l: 139.

> as we shall see, in terms of their age. To mark some people as highly developed, it was necessary to mark others as less developed.[437]

As an accessory to honour, a racist interpretation of 'level of development' flourished in the late nineteenth century, due to the need to authorize conquest and to inspire supporters. the belief that Europeans' extraordinary success in the business of colonial exploitation was presented as a natural order.

The highest level of development in English imperialism was represented by a man capable of making and proving himself – a gentleman. The gentleman was a transitional character between principles of honour and of dignity. He was granted with both honour and position among nobility, not always due to the conditions of his birth, and with full of a dignity gained by his works, respected by his equals.

The notion of 'level of development' helped to mitigate the contradictions between the principles of honour and dignity. It offered a ready explanation for the position of depending on another financially or of having to obey instructions. People in this position were considered less developed than the independent gentlemen, and were thus legally incapable of making decisions about the shape of their own lives. Such dependents were expected to cultivate "the meek and obedient habits of human possessions, desirous of the love and fearful of the wrath of the father."[438]

As Nick Lee describes the historical development of the principle of honour to the principle of dignity:

437 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press: 24.
438 Ibid.: 26.

> It appears then that the nineteenth century saw a revival of the patriarch as the owner of self and of others that previous societies[439] had incorporated, boosted this time by emerging sciences of human nature and their concern to distinguish 'primitive' people and societies from 'developed' people and societies. In the UK at least, the 'level of development', with its acme in the figure of the gentleman, preserved patriarchy long into the process of modernization and created a block on the application of universalist conceptions of human dignity to the cases of *women and children.* That contemporary children are seen both as possessions and as bearers of rights is a consequence of Taylor's main current of modernization that leads from the principle of honour to the principle of dignity meeting the complex conservative identity strategies developed by the powerful in response to that main current.[440]

3.1.4. Freud, Piaget and the notion of 'level of development'

As the idea of shared human dignity disseminated, substituting the strict hierarchies of honour, so its propensity to equalize human value were accompanied by the growth of 'level of development'. 'Level of development' became credible because it replied to two questions of integral importance to powerful Europeans of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their wealth was based on those who they regarded as uncivilized and unreasoning, hence, the questioning of the origins of civilization and of the origins of reason became crucial.

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439 Miller, P. (1999) T*ransformations of Patriarchy in the West, 1500–1900*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
440 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press: 26.

> There are men still living who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard as his direct heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own development.[441]

In his book *Totem and Taboo* Freud develops a theory of the origin of 'right' or 'law', in which he also describes the development of men from an initial 'primitive' stage, to a stage when they are both psychologically autonomous, in the sense of being able to manage their own impulses, and equally obedient to the law.

Freud states that in many 'savage' communities there are activities, individuals and things that are 'taboo'. The characteristic feature of a 'taboo' is that the person who believes in it, believes that if they violate the taboo by acting in a certain way or by touching a person or an object that is considered taboo, then punishment, even possible death, will be attracted automatically; whether or not fellow believers intentionally enact that punishment, taboo breakers will find punishment and the spirit world. One of the most widespread taboos prohibits incest, which is diversely defined by cultures as improper contact with, exhibition of, or sexual intercourse with a relative, who may be a family member and/or a fellow member of some other established group or 'totem'.[442]

Freud's theorization opens up with Charles Darwin's views on the social structure adopted by primitive humans. Darwin[443] argued that in the past, humans, or their

441 Freud, S. (1962) *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company:1.
442 Freud, S. (1962) *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
443 Darwin, C. (1871) *The Descent of Man.* London: John Murray.

close ancestors, had a life-style similar to today's gorillas where they lived in small groups or 'hordes' in which one male exclusively has sexual contacts with all the females. The dominant male safeguards his privileged sexual rights in periodic single combat with younger males. As Freud states, this social structure was the 'primal horde' in which 'a violent and jealous father . . . keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up'.[444]

There is no reliable evidence of the existence of a primal horde among humans or their near ancestors, but for Freud there is plenty of evidence today of primitive humans living in tribes consisting of group of males in which each male has equal rights and the same responsibility to respect taboos as every other. Freud supposes that the primal horde evolved into this second, 'tribal' social structure through numerous violent revolutions of similar kind:

> One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them individually.[445]

The brothers now had access to women. They hated their father overruling him and for depriving them of women, but they also admired him. Freud noticed practising psychoanalysis that children and 'neurotics' alike have controversial feelings, love and hate, towards their fathers. He then speculates that those primal brothers felt the same ambivalence toward the governing male, who Freud identifies as father. Once the father is killed and their hatred is fulfilled, their love overwhelmed them and filled them with guilt.

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444 Freud, S. (1962) *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company: 141.
445 Idem.

Their guilt led them to create two taboos. The first was a taboo against harming a 'totem' animal interpreted as the symbol of the dead father. The second was the incest taboo. These two taboos served as preventive measures for the brothers from fighting among themselves and continuing the cycle of violence. The taboo supported each man in control of his own actions because he was afraid of an immediate and automatic punishment. As Freud[446] hypothesizes the taboo freed these men from the need to threaten or control each other because each controlled himself. So just as Freud constructs the origins of law and of civilization, he also constructs the origins of the psychologically autonomous individual, making the conclusion that that every society or community in civilized societies is founded on the basic separateness of men.

According to Freud[447] the violent hierarchical conditions of the primal community were replaced by a peace that was secured by men's ability to control themselves, their desires and their behaviour. Freud provided us with an origin myth of independent individuals united in their obedience to the law and in their responsibility for themselves. Individual separation, civilization and a high level of development are inseparable in this myth.

Freud offered his views on the origins of civilization and the rule of law and Piaget elaborated his position about the origins of reason:

> The transition from chaos to cosmos . . . is brought about through an elimination of egocentrism.[448]

Piaget theorized that when babies are born, they are not yet capable of

446 Freud, S. (1962) *Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
447 Idem.
448 Piaget, J. (1997) *The child's construction of reality.* Abingdon, Oxen: Routledge: xiii.

distinguishing between themselves and the rest of the world. Piaget calls this lack of distinction 'egocentrism'. In Piaget's interpretation, babies are 'egocentric' , though not because they think they are the most important person in the world, but because they are not aware of a separation between themselves and the rest of the world. [449]

As Freud had to narrate to the pre-historical origins of civilization, without any direct evidence about it, Piaget, similarly, was hypothesizing about the individual experiences of a new-born child:

> Let us imagine a being, knowing nothing of the distinction between mind and body. Such a being would be aware of his desires and feelings but his notions of self would undoubtedly be much less clear than ours. Compared with us he would experience much less the sensation of the thinking being within him, the feeling of a being independent of the external world. The knowledge that we are thinking about things severs us in fact from the actual things.[450]

Reason is a form of thought Piaget values the most. According to him, it's a product of the final point of individual cognitive development and can only be achieved and maintained through a split between one's understanding of oneself and one's understanding of the world.

Both Freud's and Piaget's accounts became highly influential, and both implied the possibility of individuals being 'separate' from one another and psychologically independent from one another. In both cases, separateness was understood as a necessary characteristic of the valued qualities of civilization and reason.

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449 Ibid.

450 Piaget, J. (1997). *The child's conception of the world*: Jean Piaget: Selected works (A. Tomlinson & J. Tomlinson, Trans.). London: Routledge: 37.

It wasn't perceived as disrespectful, when Freud and Piaget used in their writings such terms as 'savage' and 'primitive'. Twentieth-century battles against colonialism, sexism and racism have provided us with a different lens, making the hidden oppression of these words clearly visible. Recently, even the word 'development' itself has been undergoing the transition in meaning. The association fabricated by the prior generations between level of development and the value of humans is read by some as speaking in terms of 'child development' is to depreciate children, to perceive them as nothing else but possessions. Therefore, since the end of the twentieth century, many childhood researchers who are working with the question of the value of children and of childhood have reacted critically to ideas of development and have abandoned the notions constructed by Freud and Piaget. This rejection is expressed in two main forms: antidevelopmental psychology and the new sociology of childhood.

Anti-developmental psychology[451] supposes that the notion of independent individual, which is often taken for granted, is mainly a political construct serving the ideological function of apologizing for hierarchies of power and wealth. As it is not a natural phenomenon, it is not to be found in human instinct or in the laws of child development. Thus, to sustain the importance of separateness is to pledge alliance to the ideology which generated the notion.

As for *sociologists of childhood*, they find problematic ignoring differences between children, while concentrating on differences between adults and children. The developmental ideas of Freud and Piaget have contributed to the notion of the

451 Stainton Rogers, R. and Stainton Rogers, W. (1992) *Stories of Childhood: Shifting Agendas of Child Concern.* London: Pearson Higher Education;
Burman, E. (1994) *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology.* London: Routledge;
Morss, J.R. (1996) *Growing Critical: Alternatives to Developmental Psychology.* London: Routledge.

'universal child'[452] which disregards real children's individual, cultural and experiential differences. The universal child's needs are thoroughly elaborated and very well understood by experts on child development. Hence, this universal child can safely remain voiceless about wishes, desires, and opinions of her own.

In other words, *anti-developmental psychology* is mainly antagonistic to a picture of adults as separate from and independent of each other. *The sociology of childhood* calls for recognition and respect of the separateness of children one from another. With rejection of Freud and Piaget, a crucial difference has emerged between the disciplines. One the one hand, to give children their legitimate value is to abolish the idea that adults are separate. On the other, to take into account the idea of separation for children. As Nick Lee puts it:

> This is the ambivalence that arises whenever actual and complete separation is the only tool available to us when we have to think about children's value. In other words, if we are to be able to think clearly about relations between adults and children, we need to start recognizing just how conventional the categories we habitually use to create the value of adulthood and the value of childhood are, categories such as 'developed/primitive' and 'separate/attached'. To say that these categories are conventional, is not to imply that they are bad. It does not mean that we should reject them. But it does mean that we can have a little distance from them and give ourselves time and space to consider how to relate to them and even how to change them.[453]

452 James, A., Jenks, C. and Prout, A. (1998) *Theorizing Childhood.* Oxford: Blackwell.
James, A. and Prout, A. (eds) (1997) *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood,* 2nd edn. London: Falmer.
453 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.: 34-5.

