L’inganno assurdo. Linguaggio e conoscenza tra realismo e fallibilismo

“The absurd deception. Language and knowledge between realism and fallibilism” The hypothesis according to which the external world is nothing but a mere fiction has been frequently discussed in philosophy. From Platonic shadows to Descartes' evil genius and Putnam's uncanny 'Gedankenexperiment' of the brains kept alive in vats filled with nutrient fluids, philosophers have been tackling the idea that we are unconsciously and totally deceived. To hold this hypothesis true or false has a direct bearing on our conception of the world and the knowledge we could gain about it: in fact, we may feel inclined either to subscribe to a hardcore realism which envisages a gap between the world and our cognitive faculties – leading to a sort of radical skepticism –, or a 'weaker' realism which can warrant a genuine knowledge. The latter perspective is the one favored in the book, where the skeptical hypothesis according to which the world is unknowable turns out to be not only false, but even absurd. Besides, the recovery of the possibility of knowledge is tempered by the acknowledgment that our best theories might be mistaken. Thus, realism and fallibilism turns out to be interwoven. This is revealed in the book analyzing some of the key-concepts of philosophy (world, truth, knowledge) and discussing the thought of some relevant philosophers (Peirce, Wittgenstein, Popper, Putnam, Rorty, Nozick).