3.1.5. Participation right and separability

Children's supposed inability as individuals to think independently and be accountable for themselves are main reasons for their exclusion from decision-making processes. But if we acknowledge that these qualities are collective and institutional in origin, there is no ground for why decision-making processes themselves should not be organized so as to assist children to be capable of performing them. Instead of mistakenly reject children's rights to participation as based on a poor consideration of children's actual abilities. If the relevant articles of the Convention are to be successfully carried out, this will be enacted in the form of helping children to reason for themselves and to be accountable for themselves through suitable decision-making trainings.

Adults and children usually have very different positions within distributions of separability. Adult's and child's ability to be responsible for oneself is not an individual property, but has been politically and institutionally constructed over time, at least partly, through the evolution of an institution called manners. To the extent that adults or children seem to be in control of themselves, and thus able to bear responsibility, they are equally dependent on the existence and maintenance of this institution. As Elias[454] points out, however, adults generally have a little advantage over children since they have had longer to familiarize themselves with mannerly conduct. It takes a while to become an accomplished performer of separateness. Similarly, Vygotsky[455] tells us that possessing one's own thoughts and thinking for oneself, come after a process of development that takes time.

According to Vygotsky[456] the individual mind is capable of silent, private thinking,

454 Elias, N. ([1939] 2000) *The Civilizing Process* . Ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell. Trans. E. Jephcott. London: Blackwell.
455 Vygotsky, L. (1986) *Thought and Language*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
456 Idem.

of the collectively owned and preserved institution of spoken language. The boundaries around our thoughts that appear to make us so separate from one another are the creation of collective action and are conserved by collective action. If all separateness depends on separability, then everyone, adult and child, no matter how advanced they are in separateness, is always also attached, connected and dependent. The occurrence of actual and accomplished separateness is a consequence of the interiorization of connections. Likewise, any appearance of actual and complete attachment is an effect of the concealment of separateness.

For Piaget,[457]cognitive development is a process of the elaboration of the basic understanding that one is different from and separate to the rest of the world. In his original account of children's cognitive and linguistic development, Vygotsky[458] rejects Piaget's insistence on separateness. This does not, however, lead Vygotsky to a position that rejects the possibility of 'thinking for oneself'. Rather, Vygotsky debates that the growing child since her birth is emerged into a language-using community, then, slowly, as her cognitive skills become increasingly shaped by language and via its practice, the common property of language is progressively transformed into the silent, personal property of thought. Vygotsky's views on 'thinking for oneself' suggest that our understanding of this activity need not be limited to assumptions about the special capabilities of individual adults, but can instead be analysed through separability.

> Children's apparent failure as individuals to be able to think and be responsible for themselves are principal reasons for their exclusion from decision-making processes. But if these qualities are, as I would

457 Piaget, J. (1997) *The child's construction of reality.* Abingdon, Oxen: Routledge; Piaget, J. (1997). *The child's conception of the world:* Jean Piaget: Selected works (A. Tomlinson & J. Tomlinson, Trans.). London: Routledge.
458 Vygotsky, L. (1986) Thought and Language. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

> argue, collective and institutional in origin, there is no reason why decision-making processes themselves should not be structured so as to assist children to be able to perform them. On this view, it is simply mistaken to reject children's rights to participation as based on a poor reflection of children's actual abilities. If the relevant articles of the Convention are to be effectively implemented, this will take the form of helping children to think for themselves and to be responsible for themselves through appropriate decision-making practices.[459]

The broader participation for children requires a process of social and structural transformation. It is important to mention that there's a value in participation not only in formal decision making, but also in everyday life contexts of children, in other words, in children's "manifestation of individual agency within a social context".[460]

3.2. School and temporal categories of childhood

3.2.1. Schooling 'passive becomings'

Education, as a key element of the modern state, is a field of social life where children are treated as sites of investment, as human becomings. The education as we know it today closely related to the historical process of state development in western Europe. Teachers' authority in public school system remains largely based on the notion of an adult as a completed being who holds certain, if not absolute, knowledge. Teachers' authority is often contrasted by children's lack of autonomy within the classroom, the consequence of their status as incomplete becomings. The stark contrast between adult being and child becoming is now no

459 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability*. Maidenhead: Open University Press: 157.
460 Percy-Smith, B. and Thomas, N. (2010) *A handbook of children and young people's participation: perspectives from theory and practice.* London: Routledge: 357.

longer such a key feature of schools in the affluent West.[461]

As the understanding of what knowledge a child should be provided with has become more ambiguous, the practice and aims of education have been slowly transforming. The pupil is less often understood as a passive, obedient container for adult knowledge and expertise, but rather as an active, and to a certain degree, independent creator and operator of information. The social practices of schooling first generated and implemented a passive, obedient becoming notion for pupils and then, during recent decades, has been slowly turning towards acknowledgement of children's activity as learners and referring to them as 'active becomings'.

Independently of their active or passive status, children in educational settings are still seen as beings on their way to completion, to a state of adulthood. As we turn to the present days, we shall see that while the being/becoming division was once clear enough to act as the theoretical and practical basis of schooling, there has been a decrease of relevance of the oppositional terms 'being' and 'becoming'. Access to information and communication technology in education has been adding flexibility to both teacher and pupil. Both children and adults are getting increasingly involved in process of 'becoming without end'.

Historically the modern school as a social organization was founded on the 'passive becoming' as the model of the pupil. Michel Foucault[462] considered the school as one of 'disciplinary' institutions that developed in modernity. According to him, the school , along with the prison, the factory and the army barracks, takes its roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an institution for sculpturing people's behaviour. The school wasn't only a place of skills and

461 Lee, N. (2001) *Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty.* Buckingham: Open University Press.
462 Foucault, M. (1995) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* . New York: Vintage.

information transmission from teacher to pupil, but it was also a refined engineering of every day order within its own walls, comparing pupils' individual performance to standards of competence, and interpreting pupils' development against time. Generally speaking, the disciplinary school can be considered a organization for making 'passive becomings'.

The disciplinary schooling consists of methods which ensure pupils' obedience addressing every misbehaviour, from destructing other pupils to general inattention and controlling that pupils are 'docile'.[463] Consequently, within such doctrine, teachers perceive independent undertakings of pupils' as problematic and threatening the order. One possibility was for the disciplinary school's teacher to turn a diverse and active group of people into a quiet class is to threaten physical punishment for misbehaviour.

Foucault[464] also points out less dramatic techniques for disciplining an active mass of children with their own goals and interests into a obedient class. Classroom space is designed so that each pupil had a special place to sit, their own chair, and their own area of desk space. These individual spaces were organized to face the front of the classroom. This simple spacing of children as individuals, fixed in place in lines facing the teacher, allowed the teacher easily to see when a child was moving out of their place, leaning toward their neighbour, say, or passing a note. An arrangement of proper places allows the teacher to easily notice when a child was moving and evaluate whether or not some misbehaviour was happening or was about to happen. Even a deviation in a pupil's posture can be interpreted as a sign of disobedience and a valid motive for a teacher to intervene with a word of command or a punishment, in order to keep teacher's lesson delivery uninterrupted by pupils. Consequently, a crucial part of a lesson consists

463 Ibid:136.
464 Ibid.

of the regular exclusion of the possibility of pupil's independent activity.

Curriculum, on the other hand, regulates pupils' education over time by splitting the skills and knowledge to be learned into chunks and organizing it over time. Such organization of knowledge into levels of increasing difficulty allows teachers to test all pupils at the end of each level, to compare and rank pupils' competency and to regulate the rate of development of each child through the curriculum.

Consequently, standard expectations for children's achievement over time can be developed and individual pupil's deviation from the standard can be traced. And so disciplinary schooling keeps the score on the speed and success of pupils' 'becoming' competent and allows for prediction of the future progress based on past records.[465]

The teacher holds power and authority over the pupils whose activity is adjusted to the teacher's purposes. The notion of children as passive becomings is central to the disciplinary schooling which is closely connected with adult completeness and expertise over children as becomings.

According to Paulo Freire,[466] the teacher-student relationship is defined by its fundamentally *narrative* character. This relationship includes a narrating subject (the teacher) and recipient, listening objects (the students). The meanings, in the process of being narrated, have a tendency to become rigid. Education is subject to "narration sickness".[467]

The teacher describes reality as if it were static and predictable. Or else she

465 Lee, N. (2001) *Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty.* Buckingham: Open University Press.
466 Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.).* New York: Continuum.
467 Ibid: 71.

elaborates on a subject totally alien to the life experience of the pupils. Narration (with the teacher as narrator) brings the children to memorize mechanically the narrated information. It treats children as "containers", "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teacher. The more entirely she fills the receptacles, the better a teacher she is. The more humbly the receptacles let themselves to be filled, the better students they are. Education thus turns into an act of depositing, in which the children are the depositories and the teacher is a depositor.

It is a predominantly one-way information delivery system, whereby the teacher releases information and makes deposits which the pupils patiently let in, memorize, and reproduce. Freire[468] calls it the 'banking' idea of education', in which the settings of action allowed to the pupils are limited to receiving and storing the deposits. The skills acquired through such education allow the pupils to become collectors or cataloguers of the information they store. However, we can observe an alarming lack of creativity, as knowledge develops only through invention and re-invention, through the continuing, hopeful inquiry individuals pursue in interaction with the world and with each other.

The 'banking' concept of education, according to Freire, perceives human beings as adaptable, governable beings. The more pupils are involved in storing the deposits handed to them, the less they evolve as critical conscious beings who can intervene in the world and transform that world. The more they accept the *passive role* expected from them, the more they are inclined to adapt to the world as a complete project, a *product of the past* and to the fragmented perspective of reality transmitted to them.

The 'banking' understanding of knowledge suggests that the educator's role is to rule the way the world "enters into" the students. The teachers' chore is to

468 Ibid: 72.

coordinate a process which already goes on spontaneously, to "fill" the pupils by making deposits of information which he or she believes to represent true knowledge. This concept corresponds to what Sartre[469] calls the "digestive" or "nutritive" concept of education, in which knowledge is "fed" by the teacher to the students to "fill them out." And since children "receive" the world as *passive becomings,* education should make them *more passive still,* and adapt them to the world. The educated person is the adapted individual, because she or he is better "fit" for the world.[470]

According to Freire,[471] the 'banking' education approaches children as objects and, hence, cannot promote the development of what Fromm[472] calls "biophily," but instead produces its opposite: "necrophily." While life is defined by growth in an organic, functional manner, the necrophilous individual loves all that does not alter, all that is mechanical.

> The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living persons were things. . . . Memory, rather than experience; having, rather than being, is what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object—a flower or a person—only if he possesses it; hence a threat to his possession is a threat to himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world. ... He loves control, and in the act of controlling he kills life.[473]

The banking concept of education, which is characterized by overwhelming

469 Sartre, J.-P. (1970). *Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology*. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1 (2):4-5.
470 Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.)*. New York:Continuum.
471 Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.).* New York: Continuum: 77.
472 Fromm, E. (1964). *The heart of man.* New York, NY: Harper & Row.
473 Ibid: 41.

control, is necrophilic in Fromm's terms. It seeks to control thought and action, leads children to adjust to the world, and suppresses their creative power. [474]

As Freire[475] argues, the 'banking' education to suppress or cancel the pupils creative power and to reinforce their compliance serves to maintain the status quo, to avoid the transformation of the world. A profound trust in children and their creative power is required in order to support the pupils in their quest for critical thinking and mutual humanization. To achieve these goals, teachers must be partners of the pupils in their relations with them. The 'banking' concept of education does not appreciate such solidarity. This approach to education doesn't propose to pupils that they critically reflect on reality. Instead, it attempts to turn the pupils into automatons— "the very negation of their ontological vocation to be more fully human" and of *the process-like nature of reality,* which is undergoing constant transformation.[476]

3.2.2.Education and active becomings

The early modem accent on the submissiveness of the pupil was to be questioned by the mid-twentieth century. Disciplinary education, characterized by high levels of spatial and temporal ordering, made its way to the 'developing world', together with industrialization and the notion of the developmental state. Then, criticism against disciplinary schooling slowly arose when Illich[477] and Lister[478] started questioning the adequacy of disciplinary schooling for 'developing' nations. Passive becomings were not very suitable for 'developing' nations which often couldn't afford resources, human and material, needed for raising adults who

474 Ibid: 77.
475 Ibid.
476 Fromm, E. (1964). *The heart of man.* New York, NY: Harper & Row: 74.
477 Illich, I. (1971). *Deschooling Society.* New York: Harper and Row.
478 Lister, I. (1974) *Deschooling,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

were skilled at passing examinations, but who rarely had many practical skills.

As long as school was related to adult authority, school-children were mostly trained in obeying orders and being passive. Thus, the teachers' authority over pupils', indispensable for orderly education, were now challenged. The discourse for 'unschooling' society was also disseminated in the west, as part of a social movement for the freedom of individual potential. Accordingly, new *child-centred models* of education were being formulated and tried.

They were largely inspired by Piaget's theories of child development.[479] One of the central elements of Piaget's[480] theory is that, in order to progress, children have to be provided with abundant information about the world around them and possibilities to 'work' on it. For Piaget,[481] children are active players in their own development. If they are to become rational beings, they demand the freedom to explore information, to make their own assumptions and to think for themselves. As we have described, disciplinary education is focused on keeping children as passive as possible, on limiting their movements and interactions within the classroom. It attempts to limit the range of children's classroom experiences to listening to the words and observing the actions of the teacher.

While it provided teachers the comfort of an obedient class, this framework appeared wrong in the light of Piaget's[482] work which brought an awareness of the different levels of capacity intrinsic in children as they developed. Therefore, rather than instructing passive pupils through the curriculum, the 'child-centred' teacher would have the duty of introducing children to age-appropriate

479 Walkerdine, V. (1998) *Developmental psychology and the child-centred pedagogy,* pp. 153±202 in J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine(eds) Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity, London: Methuen.
480 Piaget, J. (1997) The child's construction of reality. Abingdon, Oxen: Routledge.
481 Idem.
482 Idem.

experiences and assisting them actively to reflect on those experiences. The pupil of child-centred education is still a 'becoming', and her status of active, rather than passive, becoming is a psychologically supported fact.

Walkerdine's[483] research on the child-centred approach shows that the notion of the child as an active becoming, who has to be provided with possibilities to 'do' in order to 'understand', generated changes in standard classroom design, modifications planned to give children many possibilities to be active learners. The grid-like space of the old-fashioned classroom is split into a number of different areas, each of which can contribute to activating children as learners. In the child-centred approach, rows of desks facing the teacher are replaced with individual tables where some children might sit facing each other. This organization is suggested in order to provide opportunities for children to acquire social skills and competences.

The child-centred approach to education is focused on giving children an environment in which to have well-supplied social, material and informational experiences to involve, move and puzzle them, and therefore to sustain their active self-development. The child-centred education also changes the relationship between learning and adult authority. Where the teacher of the traditional classroom is the centre of control and of knowledge, child-centred education loosens connection between adult dominance and educational practice. The child-centred teacher is more of a guide and a facilitator of pupils' experience.

This approach threatens traditional idea of discipline, because neither the teacher's control, nor the teacher's 'completeness' is required. There are still ongoing

483 Walkerdine, V. (1998) *Developmental psychology and the child-centred pedagogy*, pp. 153±202 in J. Henriques, W. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn and V. Walkerdine(eds) Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity, London: Methuen.

debates over the question of how active and autonomous children should be in schools. The issue of whether teachers should be powerful authority figures, of whether school has to be a place of the adult dominance over a group of children is very much disputed.

The child-centred approach, focused on encouraging children's active teaming thereby separating adult authority from the learning process — is being picked up and applied to a rather different context, that of the use of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) in education.[484]

3.2.3. Becomings without end?

The word 'information and communication technology' includes all the new media that have emerged through the accelerating power and diminishing costs of computing in the late twentieth century. As Castells[485] debates, this easy and fast transmission of information is a dynamic force behind the development of the new economy. It boosts the reach of business, widens the size of their potential market, and thus adds to the intensity of competition between them. ICT, then, is a decisive element of the 'flexibilization' of the economy and of people's lives. It shortens the length of time between a present and an uncertain future. It is thus an indefensible feature of our age of uncertainty.

What is certain is that, as industrial societies needed populations capable of writing and reading, so information societies will need ICT-competent human resources. Familiarity with the new forms of computer mediated communication can be taught by moving basic writing and reading chores from paper books to the screen. Unlike ICT resources, textbooks are very structured media. They contain

484 Lee, N. (2001) *Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty.* Buckingham: Open University Press.
485 Castells, M. (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society.* Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

an approved interpretation of knowledge. The information in them has been carefully chosen for the child to satisfy clear scholastic purposes, while the global network of information is rather unregulated. Because ICT provides easy access to an enormous amount of unstructured information, ICT skills include the ability to find the information that one needs by selecting one's own filters and to be active in making choices and decisions.

For Somekh[486] one of the most important outcomes of the emergence of ICT in schools is a transformation of the relationship between teacher and pupil. If pupils are to decide how to manage information flow, then teachers must release part of their control over them. Hence, the teacher is no more obviously separated from the student by role, with one transmitting information and the other processing it.

> There is ... an understanding that teaching and learning are independent aspects of a single activity ... Teachers cast themselves in the role of a learner or co-learner *at the same time* as that of a teacher.[487]

Thus, ICT progressively promoting the pupil as an active participant in her own learning. Rather than a clear distinction between adult being and child becoming, we are observing a growing ambiguity in childhood within the networked education settings. But there is a further significant change in progress. Moreover, there is no state of 'completion' or journey's end' in ICT learning process. Instead children afforded this competency are allowed to *continue* learning and transformations throughout their lives, so that they are fit to meet to future uncertain demands and conditions. According to Somekh[488] the ability to stay connected with a changing world and endure in doing so as plans and interests

486 Somekh, B. (2000). *New teaching and learning: Policy and practice in the UK*, 1980–2010. Education and Information Technologies, , 5(1): 19—37.
487 Somekh, B. (2000). *New teaching and learning: Policy and practice in the UK*, 1980–2010. Education and Information Technologies, , 5(1): 19—37: 28.
488 Ibid.

fluctuate, will be essential to future economic success.

Where industrial societies of the past required completed beings who could efficiently fill lasting and certain roles, information societies need `self-confident, independent thinkers ... capable of acquiring a range of different skills and adapting to several jobs over a lifetime'.[489] The framework of education in information societies moves from the transformation of incomplete becomings into completed beings and towards the stimulation of 'becomings without end'. Moreover, the influence of these changes is not limited to children in schools, the European Commission has defined a state of 'becoming without end' as a new model for European citizens. Adults must stay open and incomplete, they must keep 'the capacity to learn how to learn'.[490]

The document *Teaching and Learning: Towards a Learning Society,* released by the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities 1995), states a need for 'continuous adjustment to skills and attitudes in a rapidly changing society'.[491] Edwards[492] emphasizes importance of adult training and education in order to support and develop the ability of adults to stay flexible and adaptable.

As we have delineated, schools were once based on a clear separation between *adult being* and *child becoming,* connected to the importance of adults' ability to control children's experiences and access to knowledge. Further, schooling, both in its disciplinary and child-centred models, has been focused on turning children

489 Somekh, B. (2000). *New teaching and learning: Policy and practice in the UK*, 1980–2010. Education and Information Technologies, , 5(1): 19—37: 35.
490 Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, lifelong learning and a learning society,* London: Routledge: 32.
491 http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com95_590_en.pdf (p. 20, acsessed 5 October 2016).
492 Edwards, R. (1997) *Changing Places? Flexibility, lifelong learning and a learning society,* London: Routledge.

into becomings, whether active or passive.

Adult control over children's experience and access to information are central to maintenance of the being/becoming distinction. However, new technological mediators, together with new forms of consumption and education have changed the expectation and desirability of maintaining a clear distinction between beings and becomings . As a result, children in the west are coming to have a dual status as *both becomings and beings.*

Consequently, from the point of view of the being/becoming separation model childhood is *becoming increasingly ambiguous.* Besides the increasing ambiguity of childhood, there's is also the emergence of *'becoming without end'* which regards both, adults and children, in the modern dynamic society. The status of human becoming is being diffused throughout the course of life. As such it differs from a traditional understanding of human becoming, as it has no final destination and can potentially be spread throughout the course of life, regardless of age. Therefore, the notion childhood calls for constant re-construction within these new conditions of modern society.

CHAPTER 4. The social construction of time and adult-child power relations in educational settings (the case of primary school in Sardinia, Italy)

4.1.Theoretical overview

James and Prout[493] argues that the social construction of time may be very fruitful for the study of childhood, considering centrality of time to developmental psychological concepts, distribution of power, furthermore, to control children's time and order children lives**.**

Conceptualisation of childhood is still a matter of academic debate across a range of disciplines.[494] On an individual level, it's a stage of a human life cycle with its own patterns of biological and cognitive change. At the same time,'childhood' is also 'shifting set of ideas',[495] which may be socially constructed and negotiated.

The ways in which childhood is defined vary across cultures and historical periods; what remains constant is a predominantly adult viewpoint on childhood. According to Nieuwenhuys,[496] 'exchange between generations is rarely symmetrical'. Thus, the notion of childhood is conditioned by the perspectives and concerns of those in power, while children can be assumed as a minority group in the context of unequal power relationships.

493 James, A. & A. Prout (1997) Constructing and Re-constructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood, London, Falmer Press.
494 Smith, R. (2010). A Universal Child?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
495 Cunningham, H. (1995) Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500,London and New York: Longman:1.
496 Nieuwenhuys, O. (2005) 'The wealth of children: reconsidering the child labour debate', in Qvortrup, J. (ed.) Studies in Modern Childhoodd: society, agency, culture, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp 167–83:170.

Smith points out that the notions of power and inequality are the most significant for the analysis of adult-child relations, "not just in terms of specific examples of exploitation and oppression, but also in the general sense that they are embedded in the production and reproduction of social relations. The interaction between these structural dynamics of exclusion and those 'universal' features [...] such as immaturity and limited knowledge and experience, may be seen to compound the sense of 'vulnerability' adumbrated here as a common feature of 'being a child'".[497]

Chronological age is an important characteristic for the social distribution of power. Children can be restricted in it due to the visibility of their low chronological age. Their opinions and desires are often undervalued, because their age has been take as a proof that they are not worth paying attention to. Issues of dependency and protection, then, are linked to ideas of age and prevail as themes of the time of childhood.

The dialectical interaction between temporal notions and social practices is crucial for critical analysis of the concepts of children's needs and rights. The implicit normative character of 'needs' and 'rights' is conditioned by ideas of age (calculated as years of time passing) in relation to childhood. It is understandable that children's *rights to participation* often face a more ambivalent and less favorable response than those to *protection* and *provision.*[498] Thus, children are deprived of a voice in decisions that affect them.

Childhood perceived as a project, which is caused by commitment to 'invest in children', to correct faults, build up skills and abilities, advance functioning,[499]

497 Smith, R. (2010). A Universal Child?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
498 Lee, N. (2005). *Childhood and human value: Development, separation and separability.* Maidenhead: Open University Press.
499 Harry Hendrick, Child Welfare: England, 1872-1989. London: Routledge,. 1994

which is especially relevant to the educational settings. In the context of globalization and growing complexity and interdependency of national economies, Prout suggests that "increased levels of institutional control over children represents drive to control the future through children. In such circumstances, shaping children as the future labour force is seen as an increasingly important option".[500]

In fact, in political discourses it is common to hear, on the one hand, reference to children as "our future" and, on the other hand, anxiety expressed about children inconsistency with values and norms of past generations. This future-oriented concern can play an double-edged role in children's lives, both favouring and depriving them as individuals. Present of children in such discourses appears to be of interest only in relation to their future. Future-oriented concerns often manifest themselves in intentional withholding of information of 'inappropriate' quality by establishment of temporal boundaries, such as minimum age requirements, and contribute to inter-generational power dynamics.

Children participation in such power dynamics is undermined by lack of trust in their maturity and their capability to deal with certain experience and information. Prevention of children from decision-making due to lack of information is not always obvious part of power-games. Bachrach and Baratz emphasise the importance of 'nondecision-making' in the exercise of power: 'When the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions, it can be sad that a nondecision-making situation exists'.[501] This

500 Hallett, C. and Prout, A. (eds) (2003), Hearing the Voices of Children, Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis:16.
501 Bachrach, P. S. and Baratz, M. S. (1970), Power and Poverty, Theory and Practice New York,

practice leads to silencing the voice of children as social actors and undermining of their agency, choice and participation.

Future-oriented concerns underlie developmental 'becoming prospective' on children lives', which is being replaced with a 'being prospective' in the new sociology of childhood paradigm, where children participation and agency are of major importance.[502] Recently the new consideration emerged within the new sociology of childhood, where 'being' and 'becoming' discourses must be conceptualized together in complimentary way.[503]

The concept of 'being' is more independent of the time scale and we can only comprehend it in the present. The concept of 'becoming' is formed by the notion that our 'now' changes in time, therefore this notion is vastly conditioned by past and future. We relate time with change, which we evaluate in positive or negative scale, thus time must be something "ontologically real", because it influences everything exciting externally and internally. However, the notion of time is socially constructed. Study of politics of time suggests that diverse cultures construct different time and that "disparate times coexist in the same social formation".[504] Control of time is indispensable, with power struggles that "shape time as both concept and resource".[505] When social actors utilize certain paradigm of time, it ends up enacted in their interaction, socialization and power relations, especially when it comes to adult-child power dynamics.

Oxford University Press:109.
502 Qvortup, J., Bardy, M., Sgritta, G. and Wintersberger, H. (1994)(Eds) Childhood Matters, Aldershot, Avebury.
503 Uprichard, E. (2008) 'Children as Being and Becomings: Children, childhood and temporality', Children and Society, 22(4): 303-313; Warming, H. (2013) Participation, Citizenship and Trust in children's lives : Palgrave Macmillan.
504 Rutz, Henry J. ed. 1992. The Politics of Time. American Ethnological Society Monograph Series, Number 4. Washington D.C.: American Anthropological Association
505 Ibid:1.

The concepts of “adulthood “ and “childhood” are anchored in fundamental temporal otherness of children perceived by adults. Adult's and child's temporalities are only partially overlapped and their relationship unfolds in the moment of overlap, when the concentration of powers of the past and for the future, which adult and child respectively “possess”, is particularly unequal.[506]

The adult can be perceived as an owner of a longer *time lived* (past), accumulated in experience and knowledge legitimizing adult *authority.* The child, on the other hand, has more of “*unrealised” time*, more *time lef*t, she possesses a longer future in which to act. “What one loses in *might,* one gains in *authority*. To be mighty is to have more time let, to be authoritative is to have more time past.”[507] There's an unpredictable time in the future adults cannot access directly, only influence it via the didactic messages, asking the child to carry the task into another temporality which is out of adult power.

Education is a field of social life where children are treated as sites of investment, as human *becomings- 'passive', 'active' or 'without end'.* According to Bourdieu[508] the time spent at school is characterized by particular forms of bodily control and expression which can serve to obtain from children and adults forms of consent that the mind could otherwise refuse. According to Paulo Freire,[509] the teacher-student relationship is defined by fundamentally *narrative* character, moreover, the teacher can influence pupils' self-narratives, and, therefore, their future.

School lives are determined by curricular (temporal) and behavioural rules and

506 Beauvais, C. (2015) *The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins:6.
507 Beauvais, C. (2015) *The mighty child: Time and power in children's literature.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins: 19.
508 Bourdieu, P. (1988) *'Program for a sociology of sport'*, Sociology of Sport Journal, 5: 1 5 3-6 1 : 161.
509 Freire, P. (2000). *Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.).* New York: Continuum.

structures. This control in school is significant to the broader social field for children. The school reflects, if not magnifies, the child's lack of social status and participation. Children pass through school as they pass through the chronologically arranged developmental stages *on their way* to something more important. The routine functioning of the school system shapes cognitive structures which are not necessarily conscious *dispositions of the body.*[510] Through curriculla and deeply hidden corporeal dispositions, beyond the routes of consciousness and calculation.

An emphasis on temporal structure exposes the way in which society constrains social action. The education system and the school, indeed limits the possibilities for approaching children as social agents. First of all, the school emphasizes the inferior status of children in the way that rules, values and educational routines are shaped around the need to act on and position children. James, Jenks and Prout mention the temporality of childhood. They argue that:

> schooling imposes complex temporal schedules which, through their intersection, structure daily, weekly and yearly cycles and create, for children, different spatial and temporal constraints and possibilities in relation to their school work which must be negotiated with parentsand teachers.[511]

This temporal structure can be experienced in two forms: *global* and *routine* time. A *'global'* notion of time refers to the age-grading system heavily influenced by developmental psychology. The 'staging' of education also shapes the ways in which children are acted upon by adults. *Routine* time is lived through the more immediate and constraining force of the school timetable. Children's activities—

510 Bourdieu P. (1994), "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", Sociological Theory, 12:1-18 (12)
511 James, A., Jenks, C. and Prout, A. (1998) Theorizing Childhood. Oxford: Blackwell: 75

their use of time and space—are determined by the timetable and the school curriculum, which are interwoven with rules and regulations which are sometimes official, sometimes self-evident to pupils. Moreover, adults involved within the educational world have a much greater degree of autonomy within the curriculum and the timetable of schooling.[512]

There's additional time-related challenge within the educational settings - historically, education is focused on preparing for the well known and foreseen future. It was very appropriate, as long as most children's lives were likely to be not much different from their parents' lives. However, it becomes increasingly difficult to expect that tomorrow will be pretty much like yesterday.

Most certainly we need a different vision of education, a vision that embraces education for the unknown as much as for the unknown. Children should be ready for various changes and for a future where flexibility and adaptability will be required. Managing change involves understanding and skills for handling uncertainty, relationships and conflict. The development of such skills requires careful consideration of children's agency and participation and accommodation of more integrated educational approaches, which are not limited by the acquisition of the abstract knowledge, but equally focused on the emotional, social and corporeal aspects of education.

512 Wyness, M. (2000) Contesting Childhood, London: Falmer.

4.2. Research objectives and methodology

The choice of the educational settings for the research on social construction of time in adult-child relationships had been shaped slowly through my gradual acquaintance with the body of literature on social construction of time in the context of power relationships in general, and within the context of adult-child relationships, in particular. The public school setting is one of the most essential (timewise) in children's lives, where unequal adult-child power relationships are institutionalized.

The project was designed as an interdisciplinary descriptive research with the following *objectives*:

- to observe and describe implicit and explicit temporal notions, symbols and structures which children experience on a daily basis at school;
- to notice and report the specifics of temporal notions of 'being' and 'becoming' in educational settings;
- to evaluate the temporal proportion of the cognitive, emotional, social and corporeal aspects of education in curriculum and the temporal orientation of curriculum.

The research took place in the primary school of Sardinia, Italy, after I had obtained the informed consent for participant observation from the administration of the school and the teachers of the class where I was conducting my study. Confidentiality of the individuals, adults and minors, involved in the research was assured. The empirical research process had a duration of 8 months, with few

short pauses which I used for further reading and reflection on theories related to temporal notions. The data was collected through a range of *qualitative ethnographic methods*— observation, participant and non-participant, collection of background data on historical and social context; informal discussions with adults, and with children, focus group and group discussion and non-structured interview with children at school.

> Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.[513]

Qualitative methods of data collection, such as interviewing, observation, and document analysis, have been included under the umbrella term of "ethnographic methods". Observation, for many years, has been a characteristic of both

513 Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2005a) 'Introduction: the discipline and practice of qualitative research', in N. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), The Sage Handbook of QualitativeResearch (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 1–32 (3)

anthropological and sociological research. In recent years, the field of education has experienced an increase in the number of qualitative studies that include participant observation as a way to collect information.

Marshall and Rossman define observation as "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study".[514] Observations allow the researcher to report existing situations using the five senses, depicting a "written photograph" of the situation under study.[515] DeMunck and Sobo[516] believe that participant observation is an essential method for anthropological fieldwork. Fieldwork includes ""active looking, improving memory, informal interviewing, writing detailed field notes, and perhaps most importantly, patience".[517] Participant observation, through the procedure of observing and participating in the activities of the people under study, provides researchers with and opportunity to experience these activities in the natural environment. Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte refer to participant observation as "the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the researcher setting".[518]

Berndard[519] describes participant observation as the way toward establishing contact within a community and figuring out how to act so as to blend into the

514 Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. B. (1989). *Designing qualitative research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage: 79
515 Erlandson, D. A.; Harris, E. L.; Skipper, B. L. & Allen, S. D. (1993). *Doing naturalistic inquiry: a guide to methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
516 deMunck, V. C. & Sobo, E. J. (Eds) (1998). *Using methods in the field: a practical introduction and casebook*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
517 DeWalt, K.M. & DeWalt, B. R. (2002). *Participant observation: a guide for fieldworker*s. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press: vii
518 Schensul, S.L.; Schensul, J.J. & LeCompte, M. D. (1999). *Essential ethnographic methods: observations, interviews, and questionnaires* (Book 2 in Ethnographer's Toolkit). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press: 91
519 Bernard, H. Russell (1994). *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches* (second edition). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

community so that its members will act in the usual manner, then leaving the setting or community to analyse the data and try to comprehend what is going on and find the way to write about it.

According to him, the process of being a participant observer consists of observation, natural conversations, different kinds of interviews, checklists, questionnaires, and subtle methods. Participant observation is distinguished by an open, nonjudgmental attitude of the researcher who is driven by the interest to learn more about others, being aware of the tendency to experience culture shock and make mistakes. Being an attentive observer and a good listener, however, helps to overcome the majority of mistakes.[520]

Fine[521] adopts the term "peopled ethnography" to define text that explain the setting and that provides theoretical indications through the details, based on field notes from observations, interviews, and experiences of the group members. He proposes that ethnography is most valid when one observes the community being studied in settings that allow her to "explore the organized routines of behaviour".[522]

Fine argues that "peopled ethnography" is based on extensive observation in the field that requires a large amount of labour and sometimes lasts for a considerable length of time. In this depiction of the observation procedure, one should become a part of the community being studied to the degree that the individuals themselves include the observer in the activity and ask the observer about how the community is functioning.[523]

520 DeWalt, K. M. & DeWalt, B. R. (1998). Participant observation. In H. Russell Bernard (Ed.), *Handbook of methods in cultural anthropology* (pp.259-300). Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.
521 Fine, Gary A. (2003). Towards a peopled ethnography developing theory from group life. *Ethnography, 4*(1), 41-60.
522Ibid: 41
523Ibid.

He additionally emphasizes that it at this point, when members turn to the observer for information about the group and when they start to include the observer in the "gossip", that the time has come to leave the field. This procedure of becoming a part of the community, while observing their practices and activities, Fine refers to as participant observation.[524]

Bernard[525] mentions five motives for application of participant observation in social research, all of which support the research's validity:

- It allows her to gather different types of data. Being on site over a long period of time brings the researcher and community closer to each other, thereby encouraging involvement in sensitive experiences in which she usually would not be included.

- It mitigates the rate of "reactivity" when individuals, aware of being observed, try to act in a certain way.

- It helps the researcher to elaborate questions that and culturally relevant and sound natural in the native language.

- It gives the researcher a better comprehension of what is going on in the culture and increases confidence in one's interpretations of the observation. Participant observation additionally facilitates the collection of both both quantitative and qualitative data.

- Participant observation sometimes is the only way to gather the right data for one's research.[526] This argument is particularly applicable to my

524Ibid.
525 Bernard, H. R. (1994). *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches* (second edition). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
526Ibid.: 142-3

research, considering the implicit nature of temporal notions it attempts to study.

As a researcher I have been keeping throughout the work the idea of the child as subject, attempting to stay attuned to the unique position of children in adult-child power relationships in educational settings. I was concerned with the involvement of children and perceived the research is a joint enterprise to explore everyday experiences of children in Italian primary school. I aimed at giving children a voice and providing evidence on children's lives—the character and quality of their time experienced in relation to adults at school and to adulthood in general.

When it comes to participant observation of children's everyday life, Morrow and Richards[527] differentiate between children's consent and assent: consent is taken to mean when someone 'voluntarily agrees to participate in a research project, based on a full disclosure of pertinent information', while assent refers to a 'parallel process in which the parent or guardian agrees to allow a minor ward to participate in a research project, and the child assents or agrees to be a subject in the research.'[528] While the children in this study may have merely agreed to their initial involvement, I wanted to be sure that their ongoing participation in the was based on informed consent. At the beginning of the participant observation, I asked children if they had questions about the research, including clarification of the research questions.

Discussion then turned to the issue of confidentiality and privacy, and children were assured that no information would be passed on to the parents, teachers or

527Morrow, V., & Richards, M. (1996). The ethics of social research with children: An overview. Children & Society, 10, 90-105

528Tymchuk, A. (1992). Assent processes. In B. Stanley & J. Sieber (Eds.) Social research on children and adolescents: Ethical issues, London: Sage: 128, as quoted in Morrow, V., & Richards, M. (1996). The ethics of social research with children: An overview. Children & Society, 10, 90-105: 94

other adults. They were told that their names wouldn't be mentioned, that pseudonyms would be chosen for them and that I would change any details of the descriptive part of my research, in case they might identify the child. The same conditions were communicated to the teachers involved in the project.

4.3. Research findings and discussion:

Location of research. The observation took place in the 4th grade classroom of an elementary school of Sardinia. The school building is two-stories, with the yard under construction since many years. The classroom accommodates 16 children. The most of the classroom's wall decorations can be interpreted as temporal symbols. The calendars and didactic posters display visuals which

- depict how the temporal structure goes in a *circular pattern* of seasons (images of trees changing their appearance throughout the year) , days of the week, months, or a schedule of pupils' birthdays;
- construct a timeline of the *personal history* (micro-timline) (*'I reperti della nostra storia':* photos of the children when they were preschoolers and the personal objects which were dear to them at that time);
- construct timelines of world history *(*a timeline of the history of the Roman Empire, a timeline of Ancient Mesopotamian civilization).

Children study from 8:30 AM to 13:30 PM. The school week is 30 hours, attended over 6 days a week. Since the yard is not considered safe, they tend to stay indoors, mostly within their main classroom walls.

Curriculum. The 4th grade *curriculum* divides the 300-minute school day into various blocks of time, each of which is scheduled, but approached rather fluidly depending on a teacher's discretion and arrangements. When the teacher is absent or late, children are usually divided in a few groups and sent to the classrooms of the other teachers. If children come to school earlier than their teachers, or if the teacher is on time, all the same, the first morning usually includes half an hour to socialize informally. This practice is not openly considered to be a crucial block of time even if it offers the possibility of establishing a relaxed, informal, supportive working atmosphere, as the children and the teachers begin their daily activities. Because of the unofficial status of this block of time, children often are interrupted in their communication and movement and invited to sit still and be silent rather abruptly. However, they soon return to talk and move around the class. Although the peer group can offer an important contribution to the process of education, this potential is still not recognized in the primary school curriculum. The peer group's influence on student academic achievement is traditionally perceived by teachers as potentially disturbing and negative. socialization time, with clear status, behavioural rules and expectations from children within this block of time could facilitate social competence with peers and promote the use of basic interaction skills, getting along, making friends and coping skills.[529]

At 9:00 AM curricular activities would start and continue till 10:30 AM, after which children would have 30-60 minutes for break. This time block is used to go to the toilet, to eat snacks, to socialize informally and play. Afterwards, the curricular activities continue till 13:30 PM, when adults come to school to meet

529 Elder, Glen H., Jr. (1969 Feb) *Peer Socialization in School, Educ Leadership,* 26, 5, 465-473, Retrieved from http://www.ascd.org/ASCD/pdf/journals/ed_lead/el_196902_elder.pdf

children, as primary school children are not allowed to leave the school unaccompanied by a trusted adult, who had not been introduced to their teachers in advance. This schedule remains throughout the elementary grades. The following pie-chart represents the temporal distribution of subjects within the curriculum.



Image 2. The temporal distribution of subjects within the 4th grade curriculum

Curriculum regulates pupils' education over time by splitting the skills and knowledge to be learned into segments and organizing it over time. Such organization of knowledge into levels of increasing difficulty allows teachers to test all pupils at the end of each level, to compare and rank pupils' competency and to regulate the rate of development of each child through the curriculum. Consequently, standard expectations for children's achievement over time can be

developed and individual pupil's deviation from the standard can be traced. And so schooling keeps the score on the speed and success of pupils' 'becoming' competent and allows for prediction of the future progress based on past records.[530]

It is possible to further split the curriculum activities according to their temporal orientation. History and Religion can be interpreted as *'explicitly past-oriented'* lessons, because during these lessons children learn about past experiences, events, traditions and values. It doesn't mean this knowledge can't be linked or applied to their present and future via proper didactic methods. However these subjects obviously invite to reflect on the past of humanity, locate oneself at a particular point at a temporal continuum and feel rooted in a certain group of people with shared pasts and values. Certain didactic methods can potentially stimulate children to link historic knowledge and religious wisdom to their present life-contexts and to anticipate and plan the future through the lens of the past narrated. This aim can be reached, for instance, by means of critical discussion. Nevertheless, in the class, I observed, the didactics of History and Religion lessons were mostly focused on memorization and recollection of the historical facts and religious beliefs. The children's questions could potentially open up a discussion and help to link it to the present

The *'Implicitly past-oriented'* group of lessons refers to the disciplines, such as Italian, English, Mathematics, Geography, which are not overtly focused on the past, but invite children to memorize a set of historically established rules, already explored and described structures, for instance anatomical, geological or geographical, and discoveries that happened in the past. This body of information certainly equips children as cultural participants. However, when this information

530 Lee, N. (2001) *Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty.* Buckingham: Open University Press.

is not practically explored and experimented[531] and/or linked to the children's present context, it can be hardly transformed into future knowledge, because a lot of information learned in this didactic way is likely to be easily forgotten. Moreover, a big supply of memorized information is somewhat less relevant than it used to be, with a vast amount of information at our digital fingertips. In fact, I happened to hear few times children's comments: "We studied it a few months ago and I remember almost nothing about it now"; or "Why do we have to memorize it, I can look for it on the Internet", "Why can't we use (computers) tablets at school".[532] As for the languages, these subjects can be approached in a creative, future-oriented way, but in reality, lessons of Italian and English were mostly filled with memorization of grammar, spelling rules and words. However, children were often given the creative writing assignments by the teacher of Italian.

The *'Implicitly present-future-oriented'* group of subjects refers to Music, Physical Education, Arts and Design lessons. Physical exercise as organized school classes is useful, both from the viewpoint of the pupils' long-term biological and psychosocial development and from the viewpoint of their spatio-temporal orientation in the present. *Spatiality* is a reality sensed as form, volume or depth,

531 Children, in the class I observed, are hardly involved into experimenting activities. Teachers explain it with the lack of provision with the necessary materials. There are no facilities to explore experientially the knowledge children are invited to memorize. In fact, parents are required to provide children with the personal hygiene products, such as toilet paper, soap and napkins, because school can't afford to supply children with them.

532 Children's homes are better equipped with ICT, than the school. Their classroom are equipped with an interactive whiteboard (IWB), which could offer a shared multimedia experience under teachers' supervision, not an individual one. Technology lessons are formally included in curriculum, but in reality, the school was not equipped to provide children with ICT lessons and no time was given for development of the ICT skills. Moreover, one teacher told me, while we had an informal discussion , that, even the school were supplied with IWB, teachers were not instructed how to use them appropriately, thus, they had to learn it by trail and error. The teacher expressed her regrets about teachers' lack of technical skills resulting in a very limited application of IWB. Neither maintenance was provided for IWBs, in case some expensive component of IWB was broken, there were no funds to change or fix it.

while *temporality* corresponds to a direct knowledge of the duration of different events and actions undertaken by man. It connects children through the movement to the present moment and stimulate future-oriented strategic thinking. Moreover, if it is organized in a form of the team game, it develops cooperation, agency and social skills. Physical activity connects individuals to the present via movement, likewise, Music and Art link children to the present moment via sound and image. Music and Art engage children with their emotions, stimulate emotional intelligence and imagination, dramatically increase absorption in the present moment in the feelings, thought processes, and sensory awareness. If science and technology explores questions of "what" and "how," the arts offers us ways to confront the intangible, to contemplate the "why," to imagine, to create and to innovate.

> The arts are teaching understanding and expressing the qualities of human experiences. Through music, dance, visual arts, drama and the rest, we try to give form to the feelings and perceptions that move us most as human beings: our experiences of love, grief, belonging, and isolation, and all of the currents of feeling that constitute our experience of ourselves and of others.[533]

Embodied school time and power relationships. Most educated, literate adults today are entirely unaware how deeply literacy has changed and formed the very structure of their lives and how much time they pass involved in an abstract world of ideas. Children do not take part in this world until they learn to read and become educated, which means that they only bit by bit absorb the symbolic universe of the adults. Biological adulthood, which starts with puberty, and

533. National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education (NACCCE) (1999) *All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education*. Sudbury, Suffolk: DfEE Publications. http://sirkenrobinson.com/pdf/allourfutures.pdf

symbolic adulthood, which is socially recreated in children, are not synchronized.[534]

Child culture, before it was introduced to reading, was a deeply oral culture in Ong's sense.[535] Schooling originated the transformation from oral to literate childhood culture. Spoken words inevitably involve the bodily activity and communication. Even absolute motionlessness in verbal communication can be a powerful gesture. Schooling originated the transformation from oral to literate childhood culture. Psychologically, this shift in the means of knowledge communication, from listening to reading, reorganised the child's world.[536] Reading distances the "concrete operational" children from the social, conversational, and tactile experiential fields of learning and introduces them into the sphere of hidden images, abstract ideas, and lone-working activity. Furthermore, as Ong argues, literacy provides a shift in cosmology—the very manner the child comprehends the universe.[537]

> Living in texts requires the metamorphosis of the active, lived body into a sleeplike appendage of the mind. Lived time is no longer tied to perceived events but to the turning of a page, or a clock on the schoolroom wall.[538]

The teacher's disciplining strategies are mostly concerned with children's bodies/movements, emotions and informal verbal exchange. Very often these strategies highlighted the 'becoming' nature of children. Teachers often explain

534 Simms, E.M. (2008) The child in the world: Embodiment, time, and language in early childhood. Detroit: Wayne State University Press: 219

535 Ong, W. J. (1982) *Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word.* London and New York: Routledge.

536 Egan, K. 1988. *The educated mind: How cognitive tools shape our understanding.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

537 Ong, W. J. (1982) *Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word.* London and New York: Routledge.

538Simms, E.M. (2008) *The child in the world: Embodiment, time, and language in early childhood.* Detroit: Wayne State University Press: 221.

their disciplinary strategies with concerns about children's development. For instance, the teacher's request not to bring chewing gum to school is accompanied with warnings about the future health consequences of chewing it, rather than with the teacher's personal dissatisfaction about children chewing it: “If somebody doesn't obey me and keep chewing on chewing gum, he or she will have a stomach-ache”.

The tendency of children to move on their chairs is also addressed numerous times with disciplinary requirements accompanied by the promises of the future health problems and spine conditions for those who don't sit still. In reality, time at school is a major contributor (47%) to all non-screen sedentary time.[539] Trying to reduce school-based sedentary time may be beneficial for children's health and ability to learn. Higher levels of physical activity have been linked to improved cognitive function and perceptual skills, IQ, academic achievement, verbal tests, and mathematics scores.[540]

Teachers are free to drink water and hot drinks and eat snacks whenever they wish. Whereas children are not allowed to eat or drink during the lessons, only at half-hour recess. Drinking water is perceived as a distraction from learning time. However, research has demonstrated that children offered extra water showed better results to visual attention tasks,[541] while a low fluid intake disrupts

539 Knowles, R., & Ridley, K. (2010). *Sedentary behavior in the school setting. ACHPER Active & Healthy Magazine*, *17*(3/4), 17-19.

540 Active Healthy Kids Canada (2012). *Is active play extinct?* The Active Healthy Kids Canada 2012 Report Card on Physical Activity for Children and Youth. Toronto: Active Healthy Kids Canada: http://dvqdas9jty7g6.cloudfront.net/reportcards2012/AHKC%202012%20-%20Report%20Card%20Long%20Form%20-%20FINAL.pdf (accessed October 5, 2016).

Knowles, R., & Ridley, K. (2010). Sedentary behavior in the school setting. *ACHPER Active & Healthy Magazine*, *17*(3/4), 17-19.

541 Edmonds CJ & Burford D (2009) Should children drink more water?: The effects of drinking water on cognition in children. Appetite 52(3): 776-9.

cognition and mood. Another recent study investigated the beneficial effects of drinking supplementary water during the school day on the cognitive function and feelings of fatigue or vigour, in 168 children aged between 9 and 11 years from Sardinia.[542] Results showed that a significant proportion of children were in a state of mild dehydration at the beginning of the school day (84%). The auditory number span of children was significantly reduced according to the level of dehydration, suggesting that drinking extra water at school may improve short-term memory.

Children's bodies in school's space and time provided the major evidence of the inequality of the adult-child power relationships in the educational settings. Children are unequal in the opportunity to move their growing bodies, craving for the movement, while the teachers move freely all the time. Such basic body needs as going to a toilet have to be negotiated publicly with a teacher that usually responds to these request in a restrictive tone: "Go fast to the bathroom, because I will not let you go later."; "We've started the lesson only an hour ago and you already want to go to the bathroom."

According to Bourdieu[543] schools generate particular forms of bodily control and expression which can serve to obtain from children and adults forms of consent that the mind could otherwise refuse.
As Bourdieu outlines it,

> all seemingly totalitarian regimes grant to collective corporeal practices, which help to somatize the social by symbolizing it, and aim at reinforcing

542Fadda R, Rapinett G, Grathwohl D, Parisi M, Fanari R, Calò CM, Schmitt J (2012) Effects of drinking supplementary water at school on cognitive performance in children. Appetite 59(3):730-7

543Bourdieu, P. (1988) *'Program for a sociology of sport'*, Sociology of Sport Journal, 5: 1 5 3-6 1 .

> social orchestration through its bodily and collective mimesis.[544]

Bourdieu has described how the development of 'cultural capital' is embodied within children through their learning of specific dispositions, tastes and abilities.[545]

> There is a particular mode of understanding, often forgotten in theories of intelligence, which consists of understanding with one's body. There are a great many things that we understand only with our bodies, at a subconscious level without having the words to say them.[546]

However, Bourdieu's emphasis on the bodily specifics of schooling has not noticeably influenced Western sociologists, who have formulated theories of education which concentrate mostly on language and the mind, rather than on other characteristics of human embodiment.[547] For instance, the sociology of education has been primarily concerned with the multiple relationships which develop between social class, cognitive development, ideology, certification and social mobility. This approach has generated a lot of information about educational settings within societies, yet has also created the vision that schooling is occupied only with the mind, and with the abstract and academic knowledge. This framework can be found in the works of the scholars who consider education to be intellectual development, and who see schools operating to bring dominant ideologies in the minds of pupils. Yet these perspectives ignore the embodied

544Ibid: 161.

545Bourdieu, P. (1986) *`The Forms of Capital'*, in J.G. Richardson (ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, pp. 241-58. New York: Greenwood Press.

546Bourdieu, P. (1988) *'Program for a sociology of sport'*, Sociology of Sport Journal, 5: 1 5 3-6 1 : 161.

547 Shilling, C . (1992) 'Schooling and the production of physical capital', Discourse, 1 3 (1) : 1 - 1 9.

nature of education or the corporeal significance of educational knowledge. Nevertheless, the efforts of teachers to get pupils to dress themselves 'properly', control the time when children can go to the toilet, requirements to sit still and be quiet during lessons, and respect daily rituals. All of these efforts can be considered as evidence that the moving and disciplined body, and not just the talking and listening body, is in the centre of education.

Boredom, Time and School.

> I woke up in the morning and went to the kitchen. I could smell coffee and croissants which my dad had for breakfast. I went to the bathroom and washed my face. There I could sense a pleasant scent of lavender soap and mint toothpaste. I ate my breakfast, enjoying the aroma of biscuits, and sat in my father's car and could hardly bear the smell of gasoline I could sense in the car, but my father's cologne distracted me from it. Then I came to school and it smelled like boredom .[548]

This is the account student M. gave of her everyday experience at school when students were asked to write about scents in their lives. Her words captured, very remarkably, the sentiment that 'school is boring'. When I gave children blank pieces of paper and asked them to complete the sentence "Your school time is_____", the most common answer was "boredom" and "boring." What do we know about the time spent in boredom? A lack of satisfying activity is experienced as boredom. The student who is bored has a difficulty concentrating and maintaining focus on what is going on in the surroundings. The emotion of boredom alters perception of time. Fahlam[549] argues that this complex emotion

548From the Student's Written Assignment

549Fahlman, S. A. (2009). *Development and validation of the Multidimensional State Boredom Scale* (Doctoral dissertation, York University, Ottawa, Canada). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis. Retrieved from http://www.todmanpsychology.org/

consists of lack of attention, disengagement, dissatisfaction, altered time perception and blemished vitality. Boredom, compared to anger, for example, is a silent emotion, Suárez-Orozco calls it the "elephant in the classroom". [550]

Academic emotions may be divided in two groups: positive - enjoyment, hope, and pride; and negative -anger, anxiety, hopelessness, shame, and boredom.[551] There are usually no assessment procedures or interventions for boredom in schools. Educators usually do not consider negative emotions, nevertheless, academic emotions are crucial for educational process. Academic emotions condition students' motivation, learning strategies, self-regulation, and school success, some authors call them 'achievement emotions'.[552] Children often verbally express this emotion in class, however, teachers don't pay attention to it, they tend to blame it on laziness or on the student's personality. Recognition of the emotion of boredom is usually denied: "How can you be bored? Don't you have a work to do?", or "I never want to hear this word in the classroom again!"

Subjective perception of time can play an important part in experience of boredom.[553] A lesson that is perceived as boring may make an impression as if it lasts longer than an interesting lesson. The student is more likely to experience the lesson as boring, when participation in it requires more effort over a longer period of time. The perception of time could also play a role in whether or not a student

550 Suárez-Orozco, M. (2013, September 19). The elephant in the (class) room: Three ways to close the global education gap. U.S. News Opinion. Retrieved from http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/09/19/3-ways-to-combat-boredom-and-close-the-global-education-gap

551 Pekrun, R., Elliot, A. J., & Maier, M. A. (2009). Achievement goals and achievement emotions: Testing a model of their joint relations with academic performance. *Journal of Educational Psychology, 101* (1), 115–135.

552 Pekrun, R., Goetz, T., Frenzel, A. C., Barchfeld, P., & Perry, R. P. (2011). Measuring emotions in students' learning and performance: The Achievement Emotions Questionnaire (AEQ). *Contemporary Educational Psychology, 36* (1), 36–48.

553 Danckert, J. A., & Allman, A. A. (2005). *Time flies when you're having fun: Temporal estimation and the experience of boredom*. *Brain and Cognition, 59* (3), 236–245.

can maintain motivation when working on school tasks. Time perception involves both duration and speed of passage.[554] If the student feels that the task has taken less time than was estimated, the student may be more motivated to continue working, and may even experience the task as enjoyable. When students are bored they can't engage fully in the activity offered, this results in the perceived slow passage of time.[555] The student's attention is absorbed by the passage of time rather than the lesson. The passage of time becomes overwhelming and the student feels as though time passes extremely slowly. In the class I observed children often referred to me to ask what time is it, especially during the last our of the school day. There were no wall clocks, and they couldn't trace time independently, yet, their attention was getting more and more consumed by paying attention to the passage of time.

Focusing on the internal and external causes of boredom can help to manage misbehaviour and school dropout. Wasson suggested that boredom may be caused by inattention. Mindfulness training teaches students to attend in the present moment and may help to decrease boredom.[556] Mindfulness training has been proven to develop attention and self-regulation.[557] Research showed that integrative body-mind training, in which participants focused on their breathing, could improve sustained attention.[558]

554 Sucala, M., Scheckner, B., & David, D. (2010). *Psychological time: Interval length judgments and subjective passage of time judgments. Current Psychology Letters, 26* (2), 2–9. Retrieved from http://cpl.revues.org

555 Eastwood, J. D., Cavaliere, C., Fahlman, S. A., & Eastwood, A. E. (2007). *A desire for desires: Boredom and its relation to alexithymia.* Personality and Individual Differences, *42* (6), 1035–1045.

556 Jha, A. P., Krompinger, J., & Baime, M. J. (2007). Mindfulness training modifi es subsystems of attention. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7 (2), 109–119

557 Tang, Y., & Posner, M. I. (2009). Attention training and attention state training. Trends in Cognitive Science, 13 (5), 222–227.

558 Tang, Y., Ma, Y., Wang, J., Fan, Y., Feng, S., Lu, Q., … Posner, M. I. (2007). Short-term meditation training improves attention and self-regulation. PNAS, 104 (43)

MacLean, K. A., Ferrer, E., Aichele, S. R., Bridwell, D. A., Zanesco, A. P., Jacobs, T. L., Saron, C.

Systematically unaddressed or denied boredom shifts response control of the brain to the reactive lower, emotional brain and interrupts the firing of neurons in the prefrontal cortex that forms long-term memory and directs executive functions,[559] which can lead to further discipline disruption in the classroom.

Finding themselves within the homogenized curriculum, they have no control over, that dispenses facts to be memorized without providing time for discovery, the pupils feel bored and unable to connect to content through their present curiosity, strengths and interests. The students who express feeling of boredom at school tend to describe it as an experience of being trapped and having no choice. At home children have more choice of how to spend their time, and consequently feel more free, while at school, students experience little or no control over their time. When I ask children in informal conversation: "why do you come to school", "what is education for?" Their answers can be divided in two predominant groups, which illustrate students' disengagement and lack of sense of agency related to the learning process: "because somebody (parents, grandparents, teachers) demand it from me", or "because I need it for my future (job, earning money, etc.)". When I say: "I understand how important it is for your future life and I also would like to know how do you experience you present at school", one student answers as follows: "Let's say I live my present at home and in different places after school, but not in the classroom."

Learning process which doesn't engage the present of a student tend to be deeply unpleasant and frustrating experience.[560] Italy's dropout rate is the fourth highest

D. (2010). Intensive meditation training improves perceptual discrimination and sustained attention. Psychological Science, 21 (6), 829–839.

559 Arnsten AF, Wang MJ, Paspalas CD. (2012) *Neuromodulation of thought: flexibilities and vulnerabilities in prefrontal cortical network synapses.* Neuron;76:223–239. Retrieved from www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

560 Martin, M., Sadlo, G., & Stew, G. (2006). *The phenomenon of boredom*. Qualitative Research in Psychology, *3* , 193–211.

in Europe at 18.8 percent,[561] and in Sardinia is the highest in the country.[562] The Italian government has set aside €100 million in European and national funds for programs that are intended to keep kids interested in staying in school.[563] Research suggests[564] that giving students choices can help them to cope better with boredom.

The negative impact of boredom, however, is not limited to children"s engagement with learning, it is suggested that the stress of sustained or frequent boredom correlates with neurophysiologic changes that impact cognition, memory, social, emotional behaviour and over time, it increases the risk for other medical conditions. When boredom is experienced chronically, it affects both children's present and future.[565]

The well-being of teachers and students requires replacing passivity with action and reflection. Freire expresses a language of hope and a pedagogy of possibility and emancipation, so each person can own his or her history and construct his or her own life. Freire's concept of education as transformative action are best expressed in his own words:

> We dream of a school that, because it is serious, it is dedicated to a form of competent teaching, a school that also generates happiness. What there is of

561 Italian Dropout Rates Feed a Vicious Cycle: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/italian-dropout-rates-feed-a-vicious-cycle.ht
Dispersione scolastica, a Sassari e Cagliari il (triste) record italiano: http://www.sardiniapost.it/cronaca/scuola-sassari-cagliari-citta-italiane-alta-dispersione-scolastica/ (accessed 5 October 2016)
562 Il dossier Dispersione di Tuttoscuola: http://www.tuttoscuola.com/cgi-local/disp.cgi?ID=33308
563 Italian Dropout Rates Feed a Vicious Cycle: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/06/italian-dropout-rates-feed-a-vicious-cycle.html
564 Martin, M., Sadlo, G., & Stew, G. (2006). *The phenomenon of boredom*. Qualitative Research in Psychology, *3* , 193–211.
565 Boredom in School and its Effects on Your Child's Health http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jenifer-fox/boredom-in-school-and-its_b_200602.html

> seriousness, even painful, intensive work, in the process of teaching, learning, and knowing, does not transform this task into something sad. On the contrary, the joy of teaching/ learning should accompany teachers and students in their constant yearning for joy and knowledge. And we dream of a school that is in reality democratic, that attends for this reason, to the interests of underprivileged children.[566]

The Need for Speed and School. Acceleration of time affected education too. Time has become a scarce and precious resource. Teachers are struggling with scheduling it, using it, preserving it, they explained, constrained to face difficult choices of how to allocate scarce time. Some teachers are dissatisfied with having to do unpaid extracurricular paper-work in their time outside the school.

Teachers often express feeling of stress— even despair— caused by bureaucratic and time pressures. It corresponds to Hargreaves' observations about postmodernity. He suggests that teachers in postmodern society must deal with accelerated changes in the workload, time constraints, and the structure and organization of teaching that are driven by the need to prepare students for life in the global economy. Teachers explain that they feel they are not sufficiently adapting to the meteoric pace of change and that they felt insecure and guilty about it. Hargreaves[567] asserts that feelings of guilt often trigger defensiveness and aggression in teachers, and usually do not motivate to improve.

I observed that in rare cases, when children are given the choice and a degree of control over the learning process, it can be abruptly taken away. For example, the teacher of Music invited children to choose the song they are going to sing, while they are negotiating among peers, she assigns them with the song children liked

566 Freire, P. (1993). *Pedagogy of the city.* New York: Continuum: 150.
567Hargreaves, A. (1994). Changing Teaching, Changing Times. New York: Teachers College Press.

the least. Or the teacher of English, invites them to choose didactic activity, and while children are deciding, she changes her mind, and makes a choice for them. Decisions to skip discussions and elaborate children's choices are often explained by the lack of time: “Children, you have to be faster!”, or “Fast, fast, the end of the lesson is soon!”, “Move!”.

Teachers are often concerned with wasting valuable time doing nothing. It’s essential to accept that during the pauses, teachers and students are not “doing nothing.”[568] Students may be comparing different alternatives; they may be busy with associations, comparisons, and contrasts. Their processing becomes more creative and deeper. When a teacher rushes through a lesson, she is concerned with the quick and efficient delivery of information, but students may not assimilate the information very well.

The speed at which we can elaborate information differs from person to person.[569] Some people process auditory data very fast, while others are characterized more by visual or sensorimotor strengths. Generally speaking, when there's more time available to process information, the quality of our thinking and learning improves. Independent of their age, when students are given a little more time to process information, they learn better.[570]

By taking mindful pauses, teachers can allow for both themselves and students necessary time. Usually, teachers wait after they formulate a question before they pick somebody to respond. Typically, this interval is just around one second long. Students who are faster in thinking and dealing with information find themselves in a more advantaged position. They raise their hands without hesitation. While the fast students are answering the question, the slower students are still

568Idem.

569Droit-Volet, S., Meck, W., & Penney, T. (2007). *Sensory modality effect and time perception in children and adults.* Behavioural Processes, 74, 244-250.

570Jennings,P. A. (2015) *Mindfulness for Teachers: Simple Skills for Peace and Productivity in the Classroom*, W. W. Norton, New York, NY.

processing the question, so they may not hear and grasp the answer or have the capacity to integrate it. When the speedy pace of the lesson persists, slower students may feel left behind.

Whereas educational researchers have demonstrated that if the interval between the teacher's question and the student's reply is three to five seconds long, student behaviour changes significantly.[571] Students offer more correct answers, which are longer and more elaborated. "I don't know" or non-answer responses become less frequent. Eventually, higher levels of student engagement are reached,[572] while test scores increase and school drop-out levels go down.[573]

Wait time positively affects teachers, too. Wait time, when used consciously, favour more varied and flexible questioning strategies of teachers, as well as follow-up questions stimulating more thorough information processing and higher-order thinking.[574]

Robert Stahl [575] described *eight categories of wait time*.

- *The time between a teacher's question and the student's answer,* as we described it above.

571Rowe, Mary Budd. "*Wait Time: Slowing Down May Be a Way of Speeding Up*." AMERICAN EDUCATOR 11 (Spring 1987): 38-43, 47. EJ 351 827.

572Swift, J.N., & Gooding, C.T. (1983) I*nteraction of wait time feedback and questioning instruction on middle school science teaching.* Journal of Research in Science Teaching 20(8):721–730.

Honea MJ. (1982) *Wait time as an instructional variable: An influence on teacher and student.* Clearinghouse 56(4):167–170.

573Tobin, K., & Capie, W. (1982). *Relationships between classroom process variables and middle school science achievement.* Journal of Educational Psychology, 74, 441-454.

574Casteel, J. Doyle, and Robert J. Stahl. (1973). *The Social Science Observation Record (SSOR): Theoretical Construct and Pilot Studies*. Gainesville, FL : P. K. Yonge Laboratory School;

Tobin, Kenneth. (1987). "*The Role of Wait Time in Higher Cognitive Level Learning."* Review of Educational Research, 57 (Spring 1987);

Rowe, Mary Budd. (1972). *Wait-Time and Rewards as Instructional Variables, Their Influence in Language, Logic, and Fate Control.* Paper, National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Chicago, IL.

575Stahl, Robert J. (1990). *Using "Think-Time" Behaviors to Promote Students' Information Processing, Learning, and On-Task Participation:* An Instructional Module. Tempe, Arizona State University.

- *Within-student's-response pause time,* a three-second or longer pause that happens when a student stops or hesitates while delivering an answer to a teacher's question. Teachers are inclined to interrupt students when they are processing thought on the way to the answer and stay silent. Yet, when given the time, students often successfully complete their responses after a period of silence.
- *Post-student's-response wait time,* a pause after a student has answered and other students are thinking to add comments or reactions. This pause gives the other students time to reflect on what was said and to choose whether or not they are willing to add something.
- *Student pause time,* a pause a student makes after having initiated a question, argument, or comment before the thought is complete. Formalization of this type of pause helps to overcome the tendency to ignore the question rather than allow some silence. When a student has a thought, idea, or question, getting ready to express it, and her mind goes blank, teachers can give themselves and the student a little time to remember, rather than just skipping it.
- *Teacher pause time,* a pause that the teacher intentionally makes to think of what is happening, evaluate the situation, and choose the best course of action. When the question requires a complex answer, a pause is particularly beneficial, it can contribute positively to student learning.
- *Within-teacher-presentation pause time,* a pause consciously initiated by teacher while presenting information. The teacher intentionally gives students three to five seconds of silence to digest the information and process thought, it's processing time. Employing silence this way, teachers can present the content into bite-sized pieces which positively affects the students' understanding.

- *Student task completion work time,* pause time designed to let students finish an academic task that requires whole attention. It can be challenging because of the differences in completion time among students. Students can use the time to elaborate their thoughts on the subject, if they learn to recognize the value of wait time.
- *Impact pause time,* the introduction of pause time to reach emotional involvement, creating a mood of anticipation. A dramatic silence can awake feelings of anticipation and eagerness.[576]

It is often observed that teachers become excited about delivering their own thoughts and ideas that interrupt students, not allowing for the discussion, for better processing of information and more thoughtful student answers. Wait time can be challenging to practice. However, the benefits of these silence punctuations is that they give teachers and students some time to practice mindfulness. When this is applied intentionally, teachers and students can take the time to observe their bodies in space, the entire classroom, each student, and the small details of the surroundings, in the present moment. Moreover, this inclusive practice can relieve anxiety of the students who tend to process information slowly and of those who usually avoid active participation out of fear of being left behind.

576Stahl, Robert J. (1990). *Using "Think-Time" Behaviors to Promote Students' Information Processing, Learning, and On-Task Participation:* An Instructional Module. Tempe, Arizona State University.

CONCLUSION

Research[577] suggests that 65 percent of children who recently have entered elementary school will end up working in careers that haven't been invented yet. The education system is organized to produce workers for an economy that will not exist when today's students are ready to join the workforce. In fact, teachers widely expressed their concern and perplexity about the future and found it difficult to predict possible future contexts of the students' lives. While the strategies of education applied in this school were traditionally knowledge-based, the teachers thought they were no longer sufficient. A different vision of education, a more future-oriented vision, the one that embraces education for the unknown is much needed. It is important for teachers to be aware of what may "be coming down the pipeline – probable futures".[578] It is crucial for their ability to help students be ready for various changes and for a future where flexibility and adaptability will be required.

On the whole, the elementary school curriculum is dominated with the *'implicitly past-oriented'* lessons with didactic methods focused on memorization and reproduction of the information. The least time in curriculum is given to the *'implicitly present-future-oriented'* activities. It reflects the present reality, when the goal of education in many countries would seem to be structured to set up students *to make a living*, not to prepare them *to live*. Consequently, they must learn more maths, more science and more computers. These are main fields of investment while the arts, music and humanities are underfinanced because they are interpreted as having little utilitarian use, even though many important

577 Davidson, C. (2011). Now you see it: How the brain science of attention will transform the way we live, work, and learn. (New York: Viking press)
578 Fullan, M. (2001b) *Leading in a Culture of Change*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

learning outcomes can be associated with arts education.[579] It is more politically convenient to get huge amounts of money "to finance accountability processes than to support those things that make us more human."[580]

The general framework of teaching in the school corresponds to what Nick Lee[581] refers as education of 'passive becomings' and Paulo Freire[582] as 'banking' concept of education. Teachers are engaged in transmission of information in front of the class, while children had to obediently receive it. Curriculum activities of the elementary school are profoundly influenced by the "traditional" idea of knowledge as *content*, information and skills organized to form the "subjects" or "learning areas" of the school curriculum. According to this model, the learner's job is to absorb and integrate provided knowledge into their mind and prove how well they have done this through various tools of assessment.

In her research on social class and hidden curriculum, Jean Anyon[583] observed that poor inner-city schools implement a more rigid and controlled disciplinary regulation and disregard higher-order cognitive skills in favour of memorization and recollection compared to more affluent schools. Thus, students in poor schools usually use their learning time for repetitive tasks instead of creativity, knowledge production, or critical thinking, while upper-class schools focus more on critical and creative thinking and offer more permissive environment. These temporal practices can, consequently, undermine poor students' opportunities in a

579 Harland, J., Kinder, K., Lord, P., Stott, A., Schagen, I., Haynes, J., Cusworth, L., White, R. and Paola, R. (2000) *Arts Education in Secondary Schools: Effects and Effectiveness.* National Foundation for Educational Research: The Mere, Upton Park, Slough, Berkshire, UK.
580 Stoll, L., Fink, D., & Earl, L. (2003). *It's about learning and it's about time.* London: Falmer Press: 12.
581 Lee, N. (2001) Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty. Buckingham: Open University Press.
582 Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.). New York: Continuum
583 Anyon, J. (1980). *Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work.* Journal of Edu-caution 162 (1): 67-92.

competitive fast-changing world.

Twenty-first century realities demand shifts in the traditional roles followed by learners and teachers, these roles need to be negotiated and re-examined. Also, there needs to be a greater focus on recognising and working with students' strengths and resources, and re-evaluating teachers' role in facilitating the development of every student's potential. The idea of sharing power with students can be met with suspicion, especially if it's interpreted as giving students absolute freedom to choose the direction of their learning. The challenge is to think about how students and teachers would work together in a "knowledge-generating" learning environment and to structure roles and relationships in ways that relies on the resources and knowledge of each in order to best assist learning.